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ABSTRACT 
 
The growth of the fund management industry is an important part of China’s financial 
development. The contractual form of fund management companies (FMC) organisation in 
China presents a variety of industry- and country- specific governance issues in addition to 
the conventional agency problems associated with modern corporations. The lack of fund 
investor’s voice in the governance of FMC, coupled with a regulatory environment with weak 
enforcement of investor protection, heightens the need for effective FMC governance in 
protecting the interests of fund investors. Board effectiveness is usually considered in the 
literature as the central internal governance mechanisms to enhance investor protection. 
Therefore, how to improve FMC board effectiveness is critically important, and a better 
understanding of what makes the board of directors effective is vital to addressing some major 
agency issues faced by the burgeoning fund industry in China. 
It is widely accepted that given the right institutional conditions the quality of corporate 
governance can enhance firm performance in conventional firms. Having good FMC 
performance is vital to attract and retain the interests of investors. There is however conflict 
of interests between FMC and fund investors because fund fees enrich FMC but can harm the 
interest of fund investors with poorer FMC performance. Examining how FMC performance 
may be enhanced by the quality of corporate governance therefore provides important clues to 
addressing the governance issues inherent in the fund industry.  
Using panel data of 288 firm-year observations covering more than 98% of FMC in 
China from 2006 to 2010, this study presents the first in-depth systematic investigation on 
how the quality of corporate governance may matter in determining board effectiveness and 
financial performance of the contractual form of FMC organizations by investigating evidence 
from China where institutional and regulatory environment is quite different from those of 
funds in the U.S.   
Using corporate governance index as the measure of overall quality of corporate 
governance to examine how corporate governance affects FMC performance, the results of 
empirical tests in this study suggest that corporate governance quality is important in 
determining FMC performance.  
14 
 
In examining how key internal governance mechanisms affect FMC board effectiveness 
and financial performance, we find that FMC with a listed controlling shareholder 
significantly enhances board effectiveness and improve FMC performance compared to those 
FMC with non-listed controlling shareholder. It could be explained that when the controlling 
shareholder is a listed company, high governance standards demanded of those controlling 
shareholders exert a significant positive impact on the effectiveness of FMC board and the 
functioning of governance mechanisms, thus enhancing FMC performance.  
 Even though the presence of foreign ownership in FMC increases FMC fees, the 
presence of foreign ownership substantially enhances FMC performance especially when 
using risk-adjusted returns as proxies to measure performance. Findings of this study also 
shows that the concentrated ownership in FMC has no impact on board effectiveness but 
harms FMC performance. It could be argued that having more diverse FMC shareholders 
from different financial background such as banks, insurance companies, and investment 
companies would facilitate access to more expertise and information, and greater capacity to 
identify and appoint qualified fund managers to attain good FMC performance.    
This study finds that larger board has no effect on board effectiveness but harms FMC 
performance, affirming the ineffectiveness of board size in China and the higher coordination 
costs impacting negatively on FMC performance. The proportion of independent directors is 
found to have no impact on either board effectiveness or FMC performance. With its 
concentrated ownership among FMC and shortage of qualified independent directors in China, 
it is unlikely that independent directors plays an effective role in monitoring and control, thus 
resulting in ineffectual board independence in China’s current circumstance. 
While the presence of female senior executives is found to enhance FMC board 
effectiveness, the impact of female senior executives on FMC performance is not found. We 
found increasing number of females on board have no impact on board effectiveness but 
actually damages FMC performance. It suggests that having more female members on the 
board just for the sake of “Guan Xi” or “Gender diversity” would not enhance board 
effectiveness but is likely to incur costs. In China, the appointing of female and male is 
probably subject to the same shortcomings and constraints of the existing governance 
processes so that superficial diversity measures makes little difference.  
This study shows the presence of remuneration committee could enhance board 
effectiveness but has limited power to influence FMC performance. While the presence of 
remuneration committee can help better align of interests between senior officers in FMC and 
15 
 
fund investors, it plays negligible role in retaining Chinese fund managers because of the high 
turnover rate in Chinese fund managers.  
The number of FMC supervisors does not enhance either FMC board effectiveness or 
FMC performance. This affirms the general expectation that under the current environment 
supervisors are generally ineffective in performing their roles in China.   
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: First, presenting 
a systematic study with empirical evidence on the functioning and quality of corporate 
governance and its impact under the contractual form of FMC, this study extends the literature 
on the governance of fund companies beyond the focus of the corporate form of FMC, and 
provides new perspectives and findings in an area of research much neglected in the literature.  
           Second, this research represents a step forward from the extant studies focusing on how 
board characteristics and composition in fund companies by investigating a wider range of 
relevant governance mechanisms that affect board effectiveness which other studies have not 
attempted. For instance, this thesis incorporates governance mechanisms such as shareholder 
profile and shareholding structure, the role of the supervisory board, and presence of 
remuneration committee to capture more accurately the realities of the Chinese financial and 
regulatory systems.  
Third, applying corporate governance scores to proxy for the overall corporate 
governance quality of FMC, this thesis is a first study to investigate the link between the 
governance rating and FMC performance.  
Fourth, a set of unique but important variables is introduced in this study to which the 
literature has given relatively little attention. For instance, we test the impact of the presence 
of female directors, top executives, or board chair on board effectiveness. In fact, influence 
from female as top executive or board chair in general has not been studied at all in China 
even in the context of the non-FMC corporate boards.  
Fifth, we use 5-year panel data while most of the existing studies usually on U.S. fund 
industry only use one-year data. The advantage of using panel data is the ability to control for 
individual-specific, time-invariant, unobserved heterogeneity, the presence of which could 
lead to bias in standard estimators like OLS. Finally, our data cover nearly all FMC that 
together account for more than 95% of AUM of the fund industry in China. Selection bias is 
therefore minimised. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
There is general anticipation for a country’s fund industry to play an important role not only 
in capital market development (Klapper, Sulla & Vittas 2004) but more significantly as an 
active shareholder of investee firms to enhance corporate governance of those investee firms. 
Therefore, with fund management companies (FMC) as a major institutional investor, the 
corporate governance of FMC is vital to ensuring its ability to play such important role.  
Corporate governance issues in the contractual form of FMC in China are usually more 
complex and intense compared to the more conventional public companies and corporate 
form of FMC in U.S. as explained in Chapter 5.2. However, research on how fund 
management companies are governed is scant. This thesis presents an analysis of the 
effectiveness of the board of director as the key internal governance mechanism of Chinese 
FMC in ameliorating the misalignment of the interests between FMC and its fund investors. 
The literature on fund management industry in the West has traditionally concentrated more 
on fund performance than governance. There are relatively limited studies on board 
effectiveness of mutual funds in the U.S., and very little is known about board performance of 
FMC in China. FMC performance is the key for protecting fund investor interest, and board 
effectiveness is often seen as vital to enhance performance. 
This study explores how governance mechanisms help protect the interests of fund 
investors. It provides an in-depth analysis of the governance problems under the contractual 
form of FMC in China, and investigates how governance mechanisms in FMC affect FMC 
board effectiveness and financial performance, contributing new perspective, insights, and 
new empirical evidence to the literature.   
1.2 Research Motivation and Objectives of the Thesis  
Given the significant important role of fund investors could play in capital market and the 
governance of investee firms, the quality of FMC governance is vital to playing such a role 
effectively. None of previous studies so far provide empirical studies on the governance 
issues of Chinese fund companies which differ from the U.S. mutual fund in terms of 
organizational structure and operating environment. The major motivation of this thesis is to 
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investigate the quality of governance in contractual form of Chinese fund companies and its 
impact.  
The contractual form of FMC in China’s emerging fund industry presents some 
complex governance issues in addition to the conventional agency problems associated with 
modern public corporations.  This issue arises from the conflict of interests between FMC and 
fund investors arising from fund fees, lack of direct representation of fund investors in FMC, 
and operating under a regulatory environment with weak enforcement of investor protection. 
Given the vulnerable position Chinese fund investors place, how to protect the interests 
of fund investors are vital to the healthy development of fund industry. It is well documented 
that emerging economies like China do not have well developed external governance 
mechanisms, such as the necessary market competition and social institutions, well-designed 
regulatory regime and efficient law enforcement (Kakabadse et al. 2010; Khanna & Palepu 
2000; Peng 2003; Tam 1999).  
China’s FMC organisation form and the institutional and regulatory environment are at 
distinctly early stages of development compared to the more advanced economy such as the 
U.S. (Tam & Yu 2011). The generally ineffective external governance mechanisms therefore 
make internal governance mechanisms particularly important in protecting the interests of 
fund investors.  
Studies on U.S. mutual fund also provide ample evidence that internal corporate 
governance can play a crucial role in protecting the interests of fund investors (Adams et al. 
2010; Chou et al. 2007; Ferris & Yan 2007; Gompers et al. 2001; Wallison & Litan 2007; 
Wellman & Zhou 2007). There are however few studies on corporate governance of FMC in 
emerging countries like China where the fund management industry has only gradually gained 
importance in the financial system. 
 Commonly regarded as the central internal governance mechanism, the board of 
directors is charged with the responsibility of protecting the interests of fund investors. 
Superior board performance is expected to lead to reduction in fund fees, and improve fund 
performance in most studies of the U.S.(Ferris & Yan 2007; Khorana & Servaes 2004; Kong 
& Tang 2008; Meschke 2007). In China, board effectiveness is particularly important as fund 
investors are not shareholders and there is lack of direct representation of investors in FMC 
governance. The board is required by Chinese law to put the interests of fund investors ahead 
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of FMC shareholders who control board of directors’ appointment, compensation, and tenure 
(Article 45, ‘Codes of corporate governance for FMC’).    
With a common feature of concentrated ownership in Chinese FMC, most of the board 
members especially the position of CEO or chairman are more likely to be appointed by the 
controlling shareholders. The question therefore arises whether these insiders could represent 
the interests of fund investors rather than FMC shareholders especially when there is a 
conflict of interests between fund investors and FMC shareholders. In most cases, the 
controlling shareholder in China’s fund industry is the ultimately state, but the state’s dual 
role as owner and regulator raises agency problem of how to motivate and monitor 
government appointed insiders to maximum the interests of fund investors in selecting, 
disciplining, and motivating management.  
The role of board independence has received heightened attention after every financial 
crisis. This is particularly the case in the fund industry. For instance, SEC of the United States 
has required at least 75% of a FMC board be comprised of independent directors and 
chairman independence after the scandals of the late 1990s and early 2000s (Article 1(a)(7), 
2004. “Investment Company Governance,” by Securities and Exchange Commission.) But in 
China where there is a lack of qualified independent directors (ID), their role and their 
independence have been questioned all the time (Kakabadse et al. 2010; Yuan & Yuan 2007). 
Therefore, whether independent directors could perform their assigned functions to represent 
the interests of investors in fund industry is worthwhile to investigate.  
Given the complex and intense corporate governance issues in Chinese FMC, how to 
improve FMC board effectiveness is critically important in China, and a better understanding 
of what makes board of directors’ effective is vital to addressing some major agency issues 
faced by the burgeoning fund industry in China. This study contributes to the literature by 
examining how governance mechanisms matter in the development of an effective and well-
functioning board in FMC.  
FMC performance is the key for fund investors, enhancing performance is vital to 
attract and retain the interests of investors. FMC therefore would be willing to enhance their 
performance to attract fund investors in order to increase their AUM so that more revenues 
could be earned. Examining how fund performance may be enhanced by the quality of 
corporate governance therefore provides further clues to addressing the agency issues inherent 
in the fund industry. Most literature studying the corporate form of U.S. mutual funds shows 
that corporate governance matters in fund performance. However, to what extent overall 
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corporate governance quality is related to FMC performance in China is unknown. This study 
fills a gap in the literature by examining how the totality of FMC internal governance 
mechanisms affects FMC performance under the contractual form of fund industry in China 
where institutional and regulatory environment is quite different from those of funds in the 
U.S.   
Even though the relation between the overall corporate governance quality and FMC 
performance is found, how specific internal governance mechanisms work is still unknown. It 
is widely accepted that different internal governance mechanisms may have different effect on 
performance. It is therefore worthwhile to identity and assesses what are the effective 
governance mechanisms in Chinese fund industry. 
In brief, this study aims to contribute to literature by providing an empirical analysis of 
how governance mechanisms enhance board effectiveness and FMC performance; it is the 
first systematic study on the corporate governance of Chinese FMC.  Our study sheds light on 
understanding the corporate governance of fund companies under the contractual form in 
China.    
 
This dissertation will address two major research questions:  
(1) How do specific internal corporate governance mechanisms impact on board 
effectiveness?  
(2) How does the quality of FMC corporate governance affect FMC performance?  
 
In examining the governance practices in China’s fund industry, this thesis constructs a 
panel of 288 firm-year observations from 58 FMC (98% of Chinese FMC) and 2700 funds 
from 2006 to 2010, which covers more than 95% of industry’s AUM in China. This thesis 
provides an in-depth analysis of the agency problems under the contractual form of FMC in 
China, and investigates how governance mechanisms in FMC affect FMC board effectiveness 
and financial performance. The thesis presents the first systematic study to investigate how 
governance settings work in Chinese FMC, which can provide insights for FMC to improve 
their internal corporate governance, and consequently at the macro level, they will gain 
increased ability to implement their expected functions in the capital markets and corporate 
governance of investee companies.  
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised as shown in Figure 1. Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature in 
corporate governance, which provides a theoretical foundation for identifying and analysis of 
key governance issues in the Chinese fund industry. The role of institutional investors in 
capital market development is examined to outline the important role they could play in the 
international context. In Chapter 3, various key corporate governance mechanisms in China 
are investigated. Chapter 4 presents an overview of FMC evolution and importance of FMC 
in China, which offers a foundation to understand the environmental context and issues of 
fund industry in China.  
Chapter 5 starts by analysing agency problems in Chinese FMC, and then develops 
hypotheses to be empirically tested in Chapter 7 and 8. Chapter 6 presents the data set 
employed throughout the thesis, and the methodology used for the analysis in this thesis. The 
empirical tests are performed through Chapter 7 and 8. Chapter 7 examines the impact of 
specific governance mechanisms on board effectiveness, using FMC total expense ratio as a 
measure of board effectiveness. Chapter 8 presents an examination of the impact of 
governance quality on FMC performance. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis, summarising the 
main findings, emphasizing the major contributions of the study and outlining future research 
directions.  
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                                             Figure 1: Thesis outline. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a theoretical background of corporate governance for a better 
understanding and analysis of corporate governance of Chinese FMC. Theories of corporate 
governance including agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory and 
global governance theory are explored. Board effectiveness as the central governance 
mechanisms is discussed. The role of institutional investors in capital market development 
and corporate governance of investee firms are highlighted. Corporate governance in Asia is 
also reviewed to better understand the business environment context for Chinese FMC.  
 
2.2 Corporate Governance in general 
“Corporate governance influences how the objectives of the company are set and achieved, 
how risk is monitored and assessed, and how performance is optimised1.”“The central issues 
of corporate governance involve who controls the corporation, who makes the critical 
strategic decisions, who is responsible for those decisions, and who has claims against the 
revenues and assets of the firm” (Rubach 1999). Understanding the principles and issues of 
corporate governance is therefore important to making enterprise perform better and in a way 
that is consistent with the interest of its key stakeholders. As discussed in Chapter 4.2, in 
terms of the corporate form of FMC in China where fund investors are not FMC shareholders, 
it is critically important that the interests of fund investors be protected because it is more 
likely for FMC shareholders to exploit fund investors’ interests given the inherent conflict of 
interests between FMC shareholders and fund investors.   
Corporate governance issues for publicly listed companies are well known and 
extensively researched. Whereas corporate governance problems of State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) are the subject of a growing literature in recent years (Dong Sung & Fei 2012; Ho et 
al. 2011; Shen & Lin 2009), the corporate governance of FMC is however not as well 
understood in general, and poorly researched particularly in emerging economies like China. 
In order to understand the role of corporate governance in the context of FMC in China, 
                                                 
1 ASX corporate governance council, 2010, report about “Corporate governance principals and recommendations 
with 2010 amendments” 
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corporate governance issues are reviewed and China corporate governance reforms are 
discussed.  
 
2.3  Definition and Issues of Corporate Governance 
A number of definitions of corporate governance are outlined here to highlighting its possible 
meanings in the context of FMC in China.   
a. ‘Corporate governance’ is used by Richard Eells, probably for the first time, in his book 
of  “The Governance of Corporations” in 1962 (Eells 1962). 
b. ‘The purpose of corporate governance is to minimize the total cost in aligning managers 
and shareholders’ incentives, and in unavoidable self-interested managerial behavior 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). ’  
c. Corporate governance, according to one definition in the West, is the system or process by 
which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury 1993 ). 
d. Farrar (2001) suggests that ‘Corporate Governance’, in its narrower and most usual, sense 
refers to the companies’ legislation but it is not only at legal control but also de facto 
control of corporations.  It also involves accountabilities, from many dimensions such as 
legal restraints, self-regulations and best practices (Farrar 2001). 
e.  ‘Corporate governance is ‘an umbrella term that includes specific issues arising from 
interactions among senior management, shareholders, boards of directors and controlled.’ 
(Cochran & Wartick 1994).   
 
Conflict of interests arises between shareholders and management as a result of the 
separation of ownership and control in modern corporations with dispersed ownership and 
professional managers (Berle & Means 1932). Companies are therefore exposed to agency 
issues due to self-serving managers seeking their personal interests at the expense of those of 
shareholders (Fama & Jensen 1983). Because of information asymmetry with managers 
having more superior information about the firm and its prospects than investors, this 
encourages managers to divert funds in various ways away from those who inject equity 
capital in the firm. Lower profitability and dividends, poor investment allocation and low 
productivity may be the result of failure to address these corporate governance problems 
(Davis 2002). 
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The aim of corporate governance is to improve firm performance and reduce the 
conflicts of interests between different parties within the company (OECD 1998). Corporate 
governance mechanisms are employed to mitigate these issues, reduce agency costs and 
safeguard shareholders’ interests (Bebchuk et al. 2009).   
It has been argued that companies with the perception of better corporate governance 
gain more trust from investors and in general enjoy a lower cost of capital and higher market 
valuation than others (Bai et al. 2004). Notable corporate scandals such as Barings Bank, 
Enron, HHI and WorldCom, and the recent bank failures in the Global Financial Crisis 
highlight the urgent need to strengthen corporate governance practices (Mallin 2010 ). 
As explained in more details in Chapter 4.2.3. of this thesis, FMC are established to 
offer different types of fund for various investment objectives. Fund investors are not FMC 
shareholders and have contractual relationship with FMC through the fund they buy. 
Therefore, fund investors are the key stakeholders to be looked after.  The effectiveness of 
corporate governance within the FMC is therefore extremely important to protect the interests 
of investors in fund industry.   
Agency relationships and governance settings are becoming more complex when 
corporate structures vary significantly from their conventional organizational and financial 
forms and from country to country (Dharwadkar et al. 2000; Hu & Izumida 2008) 
Most studies in the literature focus on corporate governance of publicly listed 
companies. Major players in a country’s financial system such as FMC have quite different 
organizational structures and corporate governance issues compared to public companies. The 
corporate governance issues of FMC are less understood and researched as academic research 
has lagged behind the phenomenal growth of the fund management industry. As will be 
discussed in the following Section, China’s fund management industry is new and has 
developing with huge potential to play a key role in the country’s financial development.  
 
2.4 Theories of Corporate Governance  
It has been argued that a wider range of theoretical perspectives to corporate governance can 
help recognize the  mechanisms and structures that might enhance organizational functioning 
(Daily et al. 2003). As Mallin (2010 ) states, “the development of corporate governance is a 
global occurrence and, as such, is a complex area including legal, culture, ownership, and 
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other structural differences. Therefore, some theories may be more appropriate and relevant to 
some countries than others, or more relevant at different times depending on what stage on 
individual country, or group of countries, is at.” 
The dominant theoretical perspective applied in the corporate governance literature is 
agency theory (Shleifer & Vishny 1997), but increasingly studies in psychology and 
sociology have suggested theoretical limits of agency theory. Major concerns have been 
raised because the assumption in agency theory that all managers are individualistic, 
opportunistic, and self-serving may not hold for all managers (Davis et al. 1997; Hirsch et al. 
1987). Other theoretical perspectives are often intended as complements rather than 
substitutes for agency theory (Daily et al. 2003).  
Agency theory asserts that the primary goal of corporate governance is to protect 
shareholders against management expropriation (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Agency theory 
offers a solid foundation to explore the relationship between an owner and a manager in a 
stylized modern firm, and between shareholders and management in listed firms. In this study, 
the agency perspective will provide the main theoretical framework to examine the 
relationship between fund investors, shareholders and management as discussed in Chapter 
5.2 
 
Agency Theory 
The concept of agency theory originates from Adam Smith (Smith 1937) who points out that 
a manager as an agent of the owner is more likely to be negligent or to act in self-interest. 
Berle and Means (1932) suggest that the structure of “a public corporation” was likely to 
cause problems of ownership and control. As a result of separation of control rights and 
shareholding, managers may act in their own self-interest instead of the interests of the 
corporation. In other words, opportunistic managerial decision-making could adversely 
impact company performance. This gave rise to agency theory that was further developed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) who posit that senior managers are 
individualistic and seek to maximize their own utility may misuse corporate assets for their 
private benefit and at the expense of shareholders.  
Eisenhardt (1989) identifies two major categories of problems in agency relationship. 
The first is agency problem itself rising from the conflict of interest between principal and 
agent. Agency costs occur due to the diverge interests between principal and agent and the 
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costs to identify or mitigate theses agent inopportunity behaviors. The second problem is due 
to a conflict of risk sharing arising from the differences between principals and agents’ risk 
preferences. As a result, principals and agents may prefer different actions to mitigate risk.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) state that it is because of the distinct divergence of interest 
between shareholders and managers that leads to the owner-manager conflict of interests. This 
view is supported by Denis (2001). For instance, shareholders want to maximize the share 
value, whereas managers take advantages of their position in the company to seek other 
personal goals such as their power and recognition. It is thus vital to align the interests of 
managers to those of the principals in order to minimize agency costs. However, it is argued 
that due to asymmetric information and imperfect contracts, existence of managers’ moral 
hazard problem and adverse election behaviour would lead to agency costs (Fama and Jensen 
1983; Cult 2001)   
Agency costs are incurred when the delegated agent extracts private benefits during the 
course of firm operation, given information is asymmetric behavior (Jensen & Meckling 
1976). “The problem is that most future contingencies are hard to describe and foresee”, so 
that complete contracts between principal and the agent are technologically infeasible 
(Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Therefore, an unwanted agency cost occurs when management 
actions conflict with shareholder interests because of the presence of conflicts of interest and 
asymmetry information though the existence of contractual relationship between agent and 
principal. Such would be the case when managers put their own interests ahead of an owner’s 
interests (e.g., manipulating short-term earnings.) 
Based on the assumption of widely dispersed ownership of corporations, much of the 
literature focuses on agency problems that exist between managers and shareholders due to 
free rider problem, asymmetric information, and imperfect contract (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; 
Tam 1999). Corporate governance mechanisms could help align the actions and choices of 
managers to those of shareholders (Daily et al. 2003; Guay et al. 2002).  
Whereas in countries with concentrated ownership, the fundamental agency problem 
may no longer be between shareholders and managers, but rather between minority investors 
and controlling shareholders. Principal-principal agency problem is prevalent in countries 
such as in Japan, Germany and China where ownership concentration is common (La Porta et 
al. 1998). Agency problems could be reduced by the presence of blockholders who have 
greater incentive and more power to monitor management (La Porta et al. 1998; Shleifer & 
Vishny 1986). Nevertheless, expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth could also be 
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prevalent in firms with concentrated ownership, but those expropriation technology will be 
less efficient if sufficient key mechanisms are in place through legal system (La Porta et al. 
1999; Shleifer & Vishny 1986).  
It is generally accepted that both internal and external governance mechanisms are used 
to mitigate agency costs. Internal mechanisms usually includes an effectively structured board 
(Fama & Jensen 1983; Hermalin & Weisbach 2003; Mallin 2010 ; Singh & Vinnicombe 2004; 
Smith et al. 2004; Srinidhi et al. 2011), executive compensations (Guay et al. 2002; 
Krawcheck 2012),  concentrated ownership holdings (Burkart & Panunzi 2006; Holderness 
2003; Mishra 2011), shareholder activism (Becht et al. 2008; Romano 2000); and external 
mechanisms such as competitive capital and labour markets (Daily et al. 2003; Fama 1980), 
acquisitions, divestitures, and ownership amendments (Davis et al. 1997), auditor quality (Liu 
& Lai 2012) and monitoring by business media (Bednar 2012; Core et al. 2008; Dyck et al. 
2008; Johnson et al. 2005) to control self-serving managers.  
The role of the mass media in corporate governance is one recent development in 
literature (Bednar 2012; Core et al. 2008; Dyck et al. 2008; Johnson et al. 2005). Finding of 
those studies imply that media could be viewed as an effective external mechanism to 
minimize agency costs by reducing “information asymmetry” between a firm’s management 
and outsider shareholders, and “inflicting reputational costs on firms and managers that act 
contrary to shareholder interests” .  
Walsh and Seward (1990) argue that internal mechanisms are generally preferred 
because of the expense incurred from external mechanisms. However, the impact of corporate 
governance devices appears to be ineffective when the governance environment and 
protection of shareholders are weak which is more prevalent in emerging markets like China 
(Dharwadkar et al. 2000; Setia-Atmaja 2009; Young et al. 2008).  Given the vulnerable 
position Chinese fund investors have, how corporate governance mechanisms work in 
Chinese fund industry is clearly worthwhile to investigate.  
Agency theorists label all motivations as self-serving, and assume that principal-agent 
interest divergence arises because all managers are individualistic, opportunistic, and self-
serving (Jensen & Meckling 1994). However, organizational relationships may be more 
complex than depicted held under agency theory, and propositions of agency theory may not 
apply in all situations (Davis et al. 1997). Knapp et al. (2011) argue that agency theory 
provides “a parsimonious view of what motivates human behaviour (i.e., economic utility), 
but it largely overlooks other extrinsic motivators, such as affiliation or belonging”. Therefore, 
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exclusive reliance upon agency theory has been considered undesirable and additional theory 
is needed to explain what situations/conditions interests of principal-managers to be aligned 
(Davis et al. 1997).  
In a sample of 1064 firm-year observations from 14 EU countries over 1999-2003,  
RendersGaeremynck (2012)’s finding suggest that agency theory fail to consider the national 
institutional context, which is highly relevant for the quality and effectiveness of corporate 
governance practices.  
 
Stewardship theory  
 “Stewardship theory has also garnered researcher’s attention, both as a complement and a 
contrast to agency theory” (Daily et al. 2003). Unlike agency theorists who view executives 
and directors as self-seving managers, stewardship theorists regard them as “frequently 
having interests that are isomorphic with those of shareholders” (Davis et al. 1997). 
Stewardship theory views human nature as altruistic, compared to agency theory that view 
human nature as opportunistic (Donaldson & Davis 1991).    
There are many situations in which managers (executives, directors and senior officers) 
conclude that serving shareholders’ interests also align their own interests (Lane et al. 1998). 
Under the stewardship model of man, stewards maximize their utility as they achieve 
organizational rather than self-serving objectives and short term opportunistic behaviour.  In 
other words, managers place interests of organizations ahead of individual self-interests, and 
there is trustworthy behaviour in managers (Hernandez 2012).  
Managers acquire reputations on the basis of the financial performance of their firms 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990). Therefore, senior managers (executives and directors) want to 
maximize financial performance indicators, including shareholder returns to protect their 
reputations. Managers effectively managing their own careers by working effectively for the 
organization (Fama 1980). Davis et al. (1997) extends previous stewardship theory by 
introducing new reasons from psychology and sociology perspectives. First, they suggest that 
managers who pursuit self-achievement, job-satisfaction and self-actualization may be 
motivated by maximizing organizational profits rather than personal benefits. Besides, 
managers who are highly committed and royal to organizational values are also more likely to 
serve the best interests of organization rather than self-interests. Finally, if a manager’s 
philosophy is based on involvement and being trustworthy (Davis et al. 1997), it would be 
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more likely to have a principal-steward relationship rather than principal-agent. Caldwell et al. 
(2002) argue that managers perform fiduciary obligations in protecting the interests of 
stakeholders and believe they are morally obliged to maximum those interests.  
Rousseau (1989) and Housseau & Tijoriwala (1999) state that the perceived obligations 
by managers under a psychological contract between managers and organization are found to 
have a greater impact than do formal and explicit contractual agreements that managers 
perform the interests in organizations rather than private interests.  Donaldson (2008) point 
out stewardship theorists contend that feelings of autonomy and responsibility motivate 
employees to perform in the best interests of organization rather than self-serving. Hernandez  
(2012) proposes that individual sense of obligation and responsibility is in part due to their 
emotional link to the beneficiaries of their decisions. From a psychological perspective, he 
state that “individuals’ willingness to subjugate their personal interests to behave in ways that 
serve long-term well-being of these beneficiaries”.  
Under those reasons, managers are more likely to act in the best interests of 
shareholders and maximize shareholders’ interests. Accordingly, Hernandez (2012) points out 
that “control mechanisms may be not only unnecessary but also counterproductive” 
However, there are criticisms of the stewardship theory. For instance, Jensen and 
Meckling (1994) argue that “stewarship’s approach of model of man is a simplification for 
mathematical modeling and its human behavior assumption is unrealistic”. Davis et al. (1997) 
argue that “the complexity of human behavior is not well explained and considered in 
stewardship theory”. Knapp et al. (2011) contend that stewardship theory focuses on how 
human nature shapes managers’ behaviours, but managers’ social context is largely 
overlooked.  
 
Resource dependence theory (RDT) 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) develop the resource dependency theory (RDT) that argues 
“organizations would act in self-interest, trying to gain access to, and ultimately control over, 
needed resources”. RDT recognizes that organizational behaviors are influenced by external 
factors; however, firms could reduce environmental uncertainty and dependence (Hillman et 
al. 2009). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) propose five actions that managers can adopt to 
minimize environmental dependences: “megers/vertical intergration, JVs and other 
interorganizational relationships, boards of directors, political action, and executive 
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succession”.  Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) and Hillman et al. (2009) provides a detailed 
review of those five perspective. This dissertation will focus on the perspective of board of 
directors.  
It is argued that resource dependency theory (RDT) paves a foundation for directors’ 
resource role (Hillman et al. 2009). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggests that directors could 
bring four benefits to organizations:  
“(a) Information in the form of advice and counsel, (b) access to channels of 
information between the firm and environmental contingencies, (c) preferential access to 
resources, and (d) legitimacy.” Pfeffer (1972) asserts that board members’ contributions 
enable firms to minimize dependence or gain resources.  
For example,   
“Outside directors who are partners in a law firm provide legal advice, either in board 
meetings or in private communication with firm executives that may otherwise be more costly 
for the firm to secure; outside directors who are also executives of financial institutions may 
assist in securing favorable lines of credit. The provision of these resources enhances 
organizational functioning, firm performance, and survival (Daily et al. 2003).”     
Pfeffer (1972) finds that those with greater interdependence on firm’s environment 
require a higher ratio of outside directors. He concludes that board size and composition are 
rational organizational responses to the conditions of the external environment.  
It is generally accepted that Guanxi which define as a social and business relationship 
network is the key factor to conduct successful business in China (Hellstrom 1997; Kao 1993; 
Luo 1997; Seligman 1999). Guanxi is not only properly associated with mainland China, but 
also associated with those economies where Chinese culture is dominant Taiwan, Hong Kong 
or Singapore. Compared with Western business culture where contracts is widely used as the 
governing authority, Chinese business culture is based on respect and care and more concern 
for the benefits of members of the entire network (Ai 2006). Ai (2006) concludes that 
“Guanxi relationship, with their unique code of conduct, will always be an ingredient of doing 
business in China.”   
Literature on corporate finance using RDT to study the function of board, and to explore 
the relationship between board characteristic and composition and firm performance as an 
indicator of a successful resource dependence strategy. Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 
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(1999) document board size positively related to firm financial performance. Pearce & Zahra 
(1992) state that “board size and composition are contingent not only on the external 
environment but also on the firm’s current strategy and prior financial performance”. Pfeffer’s 
(1972) find that board composition largely depends on resources provided by the board 
members and the need of the firm. Boyd (1990) point out that increasing board size may not 
always work but resource rich directors should be the focus of board composition. Thus, it is 
not just the number, but the type of directors on the board that matters (Hillman et al. 2009). 
Former government officials bring value to corporate boardrooms (Hillman 2005; Hillman & 
Hitt 1999). Kor & Misangyi (2008) document top management’s levels of industry 
experiences negatively associated with the board’s collective levels of industry experiences. 
“This suggests that the board supplements top management with vital advice and counsel”.  
As discussed in Chapter 3.3.3, given that in China the board of directors are highly 
influenced by dominant shareholder who are in charge of appointment and removal of 
members on board of directors, it is generally accepted that board are unable to discipline and 
punish shareholders, leading to ineffectiveness of board of directors in Chinese context 
(Rajagopalan & Zhang 2007). Most studies in the literature document that board size has no 
impact on firm performance in Chinese firms. (Hou & Ren 2003; Li 2009; Song et al. 2009; 
Wang & Deng 2006). However, a majority of the literature also find that larger proportion of 
independent directors enhances firm performance in Chinese listed companies (Ma 2008; 
Wang et al. 2008; Yang 2007b; Zhao & Zeng 2008). Peng (2004) documents that resource-
rich outside directors are likely to enhance firm performance, whereas resource-poor outside 
directors could not. It indicates board composition adjusts to meet firm’s environmental 
demands.  
Hillman, et al. (2007) find that firms with specific forms of environmental dependencies 
are more likely to increase board diversity. They found the likelihood of female participation 
on board of directors is significantly influenced by organizational size, industry type, firm 
diversification strategy, and network effects (linkages to other boards with women directors).  
Studies also find that the need to change board composition is followed by the change of the 
firm environment (Boeker & Goodstein 1991; Lang & Lockhart 1990).  
In a sample of 405 publicly Chinese listed firms and 1211 company–years, Peng (2004) 
suggests that outsider directors do make a difference in firm performance. He documents that 
resource-rich outside directors relate to firm performance positively, where resource-poor 
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outside directors are not, suggesting that board composition need to change to meet new 
environmental demands.  
Based on a sample of 102 US electric firms and following resource dependence theory,  
Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al. (2012) find that director interlocks (serve on multiple directorship) 
with suppliers providing business knowledge-intensive services are associated with the 
adoption of proactive environmental strategies.  
Do outside directors on corporate boards make a difference to firm performance? 
Agency theory suggests that a board comprised of a greater proportion of outside directors, 
due to their presumed independence, may theoretically lead to better firm performance 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, empirical studies report 
that overall, there is little significant relationship between outside directors and firm 
performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Consequently, Dalton et 
al. (1998: 285) argue that ‘consideration of multiple theories [beyond agency theory]... may 
lead to a more complete understanding. ’  
This view is consistent with Chancharat et al. (2012) ’s argument that “no one theory 
clearly dominates the others in determining governance outcome” in their paper examining 
how board structural mechanisms influence firm survival in “new economy” Australian firms. 
They suggest “crucial elements of agency theory, stewardship theory, and resource 
dependence theory work in a complementary fashion to determine the optimal board 
composition for new economy firms”. 
 
Global theory of corporate governance  
Judge (2012) points out that it is important to identify a rigorous and relevant theory of 
corporate governance that could apply the global economy, and he argues the importance of 
considering national and industry context which could influence governance behaviour and 
outcomes  
Carver (2010)  argues that there is a lack of a theoretical base for board governance 
despite its crucial function they could play. Judge (2011b) thinks that Carver’s (2010) paper 
“introduces a new perspective on the need for conceptual coherence in the board's role, 
practices, and relationships --- a perspective worthy of being called a global theory of 
governance”. 
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Judge (2011b) argue that “universal  theories, such as agency theory, fail to consider 
national and industry-level context as many institutional researchers do, is insufficient given 
substantial firm heterogeneity within a national context”. He believes a global theory that 
considers multiple levels of analysis, national-level factors as well as firm-level factors, and 
he suggests that “multiple-level “meso” studies of corporate governance will prove to be most 
influential in future research”.  
Using an sample of 15,648 firms from 47 countries from 1996 to 2007, Chen (2011a) 
finds that firm value is enhanced in countries with more effective legal system or stricter or 
greater control of corruption. They suggest country level legal system and control of 
corruption play important roles in determining firm value. In addition, they suggest internal 
agency problems could be reduced by the reinforce effect of securities law and control of 
corruption.   
Judge (2011a) point out that “a global theory of corporate governance must account for 
national level differences in the effective enforcement of national laws and regulations.” 
Boytsun et al. (2011) documents that countries’ informal rules such as social norms and 
cohesion play an important role on firm-level corporate governance. Their findings suggest 
social norms and values could be considered as external corporate governance mechanisms. 
There are still ongoing debates on which theory offer the best way to study and understand 
corporate governance.   
While there is an increasing interest seeking to create a “Global Governance Theory” 
(Chen 2011a; Judge 2011b), it is still a new theory at an initial stage to be developed. 
Following the extant literature in corporate governance of fund management companies in 
Western studies (Ferris & Yan 2009; Wellman & Zhou 2007), this study will apply the 
agency theory to examine the relationship between fund investors, shareholders and 
management.   
 
2.5 Effectiveness of Board of Directors   
Corporate governance addresses the nature of interactions and relationship between the firm 
and its stakeholders in the process of decision making and control over firm resources. The 
boards of directors is the link between fund investors and managers, and board effectiveness 
is essential to establish and exercise good corporate governance practices and maintain a 
sound investor-management relations (Mallin 2010 ; Monks & Minow 2000). The extant 
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literature highlights that the globalization and liberalization of financial markets, high-profile 
financial and accounting scandals, and stronger demands for accountability and transparency 
have placed the duties and functioning of board of directors at the center of the corporate 
governance debates and reforms (Ingley & Van der Walt 2005; Kiel & Nicholson 2003; 
Pugliese et al. 2009).  
Academics, investors and others have put increasing emphasis on the importance of 
independent directors. Independent directors as outsiders who are relatively free from conflict 
of interest is expected to be able to raise their voice against management. However, even in a 
relatively mature capital market in the West with well-written regulations and proper 
enforcement, to what extent independent directors could perform their role is often unknown. 
For instance, a very experienced director (William George, former CEO of Medtronic and a 
veteran of ten corporate boards) with chief executive background offers an insider’s 
perspective that it is a challenge to play the anticipated role as an independent director 
because of information asymmetry, limited engagement with the company,  limited industry-
specific knowledge and the dominant position management have in board (George 2013).   
In principle, the board of directors are accountable to shareholders in implementing a 
governance system, and shareholders are in charge of appointing qualified and effective 
directors to the board (Cadbury 1993 ). It is generally accepted that board of directors have 
two main roles: control (appoint, supervise and remunerate senior executives, reporting to 
shareholders, and ensuring compliance with the law) and direction (endorsing the firm’s 
strategies and develop directional policy) (Bhagat et al. 1999; Farrar 2001; Monks & Minow 
2000). Given the significant role of the board in the corporate governance of Chinese FMC 
and the special vulnerable position of Chinese fund investors, what mechanisms and structure 
are used to keep the directors accountable to the fund investors is an important subject for 
investigation and better understanding.  
The majority of works in the existing literature on board of directors has been 
dominated by the well-known agency theory perspective (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Jensen 1993). Researchers following this track commonly emphasize the 
formal incentives and control mechanisms, with a focus on what the optimal composition and 
structure of board of directors  (Weir & Laing 2003), what the appropriate role of board of 
directors should be (Pugliese et al. 2009), how to set an appropriate level of compensation and 
incentives for independent directors (Bryan et al. 2000; Gerety et al. 1999; Yermack 2003), 
and how board of directors may protect shareholder interests from opportunistic and self-
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serving managers through bonding or monitoring activities, particularly in situations where 
contracts are incomplete (Van Ees et al. 2009).  
This study investigates what specific governance settings could enhance board 
effectiveness in Chinese FMC and how the quality of corporate governance many impact on 
FMC performance.  
 
2.6 Corporate Governance in Asia  
Corporate governance approaches vary across different institutional environments, reflecting 
differences in historical, political, industrial, culture context, traditional financing options, 
corporate ownership patterns, and legal origin (Aguilera  & Jackson 2003; Hua et al. 2006; 
Lubatkin et al. 2005; Weimer & Pape 1999; Zattoni & Cuomo 2008). “These contextual 
elements are relevant for efficient corporate governance because they help in reducing the 
uncertainties associated with economic transitions” (Burki 2012).  
Asian countries are a diverse group, with a range of economic, legal and political 
systems (OECD 2011) (Table 1). As discussed in Chapter 2.2.4., Concentrated ownership is 
prevalent in Asian countries, and the fundamental agency problem is no longer just between 
shareholders and managers, but rather between minority investors and controlling 
shareholders (La Porta et al. 1998).  
Legal protection affects the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder’s 
incentives to monitor (Burkart & Panunzi 2006). La Porta et al (1998, 1999) further find that 
ownership is, on average, more concentrated in countries with poor legal investor protection. 
Due to the absence of sound legal system (legal regulation and enforcement), ownership 
concentration could be a substitute for legal protection, so that only controlling shareholders 
could obtain adequate investment returns (Burkart and Panunzi 2006; La Porta et al 1999). 
Further, firm level corporate governance can substitute country-level shareholder protection in 
emerging markets in reducing the cost of equity (Chen et al. 2009b).  
Corporate governance is contingent upon the presence of formal and informal 
institutions (Tam 2002). Under business environments where formal institutions are either 
weak or non-functional due to legal or market imperfections, Asian firms rely considerably on 
informal institutions such as business groups and networks in reducing uncertainty and 
enhancing reliability between social and business factors (Hitt et al. 2002; Khanna & Palepu 
2000).  
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Table 1: GDP, Market Capitalization, Listed Companies in Asian Roundtable Economies, 2010 
 Jurisdiction            GDP (2010) (USD  Market Capitalisation             
Market 
Cap/Nominal GDP    Number of all  
 Billions, PPP)   (USD millions)     Listed Companies 
Bangladesh* 244.33  46 999 47% 302 
China** 10 085.71  4 762 836 81%  2 063 
Chinese Taipei** 821.78   818 490 190% 784 
Hong Kong, China* 326.23   2 711 333 1208% 1 413 
India* 4 198.60  3 228 455 210% 6 586 
Indonesia** 1 029.79   360 388 51% 420 
Korea** 1 417.54  1 089 216 108% 1 798 
Malaysia* 414.43    410 534 172% 956 
Pakistan* 464.20    38 168 21.80% 644 
Philippines*  367.43   157 320 78% 253 
Singapore* 291.94   647 226 291% 778 
Thailand** 586.82   277 731 87% 541 
Vietnam**  276.57     20 385 19.70% 164 
  Source: OECD report “Reform Prioritied in Asia: Taking Corproate Governacne to a Higher Level”, 2011.             
*Common law traditions and **Civil law traditions.  
  
Controlling insiders divert resources for their personal use or invest unprofitable 
projects that provide personal benefits (Lemmon & Lins 2003). Controlling insiders increase 
their wealth without sharing full cost of these actions and exploit minority shareholders, 
resulting in agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
Poor corporate governance is widely regarded as one of main reason for the outbreak of the 
1997 Asian crisis (Johnson et al. 2000a). Some empirical studies have shown that corporate 
governance could explain a significant fraction of cross-firm variation in stock price 
performance during the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 -1998 (Harvey & Roper 1999; 
Johnson et al. 2000a; Mitton 2001, 2002).  
The importance of corporate governance has been widely recognized in Asian countries 
after the Asian Crisis in 1997, an issue not addressed widely before (Harvey & Roper 1999). 
International bodies such as OECD established a code of best practices in corporate 
governance after the Asia crisis to help firms improve their corporate governance pratices. 
After the Asian financial crisis, it was found that East Asian firms and governments were 
conveging towards the presumed more “efficient” Anglo-American model of conducting 
economic activities (Jomo 2004, 2005; Mishra & Bhattacharya 2011; Redding 2005). 
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Over the last decade, most Asian countries have substantially revamped their 
regulations and other formal corporate governance norms. It is now well recoginized by 
regulators, listed companies and asset mangers that good corproate goverannce enhances 
performance, makes companies more attractive to investors and lenders (OECD 2011). 
Companies in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand were leaders in seeting up independent audit 
committee. The family-owned businesses are introducing independent audit committee in this 
development. Nowland (2007) documents that since 1998 the average board independence 
has increased by 30% in countries such as Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and HK.  
Mishra (2011) states that the problems of efficient corporate governance will not be 
eradicated by simply adopting the Anglo-American model. The Anglo-American model is 
characterized as based on having dispersed ownership with a clear separation of ownership 
and control (Choon Yin 2007) and competitive markets for coporate control and senoir 
managers, and products produced by the firm (Tam 1999). Corporate governance mechniasm 
seek to better protect shareholder’s interest from explopriation.  
It is also important to note that the Asian business landscape is dominated by large and 
publiclly traded business firms that are either owned/controlled by families or are a part of 
business group that are embedded in the socio-cultural features (Peng & Jiang 2010). The 
extant literature demonstrates that unique intitutional setting of East Asian countries is 
characterized by the prevalence of family-controlled businesses, close ties between 
controlling families and top executives, relationship-based business networks, and high levels 
of government power and political influence, all of which have been shown to increase 
information asymmetry and earning opacity (Ball et al. 2003; Claessens et al. 2000).  
Local values, beliefs, and attitudes from East Aisa have been ignored by simply 
adopting Anglo-American model (Carney 2005; Yeung, 2006). Adoption of Anglo-American 
model in East Asia where organizational structure and institutions are very different from 
those of U.S. may introduce a plethora of new managerial and organizational problems for 
East Asian firms.  
For instance, Choon Yin (2007) investigates Singapore’s Temasek Holdings Limited 
(THL) , a state-owned enterprises (SOE) in charge the government’s investments in business, 
- find some indications of deviation between corporate governance practices in the THL and 
those advocaed by the Singapore government which is recommended under Anglo-American 
model. Even though THL is required to provide annual reports, there is a lack of regulations 
or rules regarding what to and not to report, and has yet to provide audotor’s report or a 
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detailed balance sheet (Choon Yin 2007). Even though the revised Singapore Code of 
Corporate Governance (2005) strongly recommend the disclosure of exact remuneration of 
key directors, how an entity calculated the base or fixed portion salary of their key executives, 
or how the entire package is determined is missing.  
While stock options plans are generally viewed as an important source of compensation 
to align the interests of principals with that of the agents, THL refuses to adopt that and has 
argued that the stock option plan can encourage manager to misinform the true condition of 
the corporation, causing its share price to rise to allow managers to exercise the call options 
(Choon Yin 2007).  
Rosser (Rosser 2003, 2004) report that conglomerates were opposed to regulatory and 
institutional reform in the Indonisian capital market because they did not want to disclose 
their activities and report accurately. Indonisian government did little to ensure that 
accounting regulations were properly enforced. Hence, as far as converngence to US/UK 
system is concerned, it has been convergence in form rather than substance (Choon Yin 2007). 
In Thailand, regulations to improve transparency were in place but have never been enforced 
(Overholt 1999).  
The high profile corproate scandals involving several large private corporations such as 
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, and Global Crossing in the U.S. and U.K. raised 
converns about the merits of the Anglo-American system.  
 
Ownership  
Asian business system is not similar to the US/UK. One feature of Asian companies is the 
presence of a large and controlling shareholder either by individual, family or state-related 
owner. For instance, the Chinese state held approximately 83.1% of the country’s stock 
market capitalization in 2007 (OECD 2011). A relatively high proportion of firms in East 
Asia are family owned, for example, with families owning ultimate 67.9% of share in South 
Korea, 68.6% in Indonesia, 64.7% in Hong Kong, 52.5% in Maylaysia, 65.5% in Taiwan, 
56.5% in Thailand and 52.0% in Singapore (Caessens et al., 2002). Iyer (1999) reports that 
90% of all private sector Indian business firms are family owned.   
As discussed above, with concentrated ownership, the fundamental agency problem is 
primarily between minority investors and controlling shareholders, and how to protect the 
interests of minority shareholders is vital to the corporate governance. Using a sample of 800 
39 
 
firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on firm value 
during the region's financial crisis in the late 1990s, Lemmon and Lins (2003) find that 
ownership structure influences dramatically how insiders expropriate minority shareholders. 
Love and Rachinsky  (2009) find that in emerging markets such as Russia and Ukraine, banks 
with more concentrated ownership have lower rankings on corporate governance. 
Therefore, in East Asia, it could be argued that there is a significant proportion of 
minority shareholders who have limited power to overturn any decisions made by the 
marjority shareholders. However, adoption of Western practices and adjustments to 
international norms are deemed necessary for Asian firms for reasons of legitimacy, to gain 
access to international markets and global finance (Ahlstrom et al. 2004; Carney 2005).  
In a sample of 1,686 firms from nine East Asian countries, Mishra (2011) find that 
presence of a dominant shareholder is associated with lower risk taking by firms. They 
suggest that the presence of multiple large shareholders help promote a more optimal 
investment policy and enhance internal governance by mitigating agency problems between 
the dominant shareholder and minority shareholders. Using sample of 3992 firm-year 
observations from eight East Asian economies, Haw et. Al., (2011) find that controlling 
shareholders exploit firm opacity through less visible misclassification means to accrue the 
private benefits of control. They also emphasize the importance of sound legal institutions and 
effectiveness of external auiting firms in mitigating misclassification behavior. Francis and 
Wang (2008) find that auditors could play an effective role in mitigating misclassification in 
countries with strong legal institutions.  
In China where concentrated ownership with the presence of state as the dominant 
sharehoder, the major governance problems are associated with the issue of state ownership, 
insider control and the weak enforcement of law and regulations (Tam and Yu 2011).  
 
Related party transaction  
With the prevalent of concentrated ownership structure in Asian countries, how to protect 
minority shareholders is a key issue. Evidence on extensive expropriation of minority 
shareholders and creditors by the controlling shareholders has been unveiled (Gao & Kling 
2008). This expropriation could happen in a variety of forms, for instance, excessive 
executive compensation, loan guarantees, and transfer pricing between related companies, and 
dilution by new share issues (Bai et al. 2004). The term “tunnelling” was introduced by 
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Johnson et al.(2000) to describe asset appropriation by large shareholder (Johnson et al. 
2000b). Tunnelling is more severe and frequently occurred in concentrated ownership firms 
where block-holding shareholders are more likely to transfer assets and profits to themselves 
(Gao & Kling 2008; Johnson et al. 2000b).    
In China, a series of scandals related to assets exploitation by large shareholders have 
been reported frequently, such as the incident of ‘Qiongminyuan’ in 1997 to the scandal of the 
‘Sanjiu Group’ in 2005 (Gao & Kling 2008; Liu & Lu 2007). Those serious corporate 
governance issues could hinder the development of Chinese capital market.  
 
Board of directors  
The functions and responsibilities of board of directors are regulated in very similar way 
across Asia countries and to those of boards in most other market-based economies.  
Key formal duties of the board normally include (OECD 2011):   
1. Call for shareholder meetings, and regular report to shareholders; implement decisions 
from shareholders.   
2. Determine the organization structure of the firm; set up rules and principles for 
company management; select, regularly evaluate, replace senior management; 
determine management tenure and compensation; overseeing succession planning.  
3. Review, guide and approve the financial objectives, major strategies, risk policy, 
annual budgets and business plans, monitoring implementation and corporate 
performance, and overseeing major capital expenditures, merges and acquisitions.  
4. Review the adequacy of the system to comply with all applicable laws/regulations.  
 
One of the important roles of the board is to review and make decisions about related-
party transactions. In many Asian counties, managers could be forced to enter into 
transactions which benefit controlling shareholder but at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Nam & Nam 2004).  It is generally accepted that board independence is essential to exercise 
objective independent judgment. The definition and process of appointing independent 
directors are certainly established on paper. However, the controlling shareholders commonly 
nominate the board, the real objectivity and independence of judgment of independent 
directors members can often be undermined. In addition, even if the independent directors is 
truly independent at the time they are appointed, it is questionable whether independent 
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directors members could raise their voice against controlling shareholders for long period 
when the controlling shareholder is practically in charge of board appointment, compensation 
and replacement.  
Therefore, how to ensure that board exercise its duty of monitoring performance, 
preventing and managing conflicts of interests objectively is a key issue. (Hu & Tam 2012) 
find that 52% of the independent directors in China possess expertise in one or more 
professional fields such as law, accounting, and finance, which is much lower compared to 
87% in Hong Kong.  It is difficult to find competent candidates for independent directors who 
have the relevant knowledge, and experience and are able to devote adequately to their 
independent directors work.  
Improvements in corporate governance can enhance investor confidence in firms in 
emerging economies and increase these firms’ access to capital (Rajagopalan & Zhang 2007).  
Each country is at a different stage of establishing a democratic, market-based economy and a 
corporate governance system. It is important to stress that solutions derived purely from a 
principal-agent perspective may sometimes fail to address the corporate governance problems 
in a different institutional setting. Therefore, an appropriate well designed corporate 
governance system is vital to strengthen economy and socio-economic development. As 
recognized by most scholars of corporate governance, a one-size- fits-all model is probably 
not the right approach to the development of corporate governance system in any country.   
 
2.7 The Role of Institutional Investor in Capital Markets Development and 
Corporate Governance of Investee Firms 
 
With the ever increasing proportion of institutional investors in corporate ownership in mature 
market economies, institutional investors are expected to influence not only the development 
of capital market but also corporate governance of investee firms.  
Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Market 
Institutional investors have traditionally played an instrumental role in capital market 
development. First, it has been pointed out that the major advantage of the presence of 
institutional investors in the capital market is that they provide absorption capacity for the 
issues of public and private debt and equity, thus boosting the rapid development of a 
country’s economy and corporations’ expansion (Franklin & Gale 2001). Klapper et al. (2004) 
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state that securities investment funds also provide investors with effective portfolio 
diversification and professional management at low cost. It is considered particularly 
important where both portfolio diversification and professional management have the 
potential to add value. Bond and money market funds have been boosted by gains in 
transaction efficiency through professional management, tax incentives and regulatory factors 
(Klapper et al. 2004). Further, institutional investors are considered to have better capacity to 
allocate savings more efficiently, and have a profound impact on the structure and functioning 
of the world’s capital market (Blommestein & Funke 1998). More importantly, institution 
shareholding provides a means of channelling finance with typically medium to long term 
horizons, enabling a notable shift away from the more speculative individual shareholding  
(Philip et al. 2001).   
Second, with their sophisticated investment analysts, institutional investors can 
contribute to financial innovations by creating new products, improving the accuracy in the 
pricing of financial assets, and enhancing better clearing and settlement (Kim, 2003). In the 
U.S., despite the recent backlash against the excesses of some financial institutions and their 
products, innovative products invented by institutional investors have played a key role in 
creating the modern financial markets (Fernando et al. 2003). While the recent global 
financial crisis may undermine the merits of some of those supposed benefits, the debates are 
still going on. Third, Klapper et al.(2004) argue that securities investment funds have the 
advantage of relatively higher operational transparency over other financial institutions, such 
as banks, thrifts, insurance companies and pension funds, compared to the service they 
provide for households. Beside, securities investment fund also bears no credit and insurance 
risks, thus no need to be concerned with risks such as non-performing loans. 
More importantly, due to the growth in institutional ownership and influence, 
worldwide institutional investors have the potential to play an important role in investee firms 
in many markets. The Chinese government anticipate that institutional investors could 
stabilize the market by engaging in long term investment, and being an active shareholder for 
investee companies to enhance corporate governance of listed companies.  
 
Institutional Investors’ Activism in Investee Firms 
As institutional investors own large portions of equities in many countries across the world, 
there is an increasing emphasis on the role and responsibilities of institutional investors in 
corporate governance (Mallin 2008). 
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For instance, institutional investor in the U.S. on average held 46.6% of total shares in 
1987, 61.4% by 2000 and 76.4% by the end of 2007. At the beginning of 2010, U.K. domestic 
institutional investors own 43% of UK equity, and overseas shareholders (predominately 
institutional shareholders) own 42% (Mallin 2012). The ownership by international investors 
in Japanese firms rose from 7.7% in 1993 to 28% in 2006, which has significant impact on 
corporate governance in Japan (Mizuno 2010). Croce et al. (2011) report that institutional 
investors in OECD countries managed over USD 65 trillion in assets at the end of 2009. 
Becht et al. (2002) point out that institutional ownership rises significantly due to the growth 
in retirement savings in many countries so that more and more money are being invested into 
pension funds and mutual funds.   
There have been considerable debates worldwide on the effectiveness and desirability of 
institutional investors activism in enhancing investee’ corporate governance and corporate 
performance. Institutional investors with substantial shareholdings in a firm tend to have 
greater incentive and the resources to influence management decisions and monitor corporate 
performance since they are the direct beneficiaries from expected benefits of their active 
activisms (Chung et al. 2002; Shleifer & Vishny 1986). Others studies suggest that 
institutional investors could be effective monitor of the self-serving and opportunistic 
behaviors of managers of investee firms in mitigating the agency problem between 
shareholders and managers, thus strengthening investee companies’ overall corporate 
governance and enhancing firms value in the long term (Chung et al. 2002; Gillian & Starks 
2000; Guercio & Hawkins 1999; McConnell & Servaes 1990). Therefore, according to this 
theoretical perspective, institutional investors will strengthen corporate governance practices 
such as introducing performance-based executive compensation and limiting executive 
bonuses. For instance, it has been shown that institutional ownership concentration is 
positively related to the use of performance-based executive compensation and negatively 
related to the whole level of compensation (Hartzell & Starks 2003).   
 Earlier studies suggest that institutional investors are however in practice often 
incapable of monitoring corporate management efficiently because they are generally short of 
essential professional skills, and the prevalent free-rider problem also hinders their 
enthusiasm in acting actively (Bhide 1994; Coffee 1991; Maug 1998). Others argue that 
institutional investors only choose the firms with good corporate governance to invest in, and 
their limited activism has negligible impact on investee firms (Karpoff et al. 1996).  
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 However, most studies especially in recent years provide different evidence. For 
instance, McConnell and Servaes (2001) find that the percentage of institutional holding is 
positively related to a firm's Tobin's Q. Cox and Thomas (2006) suggest that having the 
advantage over retail investors on litigations give institutional investors incentive to improve 
corporate governance of the investee firms. Invested firms will be more likely to improve 
their corporate governance to avoid the large financial penalty and reputation damage (Cox & 
Thomas 2006; Ferris et al. 2007). Institutional investors are found to “vote with their feet” 
when dissatisfied with a firm’s management, and that notable change of institutional 
shareholding will raise the awareness of board of directors in investee firms to take some 
actions such as replacement of the CEO (Parrino et al. 2003).   
 Using a comprehensive data set of equity holdings from 27 countries on 2000-2005, 
Ferreira & Matos (2008) report that institutional investors are becoming prominent 
shareholders in companies across the world. All institutional investors seek large firms and 
firms with strong governance indications. Findings from Davis et al. (2006) and Ferreira and 
Matos (2008) suggest that institutional investors are becoming more like “shareowners” and 
not just shareholders.  
Chung  et al. (2012) investigates the effect of institutional ownership on improving firm 
efficiency of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). They find that institutional ownership 
can enhance the firm's corporate governance and reduce firm inefficiency. Moreover, they 
document that investment advisors are more effective institutional investors in reducing firm 
inefficiency than other types of institutional investors such as hedge funds and pension funds. 
Findings from Mizuno (2010)  suggest that corporate governance has been enhanced by 
institutional investors in Japanese firms. On a sample of 124 companies from  2006 to 2008, 
Ismail & Rahman (2011) find that institutional investors are more effective in company’s risk 
management disclosure compared to the board of directors. Bushee et al. (2009) documents 
that firms with a high level of institutional shareholding exhibit significant future 
improvements in shareholder rights. They suggest institutional investors could enhance 
corporate governance through monitoring and disciplining managers through explicit actions 
or voting with their fee.  
Analysing institutional shareholders in companies from 23 countries from 2003–2008,  
Aggarwal et al. (2011) document that foreign institutions from countries with strong 
shareholder protection could promote governance improvements outside U.S. They observe 
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that with higher institutional ownership, firms “are more likely to terminate poorly 
performing Chief Executive Officers and exhibit improvements in valuation over time”. 
Therefore, most studies document and suggest that institutional shareholding promotes 
good corporate governance practices worldwide, not only because their activism restraints 
inappropriate behaviours, firms also enhance their corporate governance to attract institutional 
investors’ investment. Institutional investors are expected to be more "responsible" for 
investee firms and engage in longer-term investment.  
In China where capital market is dominated by short-term opportunistic behaviours and 
poor corporate governance of the listed companies, it is urgent for China to stimulate the 
development of fund industry and make them engaging as active shareholders, considering 
environmental and other longer-term risks and by financing long-term, productive activities 
that support sustainable growth and enhance corporate governance of listed companies. The 
Chinese government has indeed recognized this and seems to be promoting the development 
of institutional investors partly because of this (Tam and Yu 2011).    
There is a growing concern regarding the quality and efficacy of internal governance of 
the institutional investors themselves. The key issues associated with the internal governance 
of the institutional investors include transparency, which enables beneficiaries to understand 
that their funds are being handles appropriately; disclosure and management of conflicts of 
interest between institutional investors (fund custodian), fund managers and fund investors 
(Xi, 2006); and oversight structures that are suitably established so that decisions are taken in 
the interests of beneficiaries (Robert, Monks and Nell, 2004). Due to the conflict of interests 
between FMC and fund investors, how to enhance board effectiveness and improve FMC 
fund performance is vital to protect the interests of fund investors.     
 
2.8 Conclusion  
The global financial crisis which began in 2007 has led to a renewed emphasis that corporate 
governance might help improve the situation by restoring investor confidence (Mallin 2012). 
Different strands of corporate governance theories are reviewed in this chapter to explore their 
relevant applications for investigating corporate governance performance of FMC in China. 
Agency theory helps scholars understand the conflicts of interest that can arise between 
principals and agents, and the potential problems from opportunism. This study uses agency 
theory as theoretical perspective to examine whether certain governance settings in Chinese 
FMC could mitigate the conflict of interests between fund investors and FMC.  
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With concentrated ownership, the agency problem is primarily between majority 
shareholder and minority shareholder. Poor investor protection environments increase the 
opportunities for insider to expropriate interest of other major stakeholders. How to protect 
interest of investors is vital in most of Asian economies. The board of directors is widely 
accepted as the central governance mechanism to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders in Asian countries. How to enhance board effectiveness is therefore vital. Given 
the ever-increasing ownership by institutional investors in listed companies, they are expected 
to raise their voice and enhance corporate governance of investee firms. This chapter provides 
a theoretical overviewed and perspective to help identify and examine the major governance 
issues in the Chinese fund industry.  
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CHAPTER 3  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA   
 
3.1 Introduction  
As discussed in Chapter 2.2.4, with concentrated ownership, the fundamental agency problem 
is manifested between minority investors and controlling shareholders, and protecting 
minority shareholders’ interests is key element to effective corporate governance. The state is 
the dominant shareholder in the majority of Chinese listed companies either through direct 
state ownership at both central and local government levels or indirect state ownership 
through shareholding in companies by SOEs and domestic organizations (Hu et al. 2010). 
Government as the dominant shareholder could also use their position to achieve some social 
imperative and political objectives, with detrimental impact on the interests of shareholders 
(Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Therefore, concentrated ownership coupled with the state as 
dominant shareholders introduces many complex corporate governance issues. Both external 
and internal governance mechanisms are needed to mitigate such governance issues.  
This Chapter discusses Chinese corporate governance environment in terms of external 
and internal mechanisms. The role and efficacy of capital market development and legal 
infrastructure as the key external governance mechanisms in China are explored. This chapter 
also investigates in the Chinese context some key features of internal governance mechanisms 
such as the state as the dominant owner with a concentrated ownership, the function of 
supervisory board, and independence of directors. 
 
3.2  External Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
It is generally accepted that external governance mechanisms consist of corporate takeover 
market, financial market development, and the regulatory and legal system infrastructure. An 
active takeover market does not exist in China because of non-tradable share structure 
(Huyghebaert & Wang 2012). Market-driven merger and acquisition (M&A) are still rare 
(Rajagopalan and Zhang 2007). In this Section, the external governance mechanisms mainly 
including financial market development and legal infrastructure are examined.  
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3.2.1 China’s capital market development and its relationship with corporate 
governance reforms  
 
The relationship between corporate governance development and the development of China’s 
financial system are complementary (Tam and Yu 2011). “The development of China’s 
capital market is, to a large extent, determined by the quality of listed companies, which is 
closely linked with corporate governance” (Zhou 2004). Corporate governance is critically 
vital to enhance the credibility and confidence in company management, and is fundamental 
to the development of capital market. Tam and Yu (2011) stress that “well-functioning capital 
market and effective corporate governance at the firm level are widely accepted as mutually 
reinforcing”. For instance, the securities market and its regulation play a crucial role in 
enhancing sound corporate governance practices, although such effects might be constrained 
by poor corporate governance at firm level (Haque et al. 2008).  
Tam and Yu (2011) point out that some key criteria identified by (The Financial 
Development Report 2009  2009) for the necessary institutional and business environment for 
a country’s financial development also belong to the set of essential internal and external 
governance mechanisms that are required for an effective corporate governance system. 
Those criteria include  
• Capital account liberalisation 
• Domestic financial sector liberalisation 
• Extent of incentive-based compensation 
• Efficacy of corporate boards 
• Reliance on professional management 
• Strength of auditing and reporting standards 
• Protection of minority shareholders’ interests 
• Regulation of securities exchanges 
• Property rights 
• Judicial independence 
 
 
Firms with good corporate governance can enhance its ability to access to finance or at 
a cheaper rate and better financial performance than those of firms with poor corporate 
governance (Black et al. 2006; Chugh et al. 2011; Drobetz et al. 2004; Klapper & Love 2004; 
Rezaei & Jalilmehr 2012), thus enhancing the development of capital market. Therefore, 
development of a country’s capital market will help drive building a well-functioning and 
effective system of corporate governance (Tam and Yu 2011).  
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The Development of China’s Capital Market 
China’ economic reform and development started in the late 1970s has generated remarkable 
economic results. Its gross domestic product has been growing at an average annual rate of 
over 9% for the last thirty years (China Statistics Yearbook), and total stock market 
capitalization surpassed RMB 24393.91 billion at the end of 2009. As shown in Table 2 and 
Figure 2, the stock market capitalization increased from 11.25% of nominal GDP (end of 
1993) to 74.64% (end of 2009), and a big decline to 45.54% (end of 2011) due to the global 
financial crisis.  
A few major reforms have been carried out over the last two decades which enhance the 
fundamental market structural conditions in China’s capital markets. One key aspect of 
financial reform is to enhance the quality of listed companies. Several prominent milestones 
in the evolution of capital market are key to drive the evolution of corporate governance 
reforms in China. They include non-tradable share reform, improvement in the quality of 
listed companies, restructuring securities firms, strengthening institutional investors, further 
liberalizing the issuance procedures, improving the legal and regulatory frameworks2. China 
has achieved great success in economic reform and opening up to the world markets.  
The development of corporate governance in China and the development of other areas 
in the economic and regulatory environment are mutually reinforcing. As pointed out by Tam 
and Yu (2011), for instance, “the listing in recent years of major state-owned enterprises and 
banks in overseas stock exchanges has provided much needed impetus for ensuring 
governance and management changes that the Chinese authorities would find convenient to 
their advantage because foreign investors and regulators will demand compliance with higher 
international standards.” With ever increasing number of state-owned enterprises listed in 
Hong Kong and on international stock exchanges, higher governance standards of those 
companies are required (He Huang & Orr 2007).  
Chinese government has acted quite diligently in recent years to introduce measures to 
improve corporate governance practices. Poor corporate governance in China is the 
consequence of the malfunction of the stock market as well as the lack of market-based 
governance mechanisms (Zhang 2007).  
 
                                                 
2 Xiaochuan Zhang (Deputy Division Director, Market Supervision Department, China Securities Regulatory 
Commission) speech, March 3rd 2009, “An introduction to the corporate governance development in China” 
OECD conference.  
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Figure 2: 1993-2009 Chinese Stock Market Capitalization (Percentage of GDP) 
 
    Source: CSRC.   
 
Table 2: China Stock Markets. 
2008 2009 2010 2012 
Number of listed companies (A and B Shares)   1625 1718 2063 2342 
Total shares issued ( billion shares)  2452 2616 3318 3610 
Of which：Tradeable shares (billion shares)  1258 1976 2564 2885 
Market capitalisation (billion yuan)  12137 24394 26542 21476 
Of which: Tradeable shares capitalisation (billion yuan)  4521 15126 19311 16492 
Valid number of shareholders (million)  104 120 134 141 
      Source: CSRC 
Tam and Yu (2011) point out that the pace and quality of Chinese capital market 
development is a major challenge for corporate governance to evolve, and there is an urgent 
need to speed up China’s financial development. One key element of the broader and deeper 
reform for China’s financial system is to provide more varieties of financial products and 
services for companies and households to obtain better returns for their investments (Tam and 
Yu 2011). With national savings rate at over 50 per cent of GDP (Table 3), only a highly 
efficient financial system could turn such huge savings into more productive investment other 
than low yielding bank deposits (Tam and Yu, 2011).   
Institutional investors could also play a crucial role in helping the steady growth of 
capital market. As discussed in Chapter 2.2.4, mutual fund in U.S. is the major investment 
channel for corporate and households and has increasing important role in the corporate 
governance of investee firms, whether the fund industry in China could play the similar role is 
still questionable given that the fund industry is still in early stage of its development.  
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                 Table 3: China's National Savings Rate 
 
National 
savings rate Government Corporations Households 
1995 39.4 4.6 15.8 19 
1996 38 5.1 12.8 20.1 
1997 38.3 5.3 13.7 19.3 
1998 36.6 4.8 13.1 18.7 
1999 34.9 5.2 12.9 16.7 
2000 34.5 5.7 14 14.8 
2001 34.2 6.7 13.3 14.2 
2002 35.1 6.3 12.5 16.3 
2003 37.3 8.1 13.5 15.8 
2004 46.6 6.1 22 18.5 
2005 48.2 6.4 20.4 21.5 
2006 50.7 7 28.3 15.4 
Source: Asian Development Bank  
 
Importance of institutional investors in Chinese capital market 
As discussed in Chapter 2.2.5., institutional investors could play a positive role not only in 
development of capital market but also in corporate governance of investee firms. A notable 
change of the Chinese capital market over recent years has been the emergence of various 
types of institutional investors, particularly FMC, which is beginning to constitute a 
significant proportion of Chinese stock market capitalization (AUM of fund industry account 
for 9.63% of market capitalization in 2010 from 4.38% in 2003) (WIND database). By 
encouraging institutional investors, particularly securities investment funds, to enter the 
capital market, China’s regulatory authorities hold the expectation that they will enhance 
managerial accountability, raise corporate governance standards, and to promote a balanced 
and healthy development of the capital market (Kim, 2003).   
52 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2.2.5., the fund management industry is generally perceived to 
have longer investment horizon than individual investors, with an investment approach based 
on fundamental research in contrast to speculative behaviors. However, Chinese funds’ 
investment period is still far shorter judging by the international comparison of turnover ratios 
as shown in Figure 3(Qi 2008).  Chinese investors on average hold their stocks for less than 
four months, compared with the U.S. average of 17 months (Chen et al. 2005b).  
Due to the lack of power of governance in investee firms as well as weak legal 
protection, non-state institutional investors and individual shareholders tend to focus on 
speculative activities (Kang et al. 2008).  
	
            Figure 3: International Comparison of Turnover Ratio of Managed Funds. 
	
Source: QI 2008.  Notes: SSE (Shanghai Stock Exchange); SZSE (Shenzhen Stock Exchange) 
 
In China’s context, as non-performing loans have been a major policy issue and an 
obstacle to the country’s financial development and banking reform (Tam & Yu 2011), the 
fact that securities investment funds with no credit and insurance risks therefore may make 
the development of the fund industry particularly important and relevant to the development 
of Chinese capital market. Given the above reasons, institutional investors are expected by the 
Chinese government to help develop a more stable and healthy capital market environment.  
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Earlier studies suggest that institutional investors in China act passively and had a 
negligible role in investee’s performance (Hu & Wu 2004; Li 2002). While Tam (2003) finds 
that some of China’s institutional investors were engaged in monitoring investee’s 
performance, Chao (2006) finds no evidence that clearly show causality between institutional 
investors’ activism and firm performance.  
However, recent studies document that institutional investors enhance firms’ 
performance in China. Based on China’s public-listed company data from 2000 to 2005, an 
empirical study by Yang and Wang (2008) finds that institutional investors have actively 
participated in corporate governance particular in improving ownership structure and the 
proportion of independent directors, and improving firm performance in the long term. They 
conclude that institutional investors have a significant impact on enhancing the corporate 
governance of investee firms and improving the firms’ performance in the long term (Yang & 
Wang 2008).   
Similar result achieved by Yuan, Xiao et al. (2008) showing that  
equity ownership by Chinese FMC has a positive effect on firm performance. They argue that 
FMC plays a significant role in monitoring controlling shareholders and their agents, 
therefore, agency problems are reduced and firm performance enhance in the long term.  
Qi, Huang, & Wang (2011) find that mutual fund invest in listed companies with good 
corporate governance practices. For instance, listed companies with smaller board size, 
separation role of CEO and board chairman tend to have a higher ownership of mutual fund 
than those of firms with large board size and dual role of CEO and chairman. However, the 
proportion of independent director and number of board meetings has no relationship with the 
shareholding by mutual fund. It may suggest a negligible role of independent directors and 
board meeting in improving firm performance. Similar result by Shi, An, & Liu (2011) find 
that firms with larger mutual fund shareholding appear to have better performance than those 
with less mutual fund shareholding.   
As discussed above, there may be two-way influences between intuitional investors’ 
shareholding and corporate governance of investee firms. Intuitional investors are more 
capable of identifying those investees with good corporate governance. Then, companies who 
want to enhance their competitiveness in the equity market may want to improve their 
corporate governance.  
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This study focuses on corporate governance issues within China’s FMC, and it is 
beyond the scope of this study to investigate FMC’s impact on investee corporate governance. 
In any case, given the still immature stage of China’s fund management industry and lack of 
shareholder activism, analysis of this subject would best be revisited in future when the 
development and market of FMC becomes more mature. 
Given the significant role they can play in capital market development and the corporate 
governance of investee companies, institutional investors, and FMC in particular, how 
effective they have performed their role in a rapidly growing emerging economy such as 
China needs to be better understood. Corporate governance of institutional investors is also 
crucially vital in order for them to function effectively, efficiently and appropriately.  
 
QFII  
Qualified foreign financial institutions (QFII)3 have also been encouraged to invest in Chinese 
domestic exchanges since December 2002. Foreign ownership is generally expected to 
encourage the adoption of superior governance practices in areas such as information 
disclosure, internal checks and balances, and accounting standards (OECD 2002). Yoshikawa 
and Gedajlovic (2002) find that greater exposure to global capital markets including foreign 
ownership is positively associated with the quality of firms’ investor relations practices, and 
firm performance. Tam et al. (2010) find that foreign financial institutions allowed to 
participate in China’s domestic share market were unable to play a significant governance role 
as expected of their status as strategic investors. By April 2012, 129 foreign institutional 
investors had been granted QFII status and had been allocated quota totalling REM $265.6 
billion yuan4, of which 74.5% was reinvested in the stock market, 13.7% in bonds and 9.6% 
in bank deposits. QFII accounts for 1.09% of stock market capitalization. 
QFII are expected to bring advanced investment methodology and skills and undertake 
long-term investment strategies, therefore could help develop a more stable and healthy stock 
market environment. It is also hoped that QFII’s increasing significant shareholding in 
Chinese state-owned listed companies will enhance the governance standards of those 
                                                 
3 Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor was launched in 2002 in China to allow licensed foreign investors to buy and sell 
yuan-denominated "A" shares in China's stock exchanges. Chinese mainland stock exchanges were previously closed off to 
foreign investors due to China's capital controls which restrict the movement of assets in-and-out of the country (Wikipedia).  
4 Report from CSRC website April 2012 on “QFII investment quota grant U.S. 5 trillion dollar” at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/bgt/xwdd/201204/t20120403_208155.htm 
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companies (He Huang & Orr 2007). However, Tam et al. (2010) find that QFII have not yet 
been able to exert long-term impacts on the Chinese market. How the presence of foreign 
shareholding in FMC may affect board effectiveness and performance are examined in 
Chapter 7 and 8 respectively.  
 
3.2.2 Legal regulations and institutional framework  
Regulatory infrastructure and legal system provide a key and effective external mechanism in 
establishing good governance practices, building the capacity of institutions and individuals to 
implement apply and enforce those laws (APEC 2002). At the beginning of developing 
corporate governance development, Chinese government has adopted a top-down approach to 
setting up formal framework for publicly listed companies (Tam 1999). With the regulatory 
push, considerable progress has been made in creating many of the necessary conditions (Tam 
and Yu 2011). However, many of the formal and informal market and social institutions 
needed to be developed and functioning effectively for the corporate governance practices 
introduced under Anglo-American model to work well in China are missing (Tam 1999; Tam 
& Yu 2011). 
CSRC was established in 1992 under the State Council to regulate China’s securities 
and futures markets with an aim to ensure market participants operate legitimately and in 
orderly manner. CSRC stipulates a number of regulations and policies that provided key 
components of legal foundation for development of a modern corporate sector and capital 
market, which has a tremendous impact on corporate governance development in China.  
Table 4 provides some key regulatory rules and framework for developing of corporate 
governance in China. For instance, ‘China’s Company Law’ was promulgated in 1993 and 
subsequently amended in 1999 and 2005. It aims to protect the legitimate rights and interests 
of companies, shareholders and creditors, promotes the restructuring of SOEs, and facilitates 
economic development (Qi 2008). It regulates the responsibilities, rights and obligations of 
corporate stakeholders including shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors, and 
senior managers. A board of directors is required to establish for all limited liability 
companies, and “large” companies have to set up a separate board of supervisors, consisting 
of at least three independent supervisors. Shareholders are given the rights to appoint and 
remove directors and supervisors, and to determine their compensations.  
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Table 4: Law, Regulations and Administrative Guidelines Relating to Corporate Governance System 
Development and Practices 
1992 China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) established 
1993 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 
1998 Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China 
1998 Shanghai Stock Exchange Listing Rules (revised six times, latest revision 2008) 
1998 State Bureau of Industry and Commerce Administration, Administrative Rules for the Registration of the Legal Representative of Enterprise 
1999 Accounting Law of the People’s Republic of China 
2000 CSRC, Opinions on Strengthening Work on Monitoring and Regulating Listed Companies 
2000 Establishment of State-owned Assets Supervisory and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
2001 CSRC, Implementing the System of Interview Discussion with Board Chairman of Listed Companies 
2001 CSRC, Guidelines for the Establishment of the System of Independent Directors in Listed Companies. (Independent directors to reach at least one third board membership in three years) 
2002 CSRC and State Economic and Trade Commission, Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
2002 CBRC, Guidelines on Corporate Governance of Joint Stock Commercial Banks; Guidelines on Independent Directors and External Supervisors of Joint Stock Commercial Banks 
2004 Establishment of Central Hui Jin as Holding Company for China’s Four State-owned Commercial Banks 
2004 Small & Medium Enterprises Board, launched in Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
2004 CSRC,  Regulations on Strengthening Protection of Shareholder’s  Rights of the General Public 
2004 SASAC, Notice on the Publication of Central Enterprises Core Business (First Group) 
2004 SASAC, Interim Methods for Confirmation of Enterprise State Capital Value Protection and Augmentation  
2005 Revised Company Law (Introduced proxy voting  and cumulative voting system for election of board directors) 
2005 CSRC, Measures on the Administration of Split share Structure Reform of Listed Companies  
2005 
CSRC, Administrative Rules on Stock Incentives in Listed Companies (Trial)  
Stocks or stock options to senior managers as incentives 
2005 CSRC, Guidelines for Investors Relations Work of Listed Companies 
2005 CBRC, Guidelines for Boards of Directors Code of Conduct of Joint Stock Commercial Banks 
2006 Amendments to Securities Law 
2006 CSRC, Corporate Governance Code for Securities Investment Companies (Trial) 
2006 CSRC, Administrative Rules for Takeovers of Listed Companies (Revised 2008) 
2007 Property Rights Law of the People’s Republic of China 
2007 CSRC, Guidelines for Permission to Issue New Shares by Publicly Listed Companies 
2008 Ministry of Finance, CSRC, Audit Bureau, CBRC, CIRC, Basic Regulations on Enterprise Internal Control 
2009 Shenzhen Stock Exchange Growth Enterprise Market Listing Rules  
2009 SASAC, Interim Method for Performance Appraisal of Responsible People of Central Enterprises 
   Source: Tam and Yu (2011) 
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China’s Securities Law, issued in December 1998 and enacted in July 1999, confirmed 
the importance of the capital markets and formalized its legal status in China for the first time. 
The article 166 states that CSRC is considered as the major authority to regulate and monitor 
the securities, IPO, M&A, disclosure information and others of public companies. 
It regulates the issuance and trading of securities. The purpose of the law is to protect 
the rights and interests of investors, stimulate/boost the development of China’s capital 
markets, safeguard public interests, and promote the growth of the socialist market economy. 
The amended Securities Law took effect on 2006 with some major changes as follows.   
The Chinese Securities Law was amended in 2006 with an intention of protecting 
minority shareholders’ interests, and balancing the power asymmetry between the dominate 
owners (usually is the state) and the minority shareholders (Tam and Yu 2011).  
For instance, the newly added Article 47 states that senior officers including members 
on the board of director, supervisory boards, and top managers holding more than 5% of 
company’s shareholding could not trade within 6 months from the date of purchase. It aims to 
limit senior officers using their inside information to trade to benefit themselves at the 
expense of minority shareholders. Another added Article 86 stipulates that an investor holding 
or jointly holding more than 5% shares of listed companies should report to CSRC their 
shareholdings status within 3 days when it happens. By acknowledging large shareholder’s 
status, CSRC aims to mitigate insider trading. Article 87 and 134 regulate situations of M&A 
and litigation respectively to protect the interests of investors.    
There are rules and regulatories directed specifically at developing corporate 
governance of listed companies in China. In 2002, CSRC issued China’s first Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies which paid special attention to the protection of 
minority shareholders (as the Article 4 of general provision stated in Code of Corporate 
Governance). In addition, the general provision of the Code of Corporate Governance also 
promulgate that a sound board of directors is the prerequisite to good corporate governance, 
and is the core of the corporate governance, and shareholders are the major party of the 
corporate governance (Article 5 of Code of Corporate Governance).  
Despite unified laws written by national institutions in China, legal enforcement and 
alternative informal mechanisms vary considerately in different provinces and regions in 
China (Allen et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2005a; Fan et al. 2007; Huyghebaert & Wang 2012). For 
instance, Zhang (2010) state that there are overall 900 legal regulations in China, but only 
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around 240 of them are being enforced. He argues that it is in an urgent need to enhance legal 
enforcement of existing written regulations. Tu (2012) and Shen (2008) point out that lack of 
legal enforcement is the key problem for China’s legal system. It is generally accepted that 
external governance mechanisms including China’s financial and legal systems as well as 
institutions are all underdeveloped (Allen et al. 2005; Hu et al. 2010).   
External governance mechanisms in China are in general weak with poor effectiveness 
of legal enforcement and underdeveloped capital market, as well as ineffective negligible 
market for corporate control. Corporate governance reforms in China have relied on internal 
mechanisms with a particular focus on the responsibilities of directors and managers.  
 
3.3 Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
In emerging economies with weak legal protection for shareholders and ineffective external 
governance mechanisms, internal governance mechanisms are expected to play a crucial role 
in protecting the interests of minority shareholder (Hu et al. 2010; Young et al. 2008). China 
imposes a two-tier board structure, consisting both board of directors and supervisory board, 
which combine features of the German, Japanese and the U.S. governance systems. Majority 
of Chinese listed companies have the state as dominant shareholder which raise additional 
governance issues. This Section examines some of the key internal governance mechanisms 
including ownership structure, supervisory board and board of directors.  
  
3.3.1 Ownership structure  
Share structure reform in China  
Tam and Yu (2011) and Yang et al. (2011) argue that one of the main underlying problems 
for the development of corporate governance in China in publicly listed companies has been 
the dominant non-tradable shareholding by the state.  
A range of familiar as well as China-specific problems in corporate governance 
practices and outcomes have emerged due to the large portion of non-tradable state 
shareholding in listed companies coupled with the widely acknowledged insider control 
problems in many of these companies (Tam and Yu 2011). This Section examines the 
evolution of privatization in Chinese publicly listed companies, and the effect and problems 
of state as dominant shareholder in those firms.   
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During the early stage of China’s economic development and a centrally planned system, 
SOEs dominated the Chinese economy, and private enterprise were strictly prohibited.  The 
state is the owner of the vast majority of economic entities, and commanded and controlled 
almost every aspects of the economy.  
From 1984 to 1993, reform of China economic structure is initiated for the separation of 
government intervention from enterprise operation with a degree of caution, but it was later 
decreed that all medium and large sized SOE should be corporatized except for a few key 
strategic enterprises (Qi, 2008). Two stock exchanges were established to achieve that goal: 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (in 1990) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (1991). The number of 
listed companies (1550 public listed companies) nearly doubled by 2007 compared to the year 
of 1999 when there were only 949 listed companies (Qi, 2008). 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was created in 1992 to be the 
main regulator of securities markets in China. The Securities Law also gives power to the 
CSRC to examine the listed firms over securities and corporate fraud. 
The common practice of public listing of companies in China is that an SOE sets up a 
new company, and transfer a portion of its assets to the new company and becomes the 
majority shareholder. Various share ownership types are created, among which state shares, 
legal person shares and A shares5 are the most prominent. Shares are divided into tradable and 
non-tradable shares based on whether they can be traded on stock exchanges. State shares and 
legal person shares were non-tradable shares held by the shareholders before the companies 
went public and can only be transferred through the negotiation among designated parties. 
Shares are tradable shares which are those listed on the stock exchange and tradable by the 
public. 
Legal person shares, unlike state shares, are held by domestic institutions such as other 
listed companies, state-private mixed companies and non-bank financial institutions (Qian & 
Wu 2000). Government-related institutions on average own 81.5% of total legal person shares 
over the period 1991-2001 (Delios & Wu 2005). As a result, there were a large number of 
shares overhung and non-tradable. Non tradable shares on stock exchange had been strongly 
criticized and viewed as the failure of the stock market to function  effectively (Tao 2004).  
                                                 
5 There are different types of share class in China, including A share, B share and H share. A share refers to 
stocks that trade on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges and denominated in renminbi. B share refers to shares 
of some Chinese companies are listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen, but traded in U.S. dollars. H shares are also 
Chinese companies, but these securities trade on the Hong Kong Stock.  
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Wu (2004) and Qiu and Yao (2009) argue that the split share structure (tradable and 
non-tradable) has affect negatively the development of stock market and the transformation of 
the Chinese economy. The split share structure is the main reason leading to the divergent 
wealth form listed firms by large shareholder because their shares are not allowed to be traded 
so they are indifferent to share price changes. CSRC in 2006 reports that there are 676 listed 
companies to have money appropriated by controlling shareholders totalling 96.7billion 
Chinese Yuan, and 623 listed companies in 2003 to have money appropriated totalling 57.7 
billion Chinese Yuan. Individual investors held extremely diffused shares so that they do not 
attend shareholder general meetings or exercise their voting rights to protect their interest 
(Chen et al. 2009a)”. In addition, it is argued that an outside market for corporate control (e.g. 
takeover) has been precluded since the state and legal person shares occupy a majority portion 
of equity shares in most companies and they are non-tradable (Yang et al. 2011).  
The conflict of interest between controlling and minority shareholders are exacerbated 
in China because of the presence of split share structure that non-tradable shares held by 
controlling shareholders and tradable shares held by monitory shareholders (Zou et al. 2008). 
Chinese government initiated the non-tradable share reform in 2005 to make non-
tradeable shares tradable. It requires non-tradable shareholders negotiate with tradable 
shareholders to determine the compensation for tradable shareholders before non-tradable 
shares can be traded in the market. As Figure 4 shows, the proportion of negotiable stock 
accounts for about one third of market capitalization for most years until 2008, proportion of 
tradable shares among total stock market capitalization has increased significantly to 62% in 
2009 from 37.25% in 2008, and increase slightly from 2010 to May 2012. 
Since the non-tradable reform started in 2005, the proportion of tradable share among 
total stock market capitalization has been enhanced significantly over last several years. This 
share structure reform is significant not only for freeing the majority non-tradable shares in 
China’s stock markets, but could also in time alleviate the dominant position of the state as 
owner of Chinese listed companies (Tam and Yu 2011). It is expected that the governance 
issues associated with dominant state ownership such as insider control and ineffective 
monitoring through a chain of distinct government agencies can be attenuated in time, as well 
as creating condition for an active market for corporate control through mergers and 
acquisitions (Tam and Yu 2011).   
Cai et al.(2007) and Bortolotti Beltratti (2007) provide evidence that the non-tradable 
share reform has brought a statistically significant positive abnormal returns for listed firms. 
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Qiu and Yao (2009) also provide evidence that non-tradable reform has brought significant 
improvement in both corporate governance and firm performance, and enhancement in 
corporate governance of firms after non-tradable reform help improved firm’s performance.  
All though the non-tradable reform has increased the proportion of tradable shares in 
Chinese stock market capitalization significantly, the state is still the ultimate and in most 
cases the dominant shareholder for most of listed companies (Hovey 2006). For instance, the 
Chinese state as direct or indirect owner has for a considerate period of time held two thirds of 
issued shares over eighty per cent of the countries’ listed companies (Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, 2006). Chinese state held approximately 83.1% of market capitalization in 2007 
(OECD, 2011). The governance characteristics of concentrated state ownership in China are 
certainly worthwhile to investigate.  
Concentrated state ownership in China  
Comparing corporate governance in China with other OECD counties, Cheung et al. (2008) 
report that there is a weak relationship between the market valuation of listed firms and their 
corporate governance practices. Yang, et al. (2011) suggest the main reason for the 
ineffectiveness of corporate governance is the presence of the dominant  state shareholding in 
listed firms. They suggest strong political connection between the governments and listed 
firms as well as lack of independent judicial system leads to inefficiency of corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
Government owners could pursue their own agenda (e.g. maintaining employment 
levels) to achieve economic and political objectives, which are often different from 
shareholders’ profit maximization, and may also contradict or be detrimental to the interests 
of minority shareholders (Jiang et al. 2008). In addition, SOE managers have weak and even 
sometimes adverse incentives to improve firm efficiency, because SOE managers as public 
employees cannot have private benefits of from increasing revenues or from nor reducing the 
firm’s costs (Megginson 2005).  
With concentrated ownership, controlling shareholder could gain personal benefits 
“through various forms of self-dealing transactions such as selling assets, goods and services 
to listed companies at high prices or transferring assets from listed companies to member 
firms under controlling shareholders’ control at low prices (Wang & Xiao 2011)”. In addition, 
controlling shareholders of many Chinese companies directly intervene in companies’ 
operational business. For instance, they directly engage in staff appointments, business 
decision-making, or the implementation of new business initiatives. In some cases, they trade 
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with related parties to detriment to the interests of the company without fully disclosure (Qi 
2008).  
Tunnelling is often used to describe the transfer of resources away from firms for the 
benefits of controlling shareholders. It is generally accepted that tunnelling is more prevalent 
in emerging markets with weak legal system and ineffective corporate governance for 
minority shareholders. Granting the loans to majority shareholder and related party 
transactions are the major form of tunnelling in China (Liu & Lu 2007).   
With the concentrated of state ownership in China, the major governance problems 
generally are the issue of state ownership, inside control, and the weak enforcement of law 
and regulations (Tam & Yu 2011). Most recent studies document a U-shaped relationship 
between government ownership and firm performance/valuation (Chen et al. 2009a; Tian & 
Estrin 2008).   
Using a sample of 9594 firm-year observations between 1994 and 2004, Tian & Estrin 
(2008) find that detrimental effects of government shareholding initially decline as the state 
ownership stake increases, up to 25% shareholding, and increases thereafter. Therefore, they 
conclude that when the state is a large shareholder, firms could benefit from concentrated 
state ownership as state has the power to distort outcomes in favour of the firms that it owns. 
For instance, government may increase corporate value with a helping hand through tax 
rebates or government orders etc. Government ownership could be both detrimental and 
beneficial to corporate value.  
In contrast, Chen et al. (2009) find the existence of an alignment effect, the larger the 
holding of the largest shareholder, the better firm’s performance. Ma et al.(2010) also find 
that ownership concentration enhances Chinse firm performance. They point out that 
ownership concentration in Chinese firms is more powerful than any types of ownership in 
influencing firm performance. However, Huyghebaet & Wang (2012) find that increasing the 
government ownership in Chinese listed firms lead to higher the levels of expropriation of 
minority interests. 
Liu & Lu (2007) point out that the major objective of developing equity market in 
China is to help SOEs to raise capital, and regulations are in favor of SOEs or the companies 
with close ties to the government. It could be therefore argued that the true relationship 
between state ownership in SOEs and firms’ performance are hardly investigated as the state 
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may use their position to benefit SOEs which enhance firms’ performance but detrimental to 
the competitive market such as access to financing or land.  
As will be discussed in Chapter 4.4 of this thesis, the extent of shareholding by the state 
in FMC ownership may similarly exert a negative impact on board effectiveness. In practice, 
the fact that nearly 59.78% of FMC shareholding are controlled by state-owned financial 
institutions raises the question of how such concentrated state ownership may affect board 
effectiveness and FMC performance. These questions are examined in Chapters 6 and 7.  
Chinese government may believe the presence of state ownership in publicly listed 
firms are important for the quality of firms or they want to use SOEs as devise to implement 
their policies to achieve their goals. Over the last decade, a process of ownership 
reconcentration has brought many big SOEs to form central enterprises.  
 
SASAC and State-owned Enterprises Governance  
Central enterprises are wholly owned by the state. The State-owned Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) was established in 2000 to be responsible for 
exercising the ownership rights on behalf of the state over state-owned and particularly the 
central enterprises (Tam & Yu 2011). Since 2002 the Chinese government has consolidated 
and merged the largest SOEs into central enterprise groups in certain “strategic” industries, 
and modern corporate governance mechanisms are to be imposed to those enterprises in order 
to exercise state ownership rights more effectively and to achieve better firm performance 
(TY 2011). Those central enterprises are industry leaders either by virtue of their size or their 
natural/regulatory monopoly position.  
The number of central enterprises  was 149 by July 2008, and 117 at the end of 2011 
(SASAC website), but the total number of subsidiary companies and holding companies of 
those central enterprises under SASAC’s supervision was about 10,000 (OECD 2009).  
SASAC aims to reduce the number of central enterprises through restructuring and 
mergers between SOEs to develop the remaining ones to be more internationally competitive 
enterprises6. Ineffectual corporate governance practices of SOEs are unveiled when they 
operate in more sophisticated capital market like U.S. where better corporate governance is 
required. It was reported in 2010 that 25 out of a total of 284 Chinese firms listed in U.S. 
                                                 
6 News from “Newspapers for Young people in Beijing” on November 2007  
http://finance.qq.com/a/20071122/001012.htm 
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stock market were sued by class action because of alleged violations of disclosed rules and 
regulations in their financial reports.   
 
Figure 4: Negotiable Stock Capitalization/Total Stock Market Capitalization Ratio (%) 
 
Source: CSRC; Note: Data for 2012 is 2012 May.  
 
The state plays a very important role in Chinese economy, and mixed findings about the 
impact of state ownership on SOE performance provide further evidence that high levels of 
state ownership may yield different governance outcomes in contrast to firms with lower 
levels of state ownership. As shown in Chapter 6.4.1 of this thesis, the number of 
shareholders ranged from 1 to 6 among China’s 61 FMC at the end of 2010, and Herfindahl 
index (HHI)7 is 0.428. The state on average own 59.78% of FMC shareholding. How such 
concentrated state ownership may affect FMC board effectiveness and performance will be 
investigated in this thesis.  
 
3.3.2 Supervisory board  
A listed company in China is required by law to have a dual board structure: board of 
directors and supervisory board (Section 4, ‘China Company Law’ 2005).  The main roles of 
China’s supervisory board are to examine the company’s financial affairs, and to check the 
regulatory compliance of board of directors and senior managers (‘China Company Law’ 
                                                 
7 The Herfindahl index, also known as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or HHI, is a measure of the size of firms in relation to 
the industry and an indicator of the amount of competition among them. Formula is given in Appendix A, the higher HHI 
indicate higher concentration. 
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1994). Prior studies on the role of supervisory board suggest that Chinese supervisors are 
ineffective in performing their role (Dahya et al. 2003; Tam 1999; Tam & Hu 2006; Xi 2006).  
The latest amendments to China’s Company Law in 2005 significantly strengthens the role of 
members of supervisory boards and gives them more rights to monitor. For instance, 
supervisory boards can now sue directors and senior managers who commit frauds. 
Supervisory boards are given right to raise questions on board meeting. Using data for the 
years of 2005 and 2006 data (before and after the new Corporate Law became effective), Ding 
et. al., (2010) examines the effects of both size and meeting frequency on total executive 
compensation. They found that a larger supervisory board leads to a lower level of pay-
performance sensitivity, and there is an optimal range of meeting frequencies. They suggest 
the supervisory board can monitor better if it is empowered properly, and the new Corporate 
Law enhances supervisory board’s monitoring role over executive compensation.  
 “A typical Chinese supervisory board consists of three mutually exclusive groups of 
supervisors, which consist of controlling supervisors (full-time employees of the largest 
shareholder of the listed company), executive supervisors (company employees) and outside 
supervisors.(Hu et al. 2010)” 
 The composition of supervisory board inherently makes supervisory boards less 
effective because of its weak independence from the company and its controlling shareholders 
(Dahya et al. 2003; Tam & Hu 2006).  
 
3.3.3 Board composition and structure  
With relatively weak position of minority shareholders under concentrated ownership, the 
board of directors is widely considered as the key internal corporate governance mechanisms 
to protect the interests of minority shareholders. Whether the board of directors has in practice 
played a crucial role in protecting the interests of minority shareholders is still widely debated. 
The function of the board of directors in FMC are similar to those in listed companies but 
with more complex responsibility to look after the interest of fund investors because of lack of 
direct representation of fund investors in FMC coupled with conflict of interests between 
FMC and fund investors. Therefore, issues affecting board of directors’ effectiveness in listed 
companies are relevant and important for FMC. This sub-Section will discuss the function and 
role of board of directors and their effectiveness are explored.  
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The Board of Directors 
The board of directors are accountable to shareholders under The Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in China issued in 2001 by CSRC. Board of directors 
should treat all shareholders equally, and should protect the interests of various stakeholders 
in the listed companies. Similar to those of directors in other countries, as discussed in 
Chapter 2.1.4 of this thesis, the role of the board of directors is outlined as follows. 
 “ calling and hosting the annual or special shareholder meetings and reporting to 
shareholders;  
 executing resolutions passed by shareholders;  
 making up the company’s operating and investment plans, debt and equity financing 
plans, and dividend policy;  
 making proposals for merger, separation, and dissolution of the company;  
 determining the firm’s internal organization;  
 appointing or replacing top managers and setting their compensation.” (Huyghebaert 
& Wang 2012) 
 
Because Chinese directors generally gain their power from the dominant shareholder, 
are appointed and removed by the dominant shareholders, it is therefore unrealistic to expect 
the board to discipline or punish the dominant shareholders, subsequently contributing to the 
ineffectiveness of the board of directors  in the Chinese contexts (Rajagopalan & Zhang 2007). 
The state as the dominant owner in many Chinese listed companies may only exist on paper 
(Qi 2008). The absence of real governance representation for the state in some companies 
leads to the dominant position of insiders (normally insiders are senior executives) who 
populate the board of directors to exercise control in many situations. The “insider control” 
problem is usually considered as the major problem to enhancing the corporate governance of 
Chinese companies (Hu et al. 2010; Huyghebaert & Wang 2012; Ming et al. 2009). As a 
result, the protection of the interests of minority shareholders is weak.  
 
Board size  
In the literature, small boards are usually perceived as more effective in communication, 
coordination, decision making and financial performance (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Yermack 
1996). Studies suggest that larger boards may have low individual motivation, and therefore 
less likely to actively participate in decision making (Wang & Deng 2006). Therefore, smaller 
boards may be more effective in protecting the interests of minority shareholders.  
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Most studies in the literature document that board size has no impact on firm 
performance in Chinese companies. For instance, using 1103 listed companies in 2004, Song 
et al. (2009) find no relationship between board size and firm performance. They suggest that 
Chinese firms on average choose the optimal board size. Similar result obtained by HouRen 
(2003)  and Li (2009). Wang & Deng (2006) document that board size and CEO duality do 
not significantly affect the probability of default. 
Using 1196 listed companies between 2000 to 2007, Liu (2009) documents that board 
size negatively affect firm performance, they suggest the communication problem may lead to 
the negative effect of board size. In a sample of 571 private Chinese listed companies in 2008,  
Wang (2012) documents that there is a positive relation between board size and firm 
performance in private listed firms. However, Li and Naughton (2007) provide evidence that 
board size only positively affect short-term returns. Whether board size has any impact on 
FMC performance will be tested in Chapter 7.  
Independent directors  
Independent directors are supposed to contribute to maximum firm value by providing expert 
skills and knowledge and monitoring management, thereby serving the best interests of 
shareholders (Fama 1980; Fama & Jensen 1983). It is also argued that independent directors 
will work in the best interests of shareholders to maintain their good reputation in society 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). With principal-principal conflicts of interest, independent directors 
are especially important to be independent not only from the management but also from 
controlling shareholders to ensure independent board judgments and decisions toward 
maximize the value of the firm rather than those of controlling shareholders (Shleifer & 
Vishny 1997). 
In other words, with concentrated ownership, independent directors have a particular 
responsibility to protect the interests of minority shareholders. Hence, it is generally believed 
that a well-functioning corporate governance system with independent directors that provides 
independent opinions should help to reduce principal–principal conflicts of interest in Chinese 
listed firms. However, managerial hegemony theory claims that the role of nonexecutive 
directors in strategic decision making is limited because of managerial domination (Westphal 
and Fredrickson 2001). Some studies stress that outside directors often lack industry-specific 
knowledge or expertise to implement their duties well (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Estes 
1980).  
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CSRC 2001 promulgates “Guideline on the Establishment of Independent Director 
System in Listed Companies” which requires all listed companies to have independent 
directors on the board and to reach at least one third of board memberships by 2003. The 
major role for independent directors is:   
 review and express independent opinions on significant related - party translations 
 the nomination of directors and the appointment and dismissal of senior management 
officers, before these matters are submitted to board of directors  for discussion 
 review the determination of compensation or remuneration of directors and senior 
management officers 
  vote on important managerial and financial decisions 
 
Independent directors should not take any positions in the listed company other than 
independent directors according to Article 49 of Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies. They are prohibited from involving any business or other relationship with the 
companies or the dominant shareholders. Agency theorists held that being independence from 
management is vital for ID to function effectively (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 
1993). In China, the independence of directors are always been questioned. For instance, 
HuyghebaertWang (2012) and ShanMcIver (2011) argue that independent directors are often 
selected by controlling shareholders due to the presence of high ownership concentration.  
A survey conducted by Tam (1999) shows that “majority of independent directors were 
“former” officials (the precise nature of their employment relations with the government was 
complex and could often not be easily determined) in the ministries or departments that 
previously had a supervisory or administrative vis-a-via the enterprise reform which the listed 
company was created”.  Huyghebaert & Wang (2012) show that more than half of directors 
are appointed by the state in listed SOEs, and outside directors are often retired government 
officials, who are found to continue to act in the interests of the state rather than shareholders. 
Consequently, boards in China tend to lack independence and become rubber-stamp for the 
decisions made by the management and by controlling shareholders (Shan & McIver 2011). 
The independent directors are more often termed by Chinese scholars “outside 
directors” who just have no official position in those companies. Kakabadse, et al. (2010) 
argue that independent directors could not perform their role effectively because of 
concentrated ownership structure and intervention of controlling shareholders. Thus, Chinese 
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boards are heavily dominated by insiders, including senior managers and representatives of 
dominant shareholders.  
In addition, some directors do not exercise their duties and responsibilities adequately. 
For instance, they are frequently absent in board meetings, improper delegation of their duties 
to other, resulting in violating their fiduciary duty (Qi, 2008). Although CSRC has 
emphasized on the importance of the independent directors and defined the minimum number 
of ID each board should have, Rajagopalan and Zhang (2007) and Qi (2008) argue that there 
are shortage of qualified candidate to be the independent directors. In a sample of 300 largest 
Chinese publicly listed companies in 2007, HuTam (2012) found that 34% of independent 
directors in China possess expertise in one or more professional fields,  
Kakabadse et al. (2010) state that establishment of independent directors with the aim of 
actively monitoring management in listed companies in China does not necessarily help to 
enhance corporate governance standards. He & Orr (2007) raise the concern that “how key 
decisions are made in companies in which the majority shareholder is still the government and 
the Communist Party plays a powerful if shifting role” .  
Most studies in the literature document that larger proportion of independent directors 
enhance firm performance in Chinese listed companies (Ma 2008; Wang et al. 2008; Yang 
2007b; Zhao & Zeng 2008). For instance, using 2729 firm-year observations between 2002-
2004, Zhao & Zeng (2008) find that higher proportion of independent directors have positive 
impact on performance stability of Chinese listed companies. Similar result by Jiang (2007) 
showing that higher proportion of independent directors enhances firm performance in 374 
listed companies on selected years of 2001, 2003 and 2005. Using a sample of ninety-six 
financially distressed companies and ninety six healthy companies, WangDeng (2006) find 
that the proportion of independent directors are negatively associated with the probability of 
distress. Whereas Shan & McIver (2011) documents that the degree of board independence 
have a significant positive impacts on performance only in larger companies.  Given the 
complex governance issues of FMC (discussed in Chapter 5.2 of this thesis), board 
independence is vital to protect the fund investors. How board independence affect board 
effectiveness and FMC performance are the main questions to be examined in this thesis.  
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3.4  Conclusion  
 
With concentrated ownership, a major conflict of interest arises between the firm’s controlling 
shareholder and minority shareholders in Chinese listed firms. The principal-principal 
problem is more severe given that Chinese regulation and enforcement are still weak as well 
as the prevalent issue of insider control (Huyghebaert & Wang 2012). Therefore, how to 
protect the interests of minority shareholders is widely seen as the key issue for Chinese 
corporate governance.  
 It is generally accepted that in emerging markets like China, external governance 
mechanisms are weak as there is an absence of active M&A with ineffective law enforcement. 
The pace and quality of Chinese capital market development is a major challenge for the 
development of corporate governance, and there is an urgent need to speed up China’s 
financial development. This is because the development of corporate governance and the 
development of capital market are mutually reinforcing. One key element of the broader and 
deeper reform for China’s financial system is to provide more diverse varieties of financial 
products and services for companies and households to turn huge savings to obtain into more 
productive investment other than low yielding bank deposits (Tam and Yu 2011). The 
development of institutional investors is an urgent need.  
There are increasing laws on paper in China, however, legal enforcement and alternative 
informal mechanisms vary considerably in different provinces and regions in China. It is 
generally accepted that external governance mechanisms including China’ financial market 
and legal systems as well as institutions are all underdeveloped.  
Therefore, internal corporate governance mechanisms are especially crucial in 
protecting the interests of fund investors. With the concentration of state ownership in China, 
it provides additional governance issues. There is as yet little evidence that supervisory board 
is effective. Therefore, board of director effectiveness is the key to protect the interests of 
minority shareholder. However, in China, due to the presence of controlling shareholder, 
board independence is compromised as controlling shareholder determines the appointment, 
compensation and tenure of directors. In addition, there is a general lack of qualified and 
experienced candidates for board members. Therefore, a better understanding of what 
influences board effectiveness is critical in enhancing the corporate governance of Chinese 
listed companies and FMC.  
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CHAPTER 4 
FMC IN CHINA 
 
4.1 Introduction  
As discussed in Chapter 2.2.5, given the increasingly dominant position of institutional 
investors in equity market in many countries across the world, their role and responsibilities 
in corporate governance are important. As a major institutional investor, the fund industry has 
gained increasing attention. In order to implement their role in the capital market and in 
improving the corporate governance of investee firms, the quality of corporate governance of 
fund management companies themselves are critical for this important role to be realized.   
A better understanding of the historical development and structure of the Chinese fund 
industry is important for analysing the governance of China’s FMC. The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine the overall development and pertinent changes in the fund industry, the 
governance structure and governance issues of Chinese FMC, and to review the relevant 
literature of FMC governance in China. A comparison of the organizational form between 
Chinese FMC and U.S. mutual fund is outlined so as to better understand to what extent 
governance issues in U.S. mutual fund could be considered in the context of the Chinese fund 
industry, and how could the richer literature of corporate governance of U.S. mutual funds 
inform and be used in this study given that most of extant literature of corporate governance 
of mutual fund focuses on the U.S.  
 
4.2 Background of Fund Industry 
This Section examines the development and evolution of the Chinese fund industry. It also 
provides an outline of the current situation of fund industry worldwide, and discusses major 
forms of organization of FMC. A close looks at the differences of fund organizational 
structure between the corporate form in the U.S. and contractual form in China.  
4.2.1 The definition of managed fund and classification of FMC  
There are different terminologies for the principal players in the fund management industry 
among different countries such as the U.S. and China. Details of the key differences are listed 
in          Table 5. ‘Mutual fund’ refers to U.S. open end fund (OEF). More explanations of the 
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difference of fund industry between U.S. and China in terms of organizational structure are 
provided later in this chapter.  
 
         Table 5: Fund Management Terminology in the U.S. and China. 
 U.S.  China  
OEF   OEF is called mutual fund in U.S., 
each mutual fund is independent 
entity from investment company   
OEF is called securities investment 
fund in China, which includes both 
OEF and CEF. In China, OEF is not 
an independent legal corporate entity  
Fund investors  Fund shareholders  Fund unit holders (who are not 
shareholder of FMC)  
Who manages and 
invests fund assets 
Investment adviser  Fund management company(FMC) - 
Fund managers 
Custodian body  Custodian banks independent from 
Investment adviser 
Custodian banks independent from 
FMC 
Fund managers   Staff of Fund adviser outside of 
mutual fund  
Fund Management department 
(within the FMC)  
 
         Table 6: Classification of Funds. 
 How shares are bought Sale price Shares outstanding 
CEF Stock exchange Market price Fixed 
OEF Directly through the managed fund / bank 
/ other financial institution 
Net asset value Varies 
                  Source: ICI 2009, p172.  
 
A mutual fund with its declared investment objectives pools sums of money from fund 
investors, and invest in financial assets. Fund investors could diversify their investments, and 
benefit from professional investment management at a reasonable cost (Reilly & Brown 2005). 
Similar to mutual fund in the U.S., an OEF in China is created by FMC with its own 
investment objectives, and fund managers from FMC pools money from many fund investors.  
There are in general two types of funds based on whether their shares are redeemable or 
not, namely open-end fund (OEF) and closed-end fund (CEF)8. The major differences are 
listed in       Table 6. Open-end funds issue “redeemable securities” which the fund investors 
can redeem their fund holding at current net asset value (NAV). The NAV is calculated by 
dividing the total market value of the fund’s assets, minus its liabilities, by the number of 
mutual fund shares outstanding (ICI 2009). On other other hand, CEF issues a fixed number 
                                                 
8 Investment company act of 1940, sec 5(80a-5)(a); SEC, “Policy Implications,” sec 39-40 
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of shares that are publicly traded on stock exchange at market-determined prices. With CEF, 
FMC has no obligation to redeem fund investors’ shares. Investors usually buy and sell their 
shares through a broker, which is similar to trading the shares of publicly traded companies 
(ICI 2012). CEFs and OEFs are different in terms of their portfolio holdings, fee structures, 
and investment strategies. “The redemption mechanism is the institutional difference that 
gives rise to very different fund-management organizations.” (Cherkes 2012).   
As stated in Chapter 3.3.2 of this thesis, by 2010, OEF’s AUM reached RMB 2.42 
trillion yuan, which is 17.17 times of those of CEF. It could be argued that the governance 
issues are very different between OEF and CEF in the U.S. as they have different 
organizational forms. In China, a FMC can manufacture and manage both OEF and CEF, this 
thesis focuses on FMC governance issues on the whole. Because of the limited size of CEF 
and different investment style of CEF from OEF, this study will focus only on OEF.  
  
 
4.2.2 Forms of fund management companies  
Distinguished by the difference in the underlying organization structure and governance, two 
distinctive forms of fund management companies are identified: the corporate model 
(dominant in the U.S.) and the contractual model (prevalent in China, Japan, Germany, and 
the U.K.).   
In the U.S., a mutual fund, under the corporate model, is an independent legal entity 
owned by the fund investors as shareholders with the capacity to enter into contract, to sue or 
to be sued (Wallison and Robert 2007, p1). Board of directors of the mutual fund is 
responsible for protecting investors’ (who are the shareholders) assets and ensuring that the 
managers’ behaviours complies with all laws and pre-established rule and terms9.  
In contrast, Unit Trust (UT) under the contractual model in the U.K. has no board of 
directors but a trustee to monitor the fund as well as managers’ behaviours. Unlike a mutual 
fund in the U.S., an UT is not an independent legal entity, and has no board of directors or  no 
issue of voting securities to fund investors, but is a trustee to protect the interests of 
investors(Sin 1997; Warburton 2008). Similar to the role of directors, the trustee is 
responsible for protecting investors’ interests and ensuring that the manager complies with all 
applicable laws and pre-established rules and terms (Warburton 2008).  
                                                 
9 Investment company act of 1940, sec 16 Board of Directors.  
74 
 
Different from board of directors under the contractual form, trustee relies more on rules 
(i.e. standard terms or rules)  than discretion to ensure the fund manager’s compliance with 
applicable laws and pre-established rules with little or no discretion (Warburton 2008).  For 
instance, a trustee of a unit trust could only remove a fund manager if his/her wrongdoings 
breach the rules that are specified in the regulations. However, board of directors under the 
corporate form is given considerate discretionary authority in protecting shareholders’ interest 
with substantial business judgments rather than following guidance or decision rules (U.S. 
Investment Act of 1940).  
Therefore, the trustee has relatively limited authority to monitor fund managers’ 
behaviours compared with the board of directors. Constructed in the contractual form in 
China, each fund is not a legal corporate entity to enter into contract. FMC is the firm 
manufacturing and marketing different types of funds including OEF and/or CEF, with one 
board of directors charged with the role of monitoring all fund managers’ behaviors and 
safeguarding all fund investors’ assets in a FMC (Chinese Securities Investment Fund Law 
2004). Fund investors are not shareholders of FMC as they only invest in one or more funds 
rather than in the share capital of the company. A board of directors has been given similar 
discretionary authority in making decisions and protecting interests of investors like a board 
of directors under the corporate form in the U.S.  
 
4.2.3 Comparison of corporate form of mutual fund and contractual form of Chinese 
FMC  
As noted above, a mutual fund, under the corporate model, is an independent legal entity. 
Each mutual fund under this model enters into a contract with an independent investment 
adviser who manages the fund’ portfolio according to the objectives and policies written in 
the fund’s prospectus. The management fee, usually a percentage of assets under management 
will be charged by the independent investment adviser to the mutual fund. Apart from the 
investment adviser, a mutual fund also requires several service providers including principal 
underwriter, administrator, transfer agent, custodian and independent public accountant. The 
U.S. mutual fund organization structure is showed in Figure 5. Fund shareholders pay 
additional fees for other services such as legal and auditing services and custodian services 
which are not provided by the adviser.  
Mutual fund is usually created by an investment adviser. While each fund has a board of 
directors, and all the executive officers are employees of the investment adviser. However, the 
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percentage of independent directors is required to be at least 40% in 1940. The scandals of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s in the U.S. prompted the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to change corporate governance practices in 2004, in particular board 
composition. Board independence in U.S. fund industry has received increasing attention by 
the SEC, and is discussed in more details in Chapter 5.3.  
A mutual fund complex is a family of mutual funds, which provides more diversified 
types of fund. A fund complex providing services as both adviser and administrator usually 
consists of numerous funds. But there are some cases where advisory investment and 
administration services are separated. According to ICI 2012, the percentage of fund assets 
managed by larger fund complexes has increased in the past decade. The share of assets 
managed by the largest 25 complexes increased to 73 per cent in 2011 from 68 percent in 
2000 (Table 7). The mutual fund industry in the U.S. is highly concentrated. Baumol et al. 
(1990) points out that “The increase in the size of the typical complex over time may well 
have exacerbated the comparative disadvantages of a small organization”.  
  Table 7: Share of Assets at the Largest Mutual Fund Complexes. 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 
Largest 5 complexes 34 34 32 37 40 40 
Largest 10 complexes 53 48 44 48 53 53 
Largest 15 complexes 75 71 68 70 74 73 
     Source: 2012 Investment Company Fact Book, ICI  
 
Three-quarters of fund complexes were independent fund advisers, followed by non-
U.S. fund advisers (10%), insurance companies (5%), banks or thrifts (7%), and brokerage 
firms (3%),(ICI 2012).   
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Figure 5:  Organization Structure of U.S. Mutual Funds. 
 
           Source:  ICI “Investment Company Fact Book” 2009 
 
In China, a FMC is established as a limited liabilities company according to ‘China’s 
Company Law’ and must also be approved by China’s securities regulator, the CSRC. Each 
FMC in the contractual form manages several OEFs and/or CEFs. Figure 6 is the typical 
structure for FMC which is represented in this case by China International Fund Management 
Co., Ltd. There is a unitary board of directors overseeing the performance of all funds within 
the FMC. Different from normal industrial companies, a compliance officer is required to be 
established in FMC by “Article 2 of A management procedure of FMC”, who is in charge of 
ensuring the operations of funds and FMC are in compliance with the relevant law and 
regulations as well as internal risk control. The compliance office must provide independent 
reports to CSRC and the board of directors. Within the office of the compliance officer, a 
department of Inspection and Auditing is also mandated by China’s regulatory authorities.   
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Figure 6 : FMC typical organization structure in China. 
                      Source:  China International Fund Management Co., Ltd. 
 
Most of the functions associated with administration, distribution and investment 
adviser are performed by different departments within the FMC in the contractual form in 
China, in contrast to such services being provided by either external advisor or administrator 
under the corporate form in the U.S. Chinese FMC perform similar function to U.S. 
investment adviser or more exactly like a fund complex providing most of services needed to 
operating a fund. On average, each FMC manages 12 funds with different investment 
objectives in China.  
It could be argued that the most distinct difference between U.S. and Chinese fund is the 
status of fund investors. In China, fund investors are only fund unit holder rather than FMC 
shareholders. Whereas in the U.S., fund investors are fund shareholders as each mutual fund 
is a separate legal entity separate from a fund complex or administrators. In subsequent 
chapters, how this difference in terms of organizational structure affect governance issues will 
be examined in Chapter 5.2.  
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4.2.4 The global fund landscape  
Even though the fund industry in China has seen dramatic growth in the last decade, AUM of 
Chinese funds is relatively small compared to other countries. At the end of 2010, China’ 
aggregate AUM of OEF is equivalent to U.S. $36.5billion, which is approximately 1/37 of the 
AUM in U.S. mutual fund (Table 9). The number of funds in China is 1/27 of those in U.S. 
(Table 9). Given China is the second largest economy in the world, the stable and healthy 
development of Chinese fund industry is critically important to keep up with the growth of the 
economy to provide an effective investment channel in the development of a competitive 
financial system.  
Figure 7 shows the ratio of mutual fund AUM/GDP from selected countries during 
2004-2010. U.S. has the highest mutual fund AUM/GDP ratio of all sample years, followed 
by France, and United Kingdom, indicating the fund industry is well developed in those 
developed countries. In contrast, the proportion of mutual fund AUM/GDP in Japan, China 
and India are much lower. There is a slight increase from 2004 to 2010 for Chinese FMC 
AUM/GDP ratio. More importantly, the high proportion of mutual fund AUM of GDP in 
developed countries such as U.S. indicates the growth potential of fund industry in China and 
other emerging economies.   
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Table 8: Worldwide Total Net Assets of Mutual Funds. 
      
 Millions of U.S. dollars, year-end  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 World   $ 16,152,911  
 
$ 17,757,360   $ 21,808,884   $ 26,132,316   $ 18,920,012   $ 22,952,849   $ 24,698,642  
 Americas        8,780,593  
    
10,840,205      11,470,491      13,423,909      10,581,943      12,585,819      13,586,869  
 Argentina               2,355  
             
3,626               6,155               6,789               3,867               4,470               5,179  
 Brazil           220,586  
         
302,927           418,771           615,365           479,321           783,970           980,448  
 Canada           413,772  
         
490,518           566,298           698,397           416,031           565,156           636,947  
 Chile             12,588  
           
13,969             17,700             24,444             17,587             34,227             38,243  
 Costa Rica               1,053  
                
804               1,018               1,203               1,098               1,309               1,470  
 Mexico             35,157  
           
47,253             62,614             75,428             60,435             70,659             98,094  
 Trinidad and 
Tobago   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A               5,832               5,812  
 United States        8,095,082  
      
9,981,108      10,397,935      12,002,283        9,603,604      11,120,196      11,820,677  
 Europe        5,640,425  
      
6,002,310        7,803,877        8,934,860        6,231,116        7,545,535        7,902,835  
 Austria           103,709  
         
109,002           128,236           138,709             93,269             99,628             94,670  
 Belgium           118,373  
         
115,314           137,291           149,842           105,057           106,721             96,288  
 Bulgaria   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A                  226                  256                  302  
 Czech Republic               4,859  
             
5,334               6,488               7,595               5,260               5,436               5,508  
 Denmark             64,796  
           
75,187             95,601           104,083             65,182             83,024             89,800  
 Finland             37,658  
           
45,415             67,804             81,136             48,750             66,131             71,210  
 France        1,370,954  
      
1,362,671        1,769,258        1,989,690        1,591,082        1,805,641        1,617,176  
 Germany           295,997  
         
296,787           340,325           372,072           237,986           317,543           333,713  
 Greece             43,106  
           
32,011             27,604             29,807             12,189             12,434               8,627  
 Hungary               4,932  
             
6,113               8,472             12,573               9,188             11,052             11,532  
 Ireland           467,620  
         
546,242           855,011           951,371           720,486           860,515        1,013,549  
 Italy           511,733  
         
450,514           452,798           419,687           263,588           279,474           234,313  
 Liechtenstein             12,543  
           
13,970             17,315             25,103             20,489             30,329             35,387  
 Luxembourg        1,396,131  
      
1,635,785        2,188,278        2,685,065        1,860,763        2,293,973        2,512,874  
 Netherlands           102,134  
           
94,357           108,560           113,759             77,379             95,512             85,924  
 Norway             29,911  
           
40,111             54,075             74,709             41,157             71,170             84,505  
 Poland             12,015  
           
17,651             28,959             45,542             17,782             23,025             25,595  
 Portugal             30,514  
           
28,801             31,214             29,732             13,572             15,808             11,004  
 Romania                    72  
                
109                  247                  390                  326               1,134               1,713  
 Russia               1,347  
             
2,417               5,659               7,175               2,026               3,182               3,917  
 Slovakia               2,171  
             
3,031               3,168               4,762               3,841               4,222               4,349  
 Slovenia   N/A   N/A               2,486               4,219               2,067               2,610               2,663  
 Spain           317,538  
         
316,864           367,918           396,534           270,983           269,611           216,915  
 Sweden           107,064                    176,968           194,955           113,331           170,277           205,449  
80 
 
119,103 
 Switzerland             94,405  
         
116,669           159,517           176,282           135,052           168,260           261,893  
 Turkey             18,112  
           
21,760             15,462             22,609             15,404             19,426             19,545  
 United 
Kingdom           492,731  
         
547,092           755,163           897,460           504,681           729,141           854,413  
 
 Asia and 
Pacific        1,677,887  
      
1,939,251        2,456,492        3,678,326        2,037,536        2,715,234        3,067,323  
 Australia           635,073  
         
700,068           864,234        1,192,988           841,133        1,198,838        1,455,850  
 China   N/A   N/A   N/A           434,063           276,303           381,207           364,985  
 Hong Kong           343,638  
         
460,517           631,055           818,421   N/A   N/A   N/A  
 India             32,846  
           
40,546             58,219           108,582             62,805           130,284           111,421  
 Japan           399,462  
         
470,044           578,883           713,998           575,327           660,666           785,504  
 Korea, Rep. of           177,417  
         
198,994           251,930           329,979           221,992           264,573           266,495  
 New Zealand             11,171  
           
10,332             12,892             14,925             10,612             17,657             19,562  
 Pakistan   N/A   N/A               2,164               4,956               1,985               2,224               2,290  
 Philippines                  952  
             
1,449               1,544               2,090               1,263               1,488               2,184  
 Taiwan             77,328  
           
57,301             55,571             58,323             46,116             58,297             59,032  
 Africa             54,006  
           
65,594             78,026             95,221             69,417           106,261           141,615  
 South Africa             54,006  
           
65,594             78,026             95,221             69,417           106,261           141,615  
 Note: Funds of funds are not included except for France, Italy, and Luxembourg. Data include home-domiciled funds, except 
for Hong Kong, Korea, and New Zealand, which include home- and foreign-domiciled funds. N/A = not available Source: 
2011 Investment Company Fact Book, Investment Company Institute.  
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Table 9: Worldwide Number of Mutual Funds. 
Year-end  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 World  55,523    56,867    61,855   66,288   69,032   67,552    69,519  
 Americas      14,063      13,763     14,475     15,460     16,459      16,954      18,019 
 Argentina          186          200          223          241          253          252          254  
 Brazil       2,859       2,685       2,907       3,381       4,169       4,744       5,618  
 Canada       1,915       1,695       1,764       2,038       2,015       2,075       2,117  
 Chile          537          683          926       1,260       1,484       1,691       1,912  
 Costa Rica          115          110          100            93            85            64            68  
 Mexico          411          416          437          420          431          407          434  
 Trinidad and Tobago   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A            36            35  
 United States       8,040       7,974       8,118       8,027       8,022       7,685       7,581  
 Europe      29,306      30,060     33,151     35,210     36,780      34,899      35,292 
 Austria          840          881          948       1,070       1,065       1,016       1,016  
 Belgium       1,281       1,391       1,549       1,655       1,828       1,845       1,797  
 Bulgaria   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A            81            85            90  
 Czech Republic            53            51            52            66            76            78            80  
 Denmark          423          471          494          500          489          483          490  
 Finland          280          333          376          379          389          377          366  
 France       7,908       7,758       8,092       8,243       8,301       7,982       7,791  
 Germany       1,041       1,076       1,199       1,462       1,675       2,067       2,106  
 Greece          262          247          247          230          239          210          213  
 Hungary            97            91          161          212          270          264          276  
 Ireland       2,088       2,127       2,531       2,898       3,097       2,721       2,899  
 Italy       1,142       1,035          989          924          742          675          650  
 Liechtenstein          171          200          233          391          335          348          409  
 Luxembourg       6,855       7,222       7,919       8,782       9,351       9,017       9,353  
 Netherlands          542          515          473          450          458   N/A   N/A  
 Norway          406          419          524          511          530          487          507  
 Poland          130          150          157          188          210          208          214  
 Portugal          163          169          175          180          184          171          171  
 Romania            19            23            32            41            52            51            56  
 Russia          210          257          358          533          528          480          462  
 Slovakia            40            43            43            54            56            54            58  
 Slovenia   N/A   N/A            96          106          125          125          130  
 Spain       2,559       2,672       3,235       2,940       2,944       2,588       2,486  
 Sweden          461          464          474          477          508          506          504  
 Switzerland          385          510          609          567          572          509          653  
 Turkey          240          275          282          294          304          286          311  
 United Kingdom       1,710       1,680       1,903       2,057       2,371       2,266       2,204  
 Asia and Pacific      11,617      12,427     13,479     14,847     14,909      14,795      15,265 
 Australia   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A  
 China   N/A   N/A   N/A          341          429          547          660  
 Hong Kong       1,013       1,009       1,099       1,162   N/A   N/A   N/A  
 India          394          445          468          555          551          590          658  
 Japan       2,552       2,640       2,753       2,997       3,333       3,656       3,905  
 Korea, Rep. of       6,636       7,279       8,030       8,609       9,384       8,703       8,687  
 New Zealand          553          563          613          623          643          702          700  
 Pakistan   N/A   N/A            31            64            83            96          125  
 Philippines            24            32            38            40            43            41            43  
 Taiwan          445          459          447          456          443          460          487  
 Africa          537          617          750          831          884          904          943  
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 South Africa          537          617          750          831          884          904          943  
Note: Funds of funds are not included except for France, Italy, and Luxembourg. Data include home-domiciled funds, except 
for Hong Kong, Korea, and New Zealand, which include home- and foreign-domiciled funds. N/A = not available.         
Source: 2011 Investment Company Fact Book, Investment Company Institute.  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Mutual fund AUM/GDP ratio of selected countries from 2004 to 2010. 
 
       Source: Wind database.  
 
 
 
 
4.3 The importance of funds in China  
This Section provides some background on how Chinese fund are run. It discusses the 
financial environment in China, development and evolution of the Chinese fund industry, the 
regulatory environment for Chinese fund industry, custodian banks and distribution channel, 
importance and governance issues associated with fund fees. Literature on corporate 
governance of FMC in China is also reviewed.  
4.3.1 Financial background in China  
Although individual investors still account for the biggest proportion of share in China’s stock 
market (51.3% at the end of 2008), securities investment funds (25.7% at the end of 2008) are 
growing in importance in China’s stock market as shown in Figure 8. In fact, the large 
number of individual investors represents a potential market for future securities investment 
fund growth because of their high rate of savings and improving social safety net in China. 
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The government has introduced a series of new policies to build free basic education, expand 
health insurance coverage for all, and extend social safety nets to the rural people over the last 
5-6 years (Wong 2010). For instance, as of 2008, around 40% of the labour force in China 
(total is 775 million workers) were covered by one of the three government sponsors and/or 
other mandatory pension arrangements (Impavido et al. 2009). Since 2009, pilot of Pension 
System was officially launched, and people who are exceeding 60 and registered in pension 
system could receive pension every month. By three years, the total of 0.38billion old people 
registered in this pension system, and over 100 million registered old people have received 
pension fund every month10.   
With the expected increase in the number of people entering pension funds, receiving 
free education and having health insurance coverage, more people who are insured may seek 
alternative investment channels with expected higher returns than bank deposits. There might 
be increasing amount of investment into the securities market by direct investment (share) or 
additional indirect investment (securities investment fund). As shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10, 
China continues to rank as the world’s highest saver with the vast majority of household 
wealth held in cash and/cash equivalents. The high saving rate in China also provides great 
opportunity for further financial investments. Thus, securities investment fund are expected to 
experience fast growth in the future (Z-Ben Adviser 2009).  
                                                 
10 News from Xin Hua on “Pension system is launched, there are overall 0.38 billion people registered to pension fund ” at 1 
July 2012,  http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2012-07/01/c_112329298.htm   
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Figure 8: Market Shares of Different Types of Investors in terms of AUM in China’s Stock Market (at the 
end of 2007) 
 
                          Source: Qi 2008.  
 
Figure 9: Gross national saving rates in selected Asia Pacific economies (2008) 
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Figure 10: Percentage of Household Wealth Held in Cash in Selected Asia Pacific Economies (2008) 
 
 
Figure 11: FMC AUM/Market cap ratio from 2001 to 2010 in China. 
 
            Source: WIND database   
 
 
86 
 
Figure 11 shows the ratio of FMC AUM of Total market capitalization and negotiable 
market capitalization11. As fund could only invest in negotiable securities in Chinese stock 
market, therefore, changes in terms of the negotiable market is more relevant to show the 
trend over times. It shows that since the inception of China’s fund industry in 2001, FMC 
accounts for a very small proportion of negotiable market capitalization, but the ratio of FMC 
AUM/Negotiable market capitalization experienced a sharp increase from 2001 to 2008 with 
some significant volatility, then hit a record of 44% in 2005 and 42% in 2008, but dropped to 
17.7% in 2009 and 13.2% in 2010. That sharp changes within several years may be partly due 
to the short term investment focus on Chinese fund investors, and may also be due to the 
general influence of the rise and fall of Chinese stock market performance.  
As pointed out by Zhang (2012), due to the absence of long term institutional investors, 
Chinese investors tend to have short-term focus and overreact to market anticipations. When 
market anticipates positively, Chinese investors usually react too optimistically, and vise 
versa. Due to the significant role that institutional investors could play in the development of 
capital market and corporate governance of investee firms as explained in Chapter 2.2.5, 
China should encourage institutional investors, such as securities fund, pension fund, life 
insurance fund, index fund to engage in more long term investment and enhance corporate 
governance of investee firms.  
 
4.3.2 Development of fund industry in China  
 
While close-end funds (CEF) were the earliest form of fund in China, open-end funds (OEF) 
had developed rapidly in the last decade. As Figure 12 shows, AUM of CEF was RMB 70 
billion yuan compared to RMB 11.8 billion yuan of OEF at the end of 2001. OEF AUM has 
risen sharply since its inception and surpassed CEF AUM by 2004. Year 2007 saw a 
significant rise of OEF’s AUM to RMB 694.11 billion representing a doubling in size within 
three years. By 2010 OEF’s AUM reached 2.42 trillion yuan in contrast to the RMB 140.95 
billion yuan of CEF.  
 
                                                 
11 Negotiable securities is the securities which could freely buy, sold, and transfer.  
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Figure 12: 2001-2010 OEF&CEF Net Asset under Management in China (RMB Billion). 
 
                                  Source: WIND database 
 
Table 10 indicates that the top 10 FMC manage 48% AUM of total industry assets 
compared to the bottom 10 with only 1.08% market share. In terms of fund AUM, the 
Chinese fund industry is highly concentrated and very similar to U.S., as discussed in Chapter 
3.2.3 of this thesis. The largest 10 U.S. fund complexes own 53% of AUM in the U.S. fund 
industry at the end of 2011. Given the apparent high industry concentration across countries, 
it is therefore worthwhile to investigate whether scale economics exists in Chinese fund 
industry, the empirical part of this study in Chapters 7 and 8 also address this question.  
Most fund unit holders in China are individuals who together account for 71.18% of 
AUM, whereas institutions held 28.82% by the end of 2009 (WIND database). In the U.S., 
household held 89% of mutual fund assets (ICI 2012).  
Table 11 presents different types of funds in China’s FMC at the end of 2010. 
Accounting for 40% of the number of Chinese funds, equity funds had more than 50% AUM 
of the Chinese fund industry. It was followed by hybrid funds, accounting for 29% AUM with 
167 funds. The combined number of bond funds and money market funds is 224, equal to 
26.52% of the total number of funds, indicating the small proportion of these two fund types. 
AUM of other funds account for 9.37% of total fund AUM. Other funds include balanced 
funds, preservation funds, QDII funds and closed end funds.  
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Table 10: Chinese Fund Industry Landscape (Market share, September 2011). 
Rank Market share AUM(RMB bn) 
China AMC 1 9.15% 197.80 
Harvest 2 6.35% 137.24 
E-Fund 3 5.92% 127.99 
Bosera 4 5.11% 110.52 
Southern 5 5.04% 109.04 
GF 6 4.54% 98.11 
Dacheng 7 3.54% 76.62 
Hua'an 8 3.12% 67.36 
Yinhua 9 3.05% 66.01 
Full Goal 10 2.96% 64.10 
ICBC Credit Suisse 11 2.50% 54.15 
China International 12 2.39% 51.61 
China Universal 13 2.34% 50.56 
Lion 14 2.32% 50.19 
Peng hua 15 2.15% 46.51 
Rong tong 16 1.93% 41.64 
BoComm Schroders 17 1.92% 41.55 
INVESCO Great Wall 18 1.90% 41.10 
Guotai 19 1.88% 40.61 
CCB Principal 20 1.84% 39.77 
Fortune SG 21 1.74% 37.54 
Ubs Sdic 22 1.65% 35.70 
Changsheng 23 1.63% 35.34 
HFT 24 1.63% 35.20 
AEGON-industrial 25 1.52% 32.97 
Huashang 26 1.47% 31.83 
China Merchants 27 1.46% 31.64 
Great Wall 28 1.38% 29.89 
China Post & Capital 29 1.38% 29.83 
BOC 30 1.37% 29.53 
Everbright Pramerica 31 1.15% 24.88 
Manulife TEDA 32 1.12% 24.16 
Changxin 33 0.82% 17.65 
Franklin Templeton Sealand 34 0.79% 17.00 
ABC-CA 35 0.76% 16.46 
Huatai-PineBridge 36 0.68% 14.74 
CITIC-Prudential 37 0.67% 14.38 
GTJA Allianz 38 0.66% 14.30 
Galaxy 39 0.65% 14.11 
Wanjia 40 0.64% 13.91 
Zhonghai 41 0.64% 13.87 
Soochow 42 0.59% 12.79 
SWS MU 43 0.55% 11.99 
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Morgan Stanley Huaxin 44 0.48% 10.41 
HSBC Jintrust 45 0.44% 9.53 
Orient 46 0.40% 8.74 
First Trust 47 0.39% 8.45 
Baoying 48 0.38% 8.32 
Harfor 49 0.37% 8.03 
Golden Eagle 50 0.34% 7.43 
First State Cinda 51 0.30% 6.54 
New China 52 0.30% 6.52 
Tianhong 53 0.29% 6.35 
Lambarda China 54 0.28% 6.11 
Yimin 55 0.23% 5.01 
Lord Abbett China 56 0.18% 3.79 
China Nature 57 0.17% 3.70 
Ping An UOB 58 0.15% 3.21 
Minsheng Royal 59 0.10% 2.22 
AXA SPDB 60 0.06% 1.40 
KBC-Goldstate 61 0.05% 1.14 
Fuanda 62 0.05% 1.06 
BNY Mellon Western 63 0.05% 1.03 
Zheshang 64 0.04% 0.93 
        Source: Z-Ben Advisors report 2011.  
 
 
 
Table 11: Net Asset Value (NAV) and Size of China's Securities Investment Funds on 31/12/2010 
(RMB Million). 
Fund type12 
Number of 
Funds 
           AUM 
             (Million)     
  AUM  
  (%)      
Fund unit 
holding 
 (Million)     
Equity funds 327           12,816,355  50.12 
                
12,558,647  
Bond funds 155             1,411,140  5.52 
                  
1,329,579  
Hybrid funds 167             7,414,517  29.00 
                  
6,826,471  
Money market funds 69             1,532,771  5.99 
                  
1,532,771  
Other funds 96             2,396,484  9.37 
                  
2,353,539  
All  814           25,571,267  100 
                
24,601,008  
Source: WIND database  
                                                 
12 Article 29, Section 4 in ‘Operation and management procedures for securities investment funds’ defines the types of funds. 
It stipulates that equity funds are the funds with more than 60% of its AUM invested in stocks; bond funds have more than 
80% of its AUM invested in bonds; funds only investing in money market is defined as money market funds; mixed funds 
includes investments in stock, bond and/ or money market which are not within the above three definitions; others 
represent non-fixed income funds which CSRC promulgates as other type. 
 
90 
 
 
It is generally accepted that equity funds are usually associated with relatively higher 
returns and higher risks compared to other types of funds such as bond funds and monetary 
funds. Fund investors are increasingly drawn to equity funds to invest which involves more 
return and risk during the stock market bloom in 2006-2007(Bin, 2008). However, investment 
in equity fund declined significantly after the impacts of the global financial crisis due to 
uncertainties over the economy.  
 
4.3.3 Evolution of the fund industry in China in terms of fund standardization  
 
Three stages in the evolution of Chinese fund industry may be identified  (Zhou 2008):  
The first stage was from 1991 to 1997.  From 1991 onward, a number of funds were created 
to invest in securities and real estate by raising capital from the public but a large portion of 
their investments were invested in illiquid real estate. A total of 78 closed-end funds were 
established, with a total fund size of approximately US $ 794 million by the end of 1996 (Qi 
2008). Although these old funds developed and expanded rapidly in early years, they were 
found to have many problems in their operations. For instance, there was a lack of effective 
monitoring agencies and regulations in terms of their establishment, management and 
oversight of the assets of the fund, resulting in the poor protection of the interests of investors 
(He 2003, Yang 2007). Other major problems of China’s fund industry were the problem of 
single fund model (only closed-end funds), small size of fund, narrow investment (most 
investment in illiquid real estate), and big differences between funds in their investment 
returns (He 2003; Yang 2007a; Zhou 2008).   
The second stage was from 1997 to 2004. In November 1997, the “Provisional 
Measures on Administration of Securities Investment Funds” was promulgated by CSRC to 
regulate the FMC development (Qi 2008). CSRC replaced the People’s Bank of China as the 
major regulator of FMC (Zhou 2008). In an attempt to standardize all the old funds, most of 
the old funds were required to be restructured; consolidated, relisted and meanwhile new 
funds were created and become listed in the stock exchange (He 2003).  
Up to 2001, a total of 14 new fund management companies were approved by CSRC 
with 48 closed-end funds and RMB 81.7billion of assets under management (Yang 2007; 
Zhou 2008). In 2001, the first open-end fund was established based on the Open-end 
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Securities Investment Funds Pilot Schemes (Yang 2007; Zhou 2008). Since then open-end 
funds developed rapidly, and there were a total of 59 open-end funds with RMB 81.6 billion 
of assets under management by the end of 2004 (Zhou 2008).  Notable milestones have been 
achieved during this stage including the introduction of the monitoring system for the fund 
management industry (CSRC, sub-institutions from CSRC and stock exchange), formation of 
relatively professional fund management companies, and funds becoming an important force 
of institutional investors in securities market (Zhou 2008).     
The third stage is from 2004 onward. In 2004, ‘Securities Investment Fund Law’ was 
promulgated by CSRC to regulate the rights and responsibilities of all parties, with a detailed 
set of provisions in terms of information disclosing, fund operations, securities investment 
activities and trading, investment objectives, requirements from prospectus, variations of 
contracts and etc. in protecting the rights of investors in the securities markets. Others major 
regulations related to the development of FMC are listed in Table 12. Table 13 outlines major 
product developments in China’s fund industry.  
 
Key developments in China’s fund industry  
When CEF emerged in China in 1991, they operated with low efficiency due to lack of 
experience, regulations and irregularly trading behaviours. CSRC cleaned up or restructured 
the “old funds” since 1998. OEF become the mainstream products since 2002, and at end of 
2006, may types of fund products in mature markets were introduced in China as listed in 
Table 13, providing more choices for investors’ needs and keeping pace with international 
markets.      
 
Table 12: Major Regulations over FMC in China. 
Year Regulation Title  
1997 Management Procedures for FMC 
1999 FMC Management Procedures - Guidelines on information disclosure for FMC 
2001 Notice about the Application and Establishment Procedures of FMC  
2002 A Guidance and Advice for FMC Internal Control 
2003 Notice about Performance Compensation in FMC 
2004 China Fund Law  
2004 FMC Distribution Procedures  
2004 The Appointment Procedures for the Senior Officers of FMC 
2006 Guidelines on other Content and Format of Compliance Director's Report in FMC 
2006 Regulations about the Management of FMC Compliance Officer 
2006 Code of Corporate Governance for FMC  
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2007 Guidance on Internal Control for the Distribution Organizations of FMC  
2008 Guidance for Fair Trading System for FMC  
2008 The Appointment Procedures for the Senior Officers of FMC 
2009 Management Procedures for Distribution Fees of OEF   
2010 Models for FMC Information Disclosure  
2011 Revised version of Guidance for Fair Trading System for FMC  
2012 "Fund and Institutions Regulatory and Surveillance Task" system lauched to monitor trading activities 
2012 Revised version of China Fund Law  
Source: CSRC. 
 
Table 13: Major product development in China’s fund management industry. 
1991 close-end fund launched  
1998 close-end fund launched (restructured and listed in stock exchange)   
2001 open-end fund launched  
2002 bond fund and index fund launched 
2003 umbrella fund, principal-guaranteed fund, and money market fund launched 
2004 convertible bond fund, listed open-end fund, and exchange traded fund launched  
2005 mid/short-term bond fund launched  
2006 QDII fund launched  
2007 open-end fund QDII; first new style CEF   
2008 first certificate to manage assets of a specific client 
2009 first permission to manage the assets for  mutiple specific clients  
2010 allow for margin trading and short selling 
2011 first RQFII（RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors) 
2012 first arbitrage private fund 
            Source: CSRC website. 
 
Table 14: Samples of Publicly Reported Scandals in Chinese FMC.  
Year FMC         Alleged nature of scandals 
2003 Shantou Shun Jin Asset Management Insider trading 
2007 China International Fund Management Insider trading 
2007 Anxin Trust & Investment  Information disclosure 
2009 Rong Tong Insider trading 
2010 Great Wall Insider trading 
2010 INVESCO Great Wall Insider trading, Market timing strategy 
and Internal control problem.  
2011 Southeast Securities Insider trading 
2011 Everbright Pramerica Insider trading 
2011 Great Wall Insider trading 
2011 Franklin Templeton Sealand Insider trading 
2012 Investchina Xinyatai Investment Management Market timing strategy  
Source: CSRC  
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There are four major categories of breaches in Chinese fund industry reported by CSRC 
over the last decade including insider trading, market timing strategy, problems of internal 
control and fail to disclose appropriately (Table 14).   
Insider trading is the most prevalent problem in Chinese fund industry. “Lao Shu Cang” 
is one type of insider trading, and is generally considered as the most common form of inside 
trading in China. “Lau Shu Cang” refers to one gains unpublished trading information through 
the position and take advantage of this information to trade. For instance, famous “Jian 
Tang13” event. Tangjian is an assistant to fund manager of Morgan Stanley Huaxin Co. He 
purchased stock using his own account before he invested fund assets so that stock price rose, 
he stood to make significant private profit.   
Article 18 and 43 of “Chinese Fund Law” (2004) stipulates that fund managers should 
not participate in activities which damage fund assets and the interests of fund unit holders. 
Article 79 of Securities Law stipulates that if the activities of officers from FMC or custodian 
damage fund assets and the interests of fund unit holders, officers should compensate the 
damage; if it is serious, the qualification licence of fund officer is required to be cancelled; if 
it is charged as a crime, the wrong doer will be criminally responsible. This regulation did not 
specify the penalty clearly. In 2009, Article 180 of “Criminal Law” was revised and stipulates 
that fund managers who participate in “Lao Shu Cang” may compensate 1 to 5 times of the 
damages as a penalty depending on the situation, and the wrong doer may be sentenced up to 
10 years in prison as penalty. It is hoped that the severe penalty will help curb the prevalent 
practice of “Lao Shu Cang” in China.   
INVESCO Great Wall (IGW) is a FMC in China and was reported by CSRC in 2010 to 
have committed a series of problems such as insider trading, market timing strategy and 
internal control. Internal control is the major issue in terms of supervision and management of 
fund managers, IGW compliance officer cannot fulfill their responsibility, IGW did not 
manage stocks according to its constitution, IGW investment trading system is unsound. 
Those problems breached “Regulations about the Management of FMC Compliance Officer” 
2006, “A Guidance and Advice for FMC Internal Control” 2002, and “The Appointment 
Procedures for the Senior Officers of FMC”2004.  
Other scandals reported by Chinese media included issues on “Transferring” and “Due 
diligence”. The transferring refers to fund managers/senior officers deliberately benefit the 
                                                 
13  News of “A penalty decision from CSRC (Jian Tang)” (reported on 21 April 2008) on 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-04/21/content_8022512.htm  
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interests of other party but damage the interests of fund unit holders. For instance, in the 
notorious “Fanghe Han” event14. Fanghe Han received RMB 4 million to manipulate stock 
prices with Yonglin Yuan (Ex- Chairman of Shanghai Haixin Group). He was sentenced to 18 
years in prison for collusion and breaching the law on manipulation of stock price.  
The “Due diligence” issue refers to fund managers who did not operate fund assets in 
compliance with the regulations required by law such as overpurchsing certain stocks and 
trading later than regulation allows. As stipulated in Article 9 of “Chinese Fund Law” and 
Article 25 of “Trust Law”, fund managers should act in good faith, prudence and diligence. 
FMC should monitor and train fund managers to minimize the damages from these breaches. 
For instance, five funds under Hua An FMC, Southern FMC, ABN AMRO TEDA, did not 
trade according to regulations leading to overall RMB 2.2million losses of fund assets15.   
HeSun (2009) point out that the value of AUM that funds are required to be reported 
periodically is normally manipulated by senior managers in FMC. If there is a big rise in 
stock price on fund investment portfolio, pressure for redemption of fund unit share is high on 
that day. Therefore, FMC hide part of the gains by undervaluing its fund AUM(He & Sun 
2009). CSRC in 2008 promulgates the valuation methods of fund assets in “Further 
Regulating the Operations of Securities Investment Funds” to mitigate those manipulative 
practices. However, fund AUM are still frequently undervalued  just in other forms (He & 
Sun 2009).  
Those frequent scandals including manager’s self-serving behaviours and poor internal 
control damages the interests of investors, how to enhance the corporate governance of those 
FMC is vital to protect the interests of fund investors.  
 
4.3.4 Supervision of fund industry in China  
The problem of insider trading is the most prevalent and serious problem in Chinese fund 
industry. In recent years, CSRC has promulgated a number of rules and regulations to 
                                                 
14 News of “Ex-CEO of Hau An fund management company charged 18 years of prison” reported by JRJ.com on 26 
September 2007, on http://fund.jrj.com.cn/2007/09/000002730384.shtml.  
15  News of “Delaying in executing convertible bonds” by Yahoo Caijing on 26 September 2007, on 
http://fund.jrj.com.cn/2007/09/000002730384.shtml 
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mitigate the problem of insider trading associated with the problem of internal control, 
unusual trading monitoring system16 to enhance the corporate governance of those FMC.   
Article 26 of the revised version of “Guidance of management for the fund management 
companies” in 2009 stipulates that FMC should implement sound communication 
management system and to enhance management of all types of communication tools. For 
instance, FMC should record all conversations through fixed phone. Communication devises 
of fund traders’ such as mobile phones and laptops should be kept centrally daily during 
office hours. Other types of instant communication tools such as MSN and QQ should to be 
monitored during the entire trading process.  All records should be kept for five years.  
In response to this policy, several FMC report that they have established sound Fair 
Trade system in their companies. For instance, CCB Principal Asset Management Co., Ltd 
report17 installed “Fair Trade Module” to mitigate the problem of insider trading. If different 
funds purchase the same securities exceeding certain amount at the same time, this system 
will automatically transfer to Fair Trade Module to operate. They suggest this system will 
strictly prohibit transferring between different parties either directly or indirectly through third 
party.  
Morgan Stanley Huaxin Ji Fund Management Co., Ltd.report 18  that sound control 
system in terms of research quality, audit of stock storage, investment decisions, fund 
managers permissions, trading, and afterwards checks and balances to ensure effective risk 
prevention and compliance in the process of from research to investment, and then to trade 
have been established. They also implement the entire records of staff’s fixed phone, emails, 
and other communication means ect to record the entire process and backup monitoring, to 
ensure there are records for this whole process.   
According to interview of Zhifeng Xu19 Vice-president of CSRC,in general the number 
of cases related to insider trading against formal investigation cases is increasing over recent 
years although more efforts have been implement to curb this problem. For instance, he said 
the percentage of cases related to insider trading accounting for all CSRC formal investigation 
                                                 
16News of “CSRC introduce measures to prevent the problem of “Lao Shu Cang” from four aspects ” reported by 
Caijing, at 25 September 2007 on(http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-09/25/content_6791292.htm） 
17 News of “A report of the second quarter of  Equity securities investment funds of CCB Principal Asset Management Co., 
Ltd”, reported by Sina Finance on 18 July 2012 on http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20120718/070612593975.shtml 
18 News of “Morgan Stanley Huaxin Ji Fund Management Co., Ltd deny the insider trading and stock price manipulation”, 
report by Caijing on 17 January 2012 on http://finance.caijing.com.cn/2012-01-17/111624042.html  
19 News of “Insider trading subvert the foundation of the stock market” on CSRC website on 25 May 2012, 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/bgt/xwdd/201205/t20120525_210592.htm 
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cases are 38%、56%、71%、61% from 2008 to 2011, and among this, the proportion of 
cases relating to insider trading out of transferring the cases to police are 15%、42%、50% 
and 80%  from 2008 to 2011.  
It may suggest even the relevant rules and regulations are well-written, whether they 
could be enforced effectively is hard to measure. Even FMC report that they have 
implemented relevant systems and modules to prevent and mitigate the problem of insider 
trading, however, CSRC report there are three “Lao Shu Cang” event happened in the first 11 
month of 2011. 
Earlier 2012, CSRC have recruited and trained more than 200 officials with relevant 
background, and stationed in Shanghai, Beijing, Hangzhou, Shenzhen, and other major 
regions to carry out inspection work in terms of insider trading20. It is said that this is the 
largest regulatory action from CSRC. CSRC put effort to enhance the internal control of FMC 
to protect the interests of investors; however, it is yet to see the outcome of those regulatory 
actions.  
CSRC revised “China Fund Law” in July 2012. Several key amended articles are 
identified which is important to enhance the corporate governance of FMC. They include:  
Article 19: if senior officers of FMC want to purchase/sell securities, they must report 
to FMC first, and should not have any conflict of interests to fund investors.  
Article 19 senior officers of FMC should avoid using their position to benefit 
themselves which may detriment the interests of investors.  
Article 23(a): FMC should establish good corporate governance, and to clarify the 
function of shareholders committee, board of directors, supervisory board, and senior 
managers, to ensure FMC is operated independently from major shareholders. 
(b)FMC could implement stock compensation system, to establish long term 
compensation scheme for senior managers.  
Article 23(a) is to constrain and clarify senior executives powers to mitigate the 
problem of insider control where dominant executives take advantages of their power 
and position to intervene in company’s daily operations outside their authority. Article 
                                                 
20 News of “Regulatory storm: CSRC send 200 people to investigate the problem of insider trading at national level ”, 
reported by Sohu on 9 July 2012 on http://stock.sohu.com/20120709/n347621248.shtml.  
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23(b) is to align the interests of senior managers and fund managers to the interests of 
FMC and fund investors to avoid self-serving behaviors.  
 Article 25: FMC shareholder, especially dominant shareholders, should not infringe 
on the rights of other shareholder and board of directors to intervene in the daily 
operational activities.  
Article 26: if FMC breaches FMC constitution, code of corporate governance, 
internal control and/or risk management policies, leading to the detriment for 
interests of fund investors, the two major penalties are associated with senior officers 
are:   
(a) Limitations should be imposed on dividends distribution, and on payments of 
remuneration and provision of other benefits to directors, supervisors and senior 
managers.  
(b) Replace board of directors, members on supervisory board, senior managers, 
or restrict their rights.  
These articles are just example to indicate that CSRC has identified the more frequent 
problems and put in places measures to enhance the corporate governance of FMC to protect 
the interests of investors.  
Significant progress has been made in terms of imposing punishment for breaches. The 
revised “China’s Fund Law (2012)” clarifies the penalty for breaches which was ambiguous 
in the original version. For instance, Article 26 as discussed above clearly aligns the 
misconduct to those officers who are directly in charge of those tasks.   
As Association of Investment Fund was established in Beijing in July 2012, in the hope 
that professional association could enhance competition, stimulate innovations, and promote 
better corporate governance of FMC21.   
CSRC has identified some of the weaknesses and failures of corporate governance in 
the fund industry. It institutes increasing regulations and rules in fund industry to enhance 
FMC corporate governance. However, whether these rules and regulations could be enforced 
effectively is hard to ascertain precisely. Thus, internal corporate governance is critically 
                                                 
21 News of “The association of investment fund is established in Beijing at July 2012” on CSRC websites on 7 June 2012 on 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/bgt/xwdd/201206/t20120607_211192.htm .  
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important to protect the interests of fund investors, and the central mechanism is board 
effectiveness.  
 
4.3.5 Custodian banks and distribution channel for funds in China  
According to Article 29 Chapter 3 of “Chinese Fund Law”, the function of a custodian bank 
is to provide a true, accurate and complete report to CSRC to detail the investment and 
operation of a fund. Custodian bank should report to CSRC immediately if they notice any 
violations that FMC may breach the law, regulations or clauses in the fund contract (Article 
30 Chapter 3 of “Chinese Fund Law”). Like custodians in the U.S., the role of custodian in 
China is usually taken up by major Chinese banks such as China’s Construction Bank, 
Industrial and Commercial Banks of China, Bank of China, Agricultural Banks. Custodian 
banks are required by law to be independent from FMC.  
Table 15 shows that the NAV and number of managed funds in Chinese custodian 
banks at the end of 2009,  and it is reported by CSRC that there are 18 custodian banks in 
August 2012 (CSRC website). The first 5 banks managed RMB 2155.507 billion at the end of 
2009, accounting for 91.21% all AUM of mutual funds. Custodian banks for China’s fund 
industry have a highly concentrated structure. “Management Procedure for the Qualifications 
of Custodian Bank of Securities Investment Funds” stipulates that applicants seeking to 
become a custodian for a fund must be a commercial bank which continually has net assets of 
more than RMB 2 billion in the last three financial years. This regulation excludes trusts, 
securities companies or other types of financial institutions or smaller banks. There are overall 
14 banks as custodian bank for FMC in China at the end of 2009. The overall assets under 
custodian supervision by 18 custodian banks are 1.415 billion by 2011 from 0.375 billion in 
2009, which growth rate at 277.17%22. The report stress that custodian industry could help 
reduce transaction costs and solve the problem of information asymmetry in Chinese fund 
industry.   
However, whether China’s fund custodian industry could play its roles is controversial. 
First, custodian banks normally charge 0.25% of AUM directly from the fund assets the 
custodian supervises (Zhou 2008). Because custodian fee charged by custodian banks is 
directly related to the proportion of fund AUM, custodian bank has ban incentive to 
encourage the expansion of the fund AUM rather than focusing on monitoring FMC. Even if 
                                                 
22 A report on the ‘development of China’s custodian industry in 2011” written by 11 custodian banks on September 2012. . 
http://product.dangdang.com/main/product.aspx?product_id=22905488  
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they find some violations occurred to FMC, custodian banks are less likely to report to CSRC 
as their profits could be affected if FMC reputation is damaged (Xi 2011). Therefore, there is 
a question whether the compensation of custodian banks which are aligned with FMC rather 
than with fund investors could curb the custodian’s willingness to monitor. However, research 
and data in this area are scarce.  
In addition, most of FMC shareholders are financial institutions such as banks, 
investment companies, trust, insurance companies ect. Custodian banks are more likely to 
have some relationships rather than custodianship with FMC through FMC dominant 
shareholders or FMC themselves which could jeopardize custodian banks’ supervision. Those 
relationships could lead to conflict of interests, related party transactions, or others among 
those associated organizations (Xi 2011).  
 
Table 15: The NAV and Quantity Number of Managed Funds in Custodian Bank of China 31.12.2009. 
(RMB) 
No. Custodian Bank     NAV 
 (Million) 
 Number of 
funds 
Market Share 
(%) 
1 Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China 
756,684  159 29.36 
2 China Construction Bank 627,863  159 23.02 
3 Bank of China 422,009  86 17.29 
4 Agricultural Bank of China 327,016  72 13.19 
5 Bank of Communications 194,765  45 8.35 
6 China Everbright Bank 52,534  11 2.24 
7 China Merchants Bank 47,848  22 1.94 
8 Industrial Bank 45,824  12 1.46 
9 SPD Bank 33,635  9 1.28 
10 China Mingsheng Banking 23,321  7 0.96 
11 Huaxia Bank 9,931  6 0.45 
12 China Citic Bank 10,546  4 0.38 
13 Postal Savings Bank of China 1,478  1 0.06 
14 Shenzhen Development Bank 432  1 0.02 
Total  2,553,886  594 100 
Source: Wind database 
In terms of distribution channel of fund products, there are direct distribution and 
indirect distribution. Direct distribution is through FMC’s own website or counters in 
different locations. Indirect distribution is primarily through banks and securities companies. 
In China, banks are the predominant distribution channel for funds. a number of issues in 
distribution channel for Chinese fund industry can be identified. First, bank as the traditional 
financial services provider  in China has a wide coverage so that potential fund investors or 
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existing fund investors can easily access to fund products (Chen 2011b). However, bank staff 
generally lacks detailed knowledge of fund products so that fund investors or potential 
investors could not be fully informed about the merits and weaknesses of fund products. 
Second, FMC usually have no contact details of fund investors so FMC could not provide 
further information to them23.  
The four state-owned commercial banks are currently the most popular sites in 
broadcasting fund products, and these banks will choose quality FMC or those FMC pay them 
the best fees to work with. Banks promote different types of financial products, smaller or 
young FMC may find it hard to find distribution channel or face relatively more expensive 
distribution fees. For instance, if the FMC is also a subsidiary of the commercial bank, the 
commercial bank will clearly be more inclined to sell funds from its own subsidiary first. 
Even if a major bank acts as a distributor, it is the local (provincial or city) branches that are 
the actual distributor; it is also rare for all local branches of a national bank to exert the same 
level of efforts and promotion for a FMC’s fund product24.  
 
4.3.6 Fund Fees  
Fund investors seek to maximize their fund returns. Thus, minimizing fees and expenditures 
is one of the keys to achieving superior returns; whereas fund fees enrich FMC and are the 
major income source of FMC and its managers (Kong and Tang 2008; He 2005). The findings 
of both Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 of this thesis indicate that the level of fees charged by a FMC 
significantly reduces FMC performance affirms this argument. Therefore, there is an inherent 
conflict of interests between FMC and fund investors because of the fee setting, and fees 
charged by FMC to fund investors are important for investors, FMC, and policy makers. With 
the characteristics of the corporate model of U.S. mutual fund where each fund is an 
independent entity, most of extant literature use fees at the fund level as proxy of board 
effectiveness (Kong and Tang 2008; Ferris and Yan 2007). Given the generally accepted 
central position the board of directors has in China’s fund industry as discussed in Chapter 5.3 
and following existing relevant literature, this study uses FMC total expense ratio (TER) as a 
measure of board effectiveness in China to investigate how key governance variables impact 
on board effectiveness in the contractual form of FMC in China (Chapter 7).  
                                                 
23 Interview notes with a FMC general manager from First State –Cindy Fund Management Company on 7 June 2012. 
24 Interview notes with an independent director of a joint venture FMC from First State –Cindy Fund Management Company 
on 10 July 2011.  
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There are different types of fees 25 charged to fund investors, which are somewhat 
similar in the U.S. and China. In the U.S., there is a strict disclosure requirement relating to 
fund fees. TER is required by law to be included in the report for investors in the U.S. 
However, in China there is no relevant regulation to require FMC to report them. Chinese 
fund investors may or may not be fully aware and understand the effect of those expenses 
upon fund returns.  
Table 16 shows that equity funds occupy the largest proportion of AUM of China’s 
fund industry, followed by mixed fund. In 2010, overall AUM of equity fund and mixed fund 
was RMB 2023 billion accounting for 84% of total AUM of the Chinese fund industry.  It 
could be argued that managing equity, mixed and other non-fixed income funds normally 
requires greater input and more active efforts, perhaps higher skills, and more time by fund 
managers in their investment strategies than bonds and money market funds.  
Mixed funds on average charge the highest TER from 2005 to 2010 followed by equity 
fund (Table 16). It is worthwhile to note that the year of 2008 witnessed the highest TER for 
non-fixed income funds such as equity, mixed and other funds although there was a 
significant drop in AUM except for bond funds.  This could be due to the fact that up-front fee 
charges on the huge inflow of investment into managed funds prior to the global finance crisis, 
redemption volume however rapidly rose following the crisis and AUM dropped.  
Compare the fund TER between U.S. and China, U.S. has seen a declining trend over 
the past two decades since 1990 (Table 17). TER of equity funds in 2010 was less than half of 
TER in Chinese equity or mixed fund. As reported by  ICI (2011) , the steep decline in fees in 
U.S. mutual fund can be attributed to the growth of mutual fund sales through employer-
sponsored retirement plans. Its loads26 for purchases of fund shares are often waived through 
such retirement plans. U.S. has more intense competition in the fund industry which could 
drive down cost and fees. The big gap of TER between Chinese and U.S. fund may signal the 
presence of greater agency costs and deserves better understanding and investigation.  
 
                                                 
25 According to Article 34 of China’s “A management procedure of FMC operation ”in 2004  stipulates that fees could be 
charged to fund investors, including management fees, custodian fees, disclosure fees, fees for hiring accountant and lawyer, 
fees for holding the meeting for fund investors, trading fees, and other fees regulated in relevant regulation and FMC-investor 
contact.    
26 The fund investor pays the load to compensate the service of a sales intermediary (broker, financial planner, investment 
advisor, etc.). (ICI 2012) 
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Table 16: Average fund total expense ratio 2005-2010 in China. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Equity (%) 1.45 1.34 2.26 3.52 2.43 2.45 
Mixed (%) 1.91 1.65 2.86 3.94 2.82 2.72 
Bond (%) 1.19 2.68 1.6 1.32 2.46 - 
Money market (%) 0.93 1.95 0.91 0.5 1.74 1.84 
Others (%) 1.72 1.37 2.62 4.94 2.29 2.46 
Source: Wind database 
Table 17: Asset-weighted fund total expense ratio on selected year in the U.S. 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2011 
Equity funds (%) 0.99 1.06 0.99 0.91 0.83 0.79 
Hybrid funds (%) 1.02 0.97 0.89 0.8 0.77 0.8 
Bond funds (%) 0.88 0.84 0.76 0.69 0.61 0.62 
Note: total expense ratios are measured as asset-weighted averages. 
Source: Investment Company Institute and Lipper, ICI 2012.
 
Several factors affect total expense ratio. First, expense ratios often vary inversely with 
fund assets, simply because of the way of the ratio is calculated.  Certain fund costs – such as 
transfer agency fees, accounting and audit fees, and directors’ fees –are more or less fixed in 
dollar terms regardless of fund size. In principle, when the value of fund assets rises, these 
fixed costs become smaller relative to those assets (ICI 2012), thus, a fund’s total expense 
ratio should be reduced. However, as shown in Figure 12, AUM of 2007 reached the record 
level of RMB 3039.33 billion, which is more than 4 times the size of AUM in 2006, and TER 
on average actually rose to 2.26% (2007) from 1.34 (2006), and then even going up to 3.52% 
in 2008 and stayed high during the years of 2009 to 2010 despite a sharp drop of AUM in 
2008 and fluctuations of AUM between 2008 and 2010. It seems that fund expenses have not 
been pushed down by economies of scale and competition within the fund industry in China, 
there has been relatively high fees and expenses charged by FMC to fund investors regardless 
of the changes in AUM. This may suggest that significant agency costs exist in Chinese fund 
industry. How to protect the interest of fund investors are therefore vital to the healthy 
development of fund industry.  
As listed above, in 2001, CSRC stipulates that the management fee must be charged on 
a fixed rate over assets under management (AUM), which is paid directly from the fund’s 
assets and calculated as a percentage of the net assets in the portfolio, as compensation for the 
contractual investment advice and contractual administrative services provided to the fund by 
FMC.   
Wang (2009) argues that the current “management fee” payment system may motivate 
FMC to focus on fund AUM rather than fund performance, which may be detrimental to the 
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interests of fund investors. Using TER as a proxy for board effectiveness, this study will test 
what specific internal governance mechanisms enhance board effectiveness.  
 
4.4 Literature on Chinese Corporate governance of FMC  
Most studies on China’s FMC focus on individual fund performance and fee structure. An 
empirical study by Gao and Wang (2005) on the relation between individual fund 
characteristics and fee levels find that fund/FMC size and number of funds within FMC has 
no impact on fund fee levels. They find the higher the fund turnover rate, the more diversified 
in their portfolio and the older the fund will lead to higher fee level (Gao & Wang 2005). 
Similar results shows that fund size and the age of fund have no relation with fund fees but 
fund types and their fund investment strategies have an impact (Xia & Tang 2009).  
Some descriptive comparative studies have compared the fee level in China and the U.S 
(Luo 2008). Luo (2008) investigates the existing problems related to fund fees charged by 
Chinese FMC such as simple and excessive management fees rate compared to those in the 
U.S. An empirical study by Zeng et al. (2005) focuses on the relation between fund fee and 
fund performance. They provide evidence that better performed funds are negatively related 
to fund fee level, whereas underperformed funds have positive relation to fund fees.  
Xu and Deng (2004) offer little empirical evidence other than giving a brief introduction 
on the basic composition of the expenses and rate level of the securities investment fund, 
analyzing the characteristics of the fund rate level.  
At present, studies on China’s FMC and its corporate governance are scant. He (2003) 
argues the interests and objectives of fund investors and FMC shareholders are the same in the 
long term, but different and contradictory in the short term. For instance, he notes that 
managers may engage in irregularities such as over allocation to support share prices in order 
to maximize profit in the short term. Such behavior is detrimental to the interests of fund 
investors and may even violate the law. Ji (2010 ) find that FMC with the presence of foreign 
shareholding outperform those of companies without foreign shareholding. She also finds that 
there is a presence of economies of scale in fund industry in China. Yin et. al. (Yin et al. 2011) 
document that incentive and restraint mechanism of management compensation has no impact 
on the performance of equity funds.  
Some earlier studies provide only theoretical analysis as there is a lack of data for their 
studies since open-end fund only started since 2001 in China. For instance, Ou and Sun (2001) 
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offers a comparative  study on the corporate governance of FMC in China and U.S.; Yu (2002) 
investigates the role and functions of board of directors  in FMC (Yu 2002); Meng (2003) 
explain the theory of corporate governance FMC from both internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms (Meng 2003). Zhou (2008) stresses the need for better corporate 
governance by introducing more use of incentive-based compensation.  
The limited studies on China’s FMC corporate governance have tended to be based on 
conjecture and not empirically tested. This thesis will fill a gap in the literature by providing 
analytical model and empirical tests to investigate corporate governance of FMC. Thus, 
examining the effectiveness of FMC governance will enhance better understanding for 
improving their corporate governance. FMC with strong governance will gain greater ability 
to implement their expected functions in the capital markets and in the corporate governance 
of investee firms.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
There is an increasing anticipation for China’s fund industry to function not only as important 
investment channel but more importantly as a shareholder of investee firms to enhance 
corporate governance of those investee firms. Given China’s lack of long term investment 
perspective in the capital market and generally poor performance in corporate governance of 
publicly listed companies, there is an urgent need to develop a well-functioning fund industry. 
Unlike mutual funds in the form of corporate model, fund investors under the contractual 
form of FMC in China have different status. This Chapter examines the differences between 
these two major organization forms of fund management companies in order to better 
understand the governance issues associated with them. 
Even though Chinese funds have a very short history for over a decade, and they have 
developed quite rapidly. In China, fund investors are not shareholders of FMC and there is 
lack of direct representation for fund investors in FMC governance. This issue is aggravated 
by the presence of conflict of interests between fund investors and FMC shareholders. 
Regulations have been put in place to protect the interests of fund investors. The ever present 
agency problems are evidenced by constant media and official reports of scandals such as 
frequent incidences of insider trading, tunnelling, and market timing strategies.  
The newly amended “Chinese Fund Law” (2012) identifies several key governances 
issues in Chinese fund industry including dominant shareholders’ daily unauthorised 
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interventions in operations, frequent  insider trading activities, lack of incentive based 
compensation system for senior managers, and ambiguity of penalty for breaking the law and 
regulation. Custodian banks as one of the major supervision body may also lack motivation to 
work in the best interests of fund investors given the conflict of interest between custodian 
bank and fund investors, as well as the possible complex relationship between custodian bank 
and FMC.  
Fund expenses and fees are the major income source for FMC, which can reduce fund 
returns for fund investors. FMC fees are a key element in the quest for protection of fund 
investors. Even though the magnitude of AUM has risen significantly over the last decade, 
fund fee has showed an increasing trend. That may suggest significant agency problems in 
Chinese fund industry. This thesis investigates what internal governance settings could 
enhance FMC governance and performance so the agency costs are mitigated and interests of 
investors are better protected.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Under the contractual form of FMC in China, fund investors are not shareholders of FMC, as 
distinct from the corporate form of mutual fund in the U.S. where fund investors are also fund 
shareholders (see Chapter 4.2.3.). There is a conflict of interests between FMC and fund 
investors as fund fees are the major income source for FMC which reduce fund returns for 
fund investors. The complex structure of FMC provides additional governance issues 
compared to publicly listed companies. The generally weak external governance mechanisms 
make the internal governance mechanisms particularly important and relevant in China’s fund 
industry. Both in the literature and in practice, the board of directors is considered as the 
central governance mechanism to protect the interest of fund investors.  
The first major research question for this study is to investigate what specific 
governance setting could enhance board effectiveness. The second research question of this 
study examines how the totality of corporate governance quality affects FMC performance, 
and the relation between the specific governance mechanisms and FMC performance. The 
extant literature on U.S. mutual fund focuses on how board composition and characterises 
influence board effectiveness. This study also considers the impact on board effectiveness and 
FMC performance from shareholder profile and composition, but will also incorporate unique 
characterises of supervisory board, and the role of compensation committee.  
This chapter starts with an analysis of the key governance issues under the contractual 
form of fund companies in China to better understand the problems and challenges facing the 
Chinese fund industry. The relevant literature relating to the dissertation’s two major research 
questions is reviewed, followed by hypothesis development for testing in the empirical part of 
the thesis in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.   
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5.2  Major governance issues of Chinese FMC  
As discussed in Chapter 4.3.6, the profit maximization motive of FMC is realized primarily 
by increasing the size of assets under management (AUM) so that greater amount of fees can 
be earned. It is generally accepted that the remuneration of senior managers especially 
incentive payments in the Chinese fund industry are commonly based on the total AUM a 
FMC manages. The interests of FMC shareholders and senior managers, who could all be 
considered as “insiders”, in this important respect, are aligned.  
On the other hand, fund investors seek the highest possible returns on their investment 
after fees and expenses. As discussed in Chapter 4.3.6, the change of fund AUM which is 
used to calculate fund returns has no impact on fund TER suggesting that there is a 
misalignment of interests between fund investors and FMC performance. Therefore, it could 
be argued that immediate personal benefits of FMC insiders are aligned with fees FMC 
charge but not directly linked to FMC performance.  
As a result, there is a conflict of interests between fund investors and FMC because of 
contrary objectives regarding fees that FMC charge, leading to agency problems. This study 
adopts agency perspective as the main theoretical underpinning to examine the agency 
problem between fund investors and FMC.  
Under the corporate form of mutual funds in the U.S., fee setting is generally regarded 
by the extant literature as the most transparent manifestation of the conflicts of interests 
between the fund investors and the fund management company (fund advisors) (Ferris & Yan 
2007; Kong & Tang 2008; Tufano & Sevick 1997). Fee settings as important a governance 
issue under the contractual form of FMC in China as in U.S. mutual fund because of similar 
conflict of interests between FMC and Chinese fund investors. However, unlike U.S. fund 
investors who are also fund shareholders, Chinese fund investors are only fund unit holders 
due to the different structure of U.S. mutual fund and Chinese FMC as detailed in Chapter 
4.2.3.   
The governance issues of a Chinese FMC (as shown in Figure 13) shows there is a lack 
of direct representation for fund investors in FMC governance. If fund investors are not 
satisfied with FMC management or performance, they could really only exit and leave the 
fund, which incurs costs. In principle, a general meeting for fund investors can be called but it 
can only be convened when more than 10% of fund investors call for a meeting and 50% of 
fund investors attend the meeting (Article 72 and 75, Chinese Fund Law, October 2003). 
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Under the revised China’s Fund Law (2012), a fund investors meeting could be held with 
more than 1/3 of fund investors attending the meeting. If insufficient attendances lead to a 
failure to convene a meeting, fund investors could call for another one within 6 months, but 
must have more than 1/5 of fund investors attending the meeting.  
 
Figure 13: Governance Structures in Chinese FMC. 
 
In practice, however, it is rare for investors to call and hold such a meeting because of 
their dispersed fund unit holding. Fund investors activism in FMC has been rare in China. It is 
only recently that a lawsuit by a couple of fund investors brought against “China Southern 
Fund (CSF)” for failing to distribute dividends as required by the terms of the fund prospectus. 
The prospectus of China Southern Fund stipulates that the proportion of dividend distribution 
should not be below 90% of available-for-distribution profits. In fact, with RMB 9.735 billion 
yuan profits in 2007, CSF should have distributed 0.6958 yuan per unit of fund as required by 
the contract to fund investors. However, CSF has never distributed dividends. A regulation of 
“A guide for profit distribution of fund dividends” issued by the CSRC (2009) states that fund 
contract and prospectus should stipulate that the date to distribute dividends should not 
exceed 15 days from the date of calculation of profits (which is the end of financial year and 
is 31 December in China). However, it does not mandate FMC to distribute dividend under 
this circumstance.  
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 CSF reinvests the profits (which should have been distributed as dividends) in the fund 
without notice and approval by fund investors. However, CSRC did not punish CSF but claim 
that those fund investors activism will “enhance monitoring” on fund industry. Fund investors 
failed this case even though CSRC praises those fund investors who take an active role to sue 
CSF, saying that those investors have made distinguished contribution to the issue of 
dividends distribution27. According to WIND, there are overall 16 OEF that should have 
distributed divided in 2006 and 2007 but did not do so.		
Even though CSF fund investors failed to obtain compensation from or impose any 
penalty to CSF, they did generate attention on this issue to the Chinese fund industry and 
supervisory authority about dividends. For instance, Franklin Templetion Sealand Fund 
Management Co, Ltd paid dividends to its fund investors for the year of 2007 in April 2009 
which should have been paid in 200728. China AMC amends the clause in the contract for 
funds relating to “dividend”. They change the “date of distribution” to the “date of reinvesting 
the dividends” to avoid further payment obligations relating to dividend29.  	
Chinese fund investors are more vulnerable to expropriation than fund investors in U.S. 
Whereas fund shareholders/investors in the U.S. have specific voting rights such as electing 
directors and approving material changes in terms of a fund’s contract with its investment 
adviser, fund investors in China have no means nor direct representation to monitor fund 
managers’ behaviours other than the fact that the board is entrusted by law to undertake the 
monitoring role on behalf of fund investors.  
The misalignment of interests between FMC and fund investors coupled with fund 
investor’s lack of direct representation in Chinese FMC governance makes fund investors 
vulnerable to expropriation by FMC and fund managers. This was evidenced by frequently 
reported scandals such as insider trading or market trading strategies as discussed in 4.3.3. In 
addition, FMC are better positioned to exploit opportunities to charge excessive fees in order 
to maximize their pecuniary interests at the expense of fund investors. Recent reports unveil 
that 56 Chinese equity funds have experienced dramatically decrease in their AUM but the 
                                                 
27  News of “The first case about dividend distribution: China Southern Fund breach the contract, did not 
distribute the dividends, but fund investors lose the lawsuit” reported on 14 March 2012 from www.ce.cn   
28 News of “Franklin Templetion Sealand Fund Management co, Ltd makeup dividends” reported by Wangyi 
Caijing on 15 April 2009 at http://money.163.com/09/0415/08/56U5V21H0025304V.html 
29 News of “China AMC co, Ltd revised clause about dividends distribution”, reported by Wangyi Caijing on 15 
April 2009 about http://money.163.com/09/0415/09/56U99J8S00251LDT.html  
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management fees for those funds have risen over the previous financial year 30  . It is 
commonly accepted that both external and internal governance mechanisms are needed to 
reduce agency costs. Appropriate law, effective enforcement mechanisms and market 
competitive conditions (competitive capital market, industry concentration, conditions of 
entry, investor mobility) are widely regarded as essential external governance mechanisms for 
a well-functioning mutual fund industry. As discussed in Chapter 3.2, China’s FMC 
organisation form and the institutional and regulatory environment are at early stages of 
development compared to the more advanced economy such as the U.S. (Tam & Yu 2011). It 
is well documented that emerging economies like China do not have well developed external 
governance mechanisms, such as the necessary market and social institutions, well-designed 
law and efficient law enforcement (Kakabadse et al. 2010; Tam 1999) 
Weak legal enforcement in China leaves much room for FMC shareholders and fund 
managers to exploit fund investors’ rights and interest. Ineffective external governance 
mechanisms therefore make internal governance mechanisms particularly important in 
protecting the interests of fund investors (Xi 2011). Studies on U.S. mutual funds provide 
ample evidence that internal corporate governance plays a crucial role in protecting the 
interests of fund investors (Adams et al. 2010; Chou et al. 2007; Ferris & Yan 2009; Gompers 
et al. 2001; Wallison & Litan 2007; Wellman & Zhou 2007). There are however relatively 
few studies on corporate governance of FMC in emerging economies like China where the 
fund management industry has only gradually gained importance in the financial system.  
As discussed in Chapter 4.4., the current limited studies on China’s FMC focus 
primarily on the relationship between the types of fund (by investment objectives) and their 
financial performance (Ding & Wermers 2005; Gao & Wang 2005; Xia & Tang 2009). 
Studies by Chinese researchers (He 2003; Zhou 2008) on FMC corporate governance in 
China have tended to be descriptive and not empirically tested.  
This study aims to contribute to the literature by providing an empirical analysis of how 
governance mechanisms affect board effectiveness and fund performance; it is the first 
systematic study on the corporate governance of Chinese FMC. It aims to shed light on the 
corporate governance of fund companies under the contractual form in China.  
 
                                                 
30 News of “AUM of 56 Funds decreases but their management fees are increasing” reported on 10 April 2012 
from http://finance.qq.com/a/20120410/001075.htm.  
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5.3 Literature on board effectiveness   
Commonly regarded as the central internal governance mechanisms, the board of directors is 
charged with the responsibility to protect the interests of shareholders. Most studies of the U.S. 
fund industry show that superior board performance is expected to lead to reduction in fund 
fees, and improvement in fund performance (Ferris & Yan 2007; Khorana & Servaes 2004; 
Kong & Tang 2008; Meschke 2007; Tufano & Sevick 1997).  
In China, the role of the board of directors is similar to that of board of directors  in U.S. 
mutual funds including management fees with fund investors, and budget in financial reports; 
monitoring of fund management and enforcing legal compliance; initiation of a new fund. 
Board of directors is expected to evaluate and monitor the performance of fund management 
to reduce compliance violations to a minimum. Compared to board of directors in the 
corporate form of mutual fund in U.S., board of directors under the contractual form in China 
are in principle primarily responsible for protecting the interests of fund investors rather than 
FMC shareholders who are also their employers.  
The FMC board is required by law to represent first and foremost the interests of fund 
investors. The CSRC has placed the board of directors in a central position to protect the 
interests of fund investors and assets managed by FMC. However, in China, it is the FMC 
shareholders who ultimately determine the appointment and compensation of directors 
although their decisions are required to be submitted to CSRC for approval (Article 45, 
‘Corporate Governance Code for FMC’). With widespread ownership concentration in 
Chinese FMC, most board members and especially the positions of CEO or chairman are 
likely to be appointed by the controlling shareholders.  
The question therefore arises whether these insiders could genuinely represent the 
interests of fund investors rather than the FMC shareholders especially when there is a 
conflict of interests between fund investors and FMC shareholders. In most cases, the ultimate 
controlling shareholder in China’s fund industry is the state, but the state’s dual role as owner 
and regulator raises agency problem of how to motivate and monitor bureaucrats to maximise 
the interests of fund investors in selecting, disciplining, and motivating management. 
Therefore, whether the FMC board can perform its role effectively in these circumstances is 
critical.  
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The role of board independence has received heightened attention after every recent 
global or regional financial crisis. This is particularly the case in the fund industry. For 
instance, SEC requires at least 75% of a mutual fund’s directors to be independent and also 
mandating chairman independence (Article 1 (a) (7), ‘Investment Company Governance’, 
U.S., 2004). By the end of 2009, independent directors comprised at least three-quarters of 
board membership in almost 90 per cent of fund companies (ICI 2011). These changes 
demonstrate the significant role of independent directors is expected to play in the U.S. fund 
industry.  
But in China where there is a lack of qualified independent directors, their role and 
their independence have been questioned all the time (Kakabadse et al. 2010; Yuan & Yuan 
2007). Whether independent directors could perform their assigned functions to represent the 
interests of fund investors is clearly critical to the governance development for the industry.  
Given the complex and potentially pivotal corporate governance issues in Chinese FMC, 
how to improve FMC board effectiveness is critically important in China, and a better 
understanding of what makes board of directors effective is vital to addressing some major 
governance issues faced by the burgeoning fund industry in China. This study extends the 
literature by identifying and examining the efficacy of key governance mechanisms in the 
development of an effective and well-functioning board in the contractual form of FMC 
organization in an emerging transition economy.  
The first major research question of this study is as follows:  
(1) How may specific internal governance mechanisms impact on board effectiveness in 
Chinese FMC?  
As discussed in Chapter 4.3.6, FMC total expense ratio (TER) is employed as a proxy 
of board effectiveness to examine how governance settings impact on board effectiveness in 
the contractual form of FMC in China where each board of directors oversees all the funds 
underneath the fund companies (Chapter 7). The impact of each of the internal mechanisms in 
theoretical terms is discussed in the following Section.  
 
 
 
113 
 
5.4 Hypotheses development: governance mechanisms and board 
effectiveness 
 
This Section discusses the development of the major hypotheses relating to the first key 
research question of this thesis. It addresses the issue of which type of governance 
characteristics matters most in the governance of FMC in enhancing board effectiveness for 
fund investors in China.  
Most of the extant studies in the literature focus on the impact of board composition and 
characteristic on board effectiveness in the U.S. context (Adams et al. 2010; Ding & Wermers 
2009; Ferris & Yan 2007; Khorana et al. 2007a; Khorana et al. 2007b; Kong & Tang 2008; 
Meschke 2007). This dissertation extends the conventional analytical approach by including 
an analysis of the impact on board effectiveness from governance variables such as FMC 
ownership identities, structure, and concentration, the presence of remuneration committee 
and the supervisory board.  
 
FMC shareholding structure  
Given the high concentration of ownership, board effectiveness is subject to the influence of 
shareholders as they have the capacity to influence the appointment and compensation of 
directors although their decisions are nominally subject to CSRC approval (Article 45, 
‘Corporate Governance Code for FMC’). Therefore, whether certain types of shareholding 
characteristics and structure could improve or impair board effectiveness for the protection 
the interests of fund investors will be a key issue to be investigated in this study.  
As discussed in Chapter 3.3.1., state-owned companies are often considered to be 
associated with slow growth and low performance (Pedersen & Thomsen 2003; Shleifer 
1998). It is often argued that state ownership harms firm performance in Chinese firms (Li et 
al. 2009; Nee et al. 2007; Yiu & Lu 2005).  
In the context of FMC ownership, it could be argued that the extent of shareholding by 
the state may similarly exert a negative impact on board effectiveness. Whereas the CSRC 
requires major shareholder of FMC to have financial industry background (Article 12 (3), 
Chapter 2 of “Chinese Fund Law”, 2004), in practice, nearly 59.78% of FMC shareholding 
are state-owned financial institutions. Accordingly, in this study we will examine whether the 
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level of ownership stake of state-owned financial institutions in FMC affects board 
effectiveness. Hypothesis 1 is formulated: 
Hypothesis 1:  Shareholding by state-owned financial institutions in FMC diminishes 
board effectiveness.  
As noted in Chapter 3.3.1, many studies on Asia and China reveal that dominant 
controlling shareholder frequently expropriates the interests of minority shareholders 
(Claessens et al. 1999; Hu et al. 2010). Empirical studies also find that controlling shareholder 
in China often engages in related party transactions, market manipulations, and even 
falsifications of financial statements, thus harming the interests of minority shareholders  (Bai 
et al. 2004; Hu et al. 2010; Yiu & Lu 2005) .  
A controlling shareholder31 of Chinese FMC on average holds nearly 47% of total 
shareholding. Board effectiveness can be influenced by controlling shareholders as they can 
exert influence on director appointment and compensation.  Listed companies are subject to 
more rigorous corporate governance mandates and are generally expected to exhibit higher 
governance standards. We therefore test whether publicly listed companies as the controlling 
shareholders could enhance FMC board effectiveness. Based on the above analytical 
perspective, Hypothesis 2 is formulated.   
Hypothesis 2: A listed company as the controlling shareholder of FMC enhances board 
effectiveness.  
As discussed in Chapter 3.2.2, increasing the presence of foreign institutions as 
shareholder is expected to enhance the governance standards of public listed companies. Since 
the ‘Rules on the Establishment of Joint Venture Fund Management Companies’ came into 
effect in July 2002, there have been 28 joint venture FMC established (out of 61 FMC) by the 
end of 2010 (WIND). It has been argued that foreign ownership in FMC has brought to 
Chinese FMC product diversification, increased competition, improved compliance and 
                                                 
31This study defines a controlling shareholder as the shareholder with the largest shareholding which is at least 2% greater 
than the second largest shareholder. The 2% difference is used as China’s regulation only allows majority shareholding for 
domestic companies and there are many companies with the largest shareholder holding at 51% and the second shareholder 
holding 49%. This is particular common for FMC with foreign companies participates. Article 8 of “Rules on the 
Establishment of Joint Venture Fund Management Companies” promulgates that the aggregate foreign direct and indirect 
shareholding should not exceed 49% of FMC. It indicates that CSRC may try to control the power of foreign companies on 
the FMC.  
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management efficiency, and has facilitated good international practices, and improved the 
international competitiveness of domestic FMC (Qi 2008). Foreign shareholding in Chinese 
FMC varies from 16.5% to 49%. Accordingly, Hypothesis 3 is formed: 
    
Hypothesis  3: The presence of foreign shareholding in FMC enhances board effectiveness.   
The law and finance literature argues that quality of legal protection for shareholder and 
ownership concentration are inversely related, that is, they are substitutes (Burkart & Panunzi 
2006; La Porta et al. 1999). However, in terms of Chinese FMC where shareholders are not 
fund investors, the relation between concentrated ownership and fund investor protection 
deserves better understanding and investigation.  
As Table	 21 indicates, the number of shareholders in FMC varies from 1 to 6 in China 
(WIND). For instance, “Huaxia” and “Zhongxin” both have only one shareholder with 100% 
shareholding. Most FMC have state-owned financial institutions as the controlling 
shareholder. A high level of control by the controlling shareholders may be more likely to 
lead to a reduction in the power and effectiveness of the board of directors (Sanchez-Marin et 
al. 2011). It could be argued that a more dispersed shareholding in FMC should in principle 
be expected to positively impact on board effectiveness. Herfindahl index (HHI)32  will be 
used in this study to measure ownership concentration in FMC. Hypothesis 4 is	formulated:	 
Hypothesis  4:  Higher ownership concentration diminishes board effectiveness. 
 
Board Characteristics and composition  
As discussed in Chapter 3.3.3, a substantial body of work in the literature views the board of 
directors as the center of corporate governance architecture. The board of directors is also 
expected under Chinese law to play a critical role in the effective corporate governance of 
FMC. Having the optimal board composition is generally considered important for the board 
to perform effectively(Bange & Mazzeo 2004).  
Superior board governance performance is expected to lead to reduction in fund fees, 
and improved fund performance (Ferris & Yan 2007; Khorana & Servaes 2004; Kong & Tang 
2008; Meschke 2007; Tufano & Sevick 1997). Board of directors is considered as a central 
                                                 
32 Herfindahl index (HHI) is defined in Chapter 3.3.1.  
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internal mechanism to protect the interests of investors in mutual fund by both regulators and 
researchers. Using agency theory as the dominant theoretical paradigm, the extant literature 
has focused mainly on mutual fund in the U.S. in investigating which type of board as an 
internal governance mechanism can improve board effectiveness. 
Tufano and Sevick (1997) show that lower fees are charged by funds with smaller board, 
a greater fraction of independent directors, and whose board members sit on a larger fraction 
of the fund sponsor’s other boards. They also find evidence that independent directors with 
relatively higher compensation approve higher fees charged to fund investors. Using director 
data and 2689 U.S. domestic equity mutual funds, Ding and Wermers (2009) confirm Tufano 
and Sevick’s findings of 1995, 1999, and 2002. Similar result is found for closed-end funds 
by Del Guercio, Dann and Partch (2003) that small boards that are dominated by independent 
directors charge lower fees.  
However, Ferris and Yan (2007) find that neither chairman independence nor 
independent directors is related to the probability of fund scandals or fund expense ratio, 
which challenges the usefulness of SEC recent regulations towards corporate governance of 
FMC. They also provide evidence that other governance factors such as multiple directorships, 
board size and unexplained independent director compensation are positively related to fund 
expense ratios. Kong and Tang (2008) find that a unitary board of small size, rather than 
independent boards contributes more to the benefits of fund investors.  
Studies on U.S. mutual funds document that funds with larger board charge higher fees 
(Ferris & Yan 2007; Gao & Wang 2005; Kong & Tang 2008; Tufano & Sevick 1997). They 
argue that a large number of directors on the board pose a challenge in terms of coordination 
and using them effectively and having any kind of meaningful individual participation.  
Studies investigating mutual fund under the corporate form find that the independence 
of the board of directors enhances its monitoring effectiveness (Mayers & Smith 1986; 
Weisbach 1988). Tufano and Sevick (1997) provide empirical evidence that funds with a 
higher percentage of independent directors charge lower fees. The relation between the 
fraction of independent directors and fund fees is also found to vary over time (Meschke 
2007). Kong and Tang (2008), however, find that board independence is not beneficial to fund 
investors as FMC with higher board independence tends to charge higher fees.  
In theory, independent directors are expected to contribute expertise and greater 
objectivity that reduces managerial entrenchment and expropriation to protect the best 
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interests of investors, thereby decreasing managerial opportunism and lowering fund fee level 
(Kong and Tang 2008). In China, fund investors are not FMC shareholders as FMC are 
organized in contractual form. Independent directors in China are formally charged with the 
mandatory responsibility to safeguard fund investors’ wealth and to protect their interests. On 
the basis of the existing literature, Hypotheses 5 and 6 are therefore formulated.  
Hypothesis  5:  Smaller FMC board size enhances board effectiveness.   
Hypothesis  6: Higher proportion of independent directors enhances board effectiveness.   
In corporate governance literature, it is sometimes argued that a feature of good 
corporate governance is having diversity in the board and senior management, because it 
could potentially impact positively on shareholder value and firm performance (Bantel & 
Jackson 1989; Carter et al. 2003; Murray 1989; Weippert 2002). For instance, female in top 
management positions is found to enhance board effectiveness because of the management 
diversity (Singh & Vinnicombe 2004; Smith et al. 2004; Srinidhi et al. 2011). Nielsen & Huse 
(2010) found that gender diversity in the board encourages cognitive conflict which results in 
more effective decision making.  
In a sample of U.S. listed firms from 2001-2007, Srinidhi et al. (2011) document a 
positive relation between the presence of female directors and firm performance. Their result 
suggests gender diversity on corporate boards may enhance board effectiveness. Muller-Kahle 
& Lewellyn (2011) however find that board with gender diversity is negatively associated 
with subprime lending. As a different group from the dominant “old boys” network, women 
are considered to be more independent than male board members (Brennan & McCafferty 
1997).   
To the best of our knowledge, the relationship between management diversity (female 
representation) and FMC/mutual fund board effectiveness has not been investigated in prior 
studies.  Accordingly, Hypotheses 7 and 8 are formulated.   
Hypothesis  7:  A female CEO/ board chair enhances board effectiveness.  
Hypothesis  8: Board with gender diversity enhances board effectiveness. 
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Other key governance variables  
A well designed executive remuneration scheme plays a significant role in attracting and 
maintaining quality managers, and provides incentives to perform their duties in alignment 
with the best interests of shareholders (Anderson & Bizjak 2003; Conyon 1997). Whether 
FMC with remuneration committee could be managed in a more efficient way so that their fee 
level can be lower than those FMC without remuneration committee will be examined in this 
study. Based on the above theoretical perspective, Hypothesis 9 is given. 
Hypothesis 9: The presence of remuneration committee enhances board effectiveness.  
As discussed in Chapter 3.3.2., most studies in the literature show that the presence of 
supervisor board has no effective role in Chinese public listed companies. For Chinese FMC, 
there has been no study on the impact of supervisors. In China, supervisors in FMC are 
required to play the same role as those in public companies. We therefore expect supervisors 
are also ineffective in FMC, Hypothesis 10 is formulated.  
Hypothesis 10: Increasing the number of supervisors does not enhance board effectiveness. 
Table 18: List of Hypothesis to test relationship between specific internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and board effectiveness in Chinese FMC.  
Hypothesis 1:  Shareholding by state-owned financial institutions in FMC diminishes board effectiveness. 
Hypothesis 2: A listed company as the controlling shareholder of FMC enhances board effectiveness.   
Hypothesis 3: The presence of foreign shareholding in FMC enhances board effectiveness.   
Hypothesis 4:  Higher ownership concentration diminishes board effectiveness. 
Hypothesis 5:  Smaller FMC board size enhances board effectiveness.   
Hypothesis 6: Higher proportion of independent directors enhances board effectiveness.   
Hypothesis 7:  A female CEO/ board chair enhances board effectiveness.  
Hypothesis  8: Board with gender diversity enhances board effectiveness. 
Hypothesis  9: The presence of remuneration committee enhances board effectiveness. 
Hypothesis 10: Increasing the number of supervisors does not enhance board effectiveness. 
 
 
5.5  Literature on FMC performance and corporate governance  
In principle, enhancing performance is vital to attract and retain the interests of investors, and 
FMC should be willing to enhance their performance to attract investors in order to increase 
their AUM so that more income could be earned. Empirical finding in Chapter 8 shows there 
is no relation between AUM/TER and performance, as fund investors pursue maximization of 
fund performance whereas FMC wants to charge more fees or enlarge AUM so more fees 
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could be charged. Therefore, a misalignment of interests arises between FMC shareholders 
and fund investors.  
In two interviews with fund senior managers of Chinese FMC by the author of this 
thesis, the interviewees point out that it is only possible to increase a fund performance when 
fund AUM is relatively small because of investment strategies and skills. In addition, a fund 
with star performance (top five among all funds) could have positive effect on FMC AUM as 
the reputation of FMC could be enhanced by its star fund. However, other funds within the 
same family may not have increased returns; therefore, overall FMC performance is slightly 
changed. Empirical studies find that fund performance does not persist in China. For instance, 
in a sample of 122 OEF from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2010 and using four 
performance measures, Niu (2012) find that except for index funds, all other types of OEF 
including equity, bond, and mixed funds previous year performance has no relationship with 
future performance. This result is supported by GuoZhang (2012) showing that quarterly 
performance of 44 Chinese OEF in 2006 to 2008 did not persist.   
Feng (2009) finds that if fund’s current performance is better than the last investment 
period, it could induce an AUM outflow as fund investors redeem their investment to collect 
the gains. This result is consistent  with findings by Li (2003), Liu (2004) and Lu et al. (2007). 
Feng (2009) explains that because of the absence of persistent performance in China, fund 
investors normally disregard fund’s historical performance but their buying decisions are 
primarily influenced by the recommendation of staff of the bank selling the fund product. 
Given the fluctuations in fund performance, investors usually redeem the funds to reap the 
gains when fund performance is seen as good. Therefore, the motivation for FMC to raise 
FMC overall performance is not as strong as compared to the maximisation of the AUM of  
FMC. 
It could be argued that the immediate personal benefits of FMC insiders are thus aligned 
as far as fees income is concerned but is not directly linked to FMC performance. Examining 
how FMC performance may be enhanced by the quality of corporate governance therefore 
provides further clues to addressing the governance issues inherent in the fund industry. As 
discussed, fees are a major income source for FMC, thus FMC insiders (shareholders and 
senior managers) want to maximum this income. However, those fees enrich FMC but harm 
FMC performance which is the major return for fund investors’ investment. 
The current literature provides empirical evidence that fund governance plays an 
important role in mutual fund performance (Chou et al. 2007; Cremers et al. 2009; Wellman 
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& Zhou 2007). Better fund governance may bring fees more in line with performance (Gil-
Bazo & Ruiz-Verdú 2009). Chou, Ng et al. (2007) find that fund with better governance 
standards tend to invest in corporations with good corporate governance mechanism.  
It should be noted that this study investigates the impact of governance profile on board 
effectiveness and performance at the FMC level rather than at the fund level, taking into 
account the contractual nature of Chinese FMC as also funds within the FMC operate under 
the same set of governance mechanisms.   
To what extent overall corporate governance quality may impact on FMC performance 
in China is unknown. This study aims to make a contribution to the literature by examining 
how the overall quality of FMC governance and various governance mechanisms affect FMC 
performance under the contractual form of fund industry in China where institutional and 
regulatory environment is quite different from those of funds in the U.S. If higher quality of 
corporate governance could lower fund expense ratio and enhance fund performance, then it 
is useful and valuable for fund investors to take governance rating into account when deciding 
on their investments. Fund investors could use this information to invest in funds managed by 
the FMC with good governance or avoiding FMC with poor governance. FMC are more 
likely to improve their corporate governance ratings to attract more investors, which in return 
could enhance their performance. Therefore, examining the link between quality of corporate 
governance and FMC performance is critical. 
It is generally accepted that some governance mechanisms may likely be more effective 
than others. Chinese fund industry is no exception. Board is widely regarded as the central 
internal governance mechanisms playing a vital role in Chinese fund industry; however, other 
internal governance mechanisms may also works effective in FMC. As the central internal 
governance mechanism, board may perform better if other internal governance mechanisms 
function well. It is therefore worthwhile to identify which mechanisms work and those that 
are not in enhancing the effectiveness of corporate governance in FMC. The relationship 
between specified governance mechanisms and FMC performance is therefore further 
investigated.  
As a form of robustness test, this thesis also uses total expense ratio as a proxy of 
board effectiveness to examine the relation between this key governance mechanism (board 
performance) and FMC performance. 
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The second major research question in this thesis is:  
(2) How does the overall quality of FMC corporate governance affect FMC performance? 
What are the relationships between specific internal governance mechanisms and 
FMC performance?  
There are four measures of FMC performance in this study: continuous monthly returns   
(MPF), objective-adjusted performance (OAPF), Modigliani and Modigliani performance 
(M2PF) and Jensen’s alpha (JENSENPF) as explained in details in Chapter 6.6.5. Taking the 
perspective of fund investors, FMC performance is about returns to their investment. Thus, 
FMC performance under these measures is essentially derived from various methods for 
aggregating the performance of funds managed by a FMC.  
 
5.6  Hypotheses development: governance mechanisms and performance  
 
It is widely accepted that given the right institutional conditions the quality of corporate 
governance can enhance firm performance in conventional firms (Duggal & Millar 1999; 
Hermalin & Weisbach 1991; Jackling & Johl 2009). Improving FMC performance is 
important for a transition economy as those financial institutions form an important aspect of 
a reforming economy’s path to financial development. It is therefore important to examine 
whether the quality of corporate governance could impact on firm performance in Chinese 
fund industry when there is an immature capital market, weak legal enforcement and poor 
external institutional conditions. The empirical analysis and evidence of this study may 
provide useful insights for instituting measures to better protect the interests of fund investors.  
The hypotheses are developed as follows.  
Studies on the governance of U.S. mutual funds show that the quality of governance, as 
measured by governance ratings, plays a significant role in attracting fund investors. However, 
there is little empirical research on the role of corporate governance quality measured by 
those governance ratings in assessing fund performance (Chou et al. 2007; Ertugrul & Hegde 
2009; Wellman & Zhou 2007).  
If higher quality of corporate governance could lower fund expense ratio and enhance 
fund performance, then it is useful and valuable for fund investors to take governance rating 
into account when deciding on their investments. In the Chinese context, fund investors could 
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use this information to invest in FMC with good governance or avoiding FMC with poor 
governance. FMC are more likely to improve their corporate governance to attract more 
investors, which in return could enhance their performance. Therefore, examining the link 
between the quality of corporate governance and FMC performance will provide important 
evidence.  
A series of studies in the literature have attempted to investigate the overall quality of a 
firm’s governance in conventional companies including La Porta, Lopez de Silanes et al. 
(1998), Gompers, Ishii et al. (2001), Gompers, Ishii et al. (2001) and Bebchuk et al. (2009). 
Most of them suggest that better corporate governance enhances firm performance.  
There are relatively scant studies on how better governance quality may affect fund 
performance in the fund industry. Using Morningstar’s rating of board directors quality, Lai et 
al. (2010) examine 461 U.S. equity funds over 2001-2007 showing that good quality board 
are more responsive to adopt strategic change when performance is poor. Factors considered 
in measuring the board quality rating in the Morningstar include the nature of past board 
actions, board independence, director ownership stake, and the quality of board oversight. 
Wellman and Zhou (2007) document that the quality of fund governance is positively 
correlated to fund performance. Chou, Ng et al. (2007) show that a fund with better corporate 
governance ratings tends to invest in firms with strong corporate governance.  
The literature on governance rating and fund performance suggests that fund investors 
ought to make their fund selection based not only on the fund’s past performance, but also 
fund governance. There has been no study on the Chinese fund industry to provide insight of 
the efficacy of FMC governance and its ramifications for FMC performance. This study fills a 
gap in the literature by examining how the overall quality of corporate governance as 
measured by governance ratings may affect FMC performance. Hypothesis 11 is formulated:  
Hypothesis 11: Good governance enhances FMC performance. 
The Corporate Governance Index (CGI) constructed by the China Centre for 
Institutional Investors (CCII at Nanjing University) is used as a proxy for overall quality of 
corporate governance and is applied to examine its impact on FMC performance in China. 
There are 7 provisions in the construction of the index including shareholders, board of 
directors, board independence, supervisory board, investment committee, superior officers 
and fund manager. For each category, it contains diversified variables underneath in terms of 
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age, sex, education background, position, years of experience, professional background. CGI 
aims to measure the overall quality of corporate governance in Chinese FMC.  
In addition to investigating the link between the overall quality of governance and 
performance of FMC, this dissertation will also examine the relationship between identified 
governance mechanisms and FMC performance. It identifies for the Chinese context key 
internal governance mechanisms from various perspectives including shareholder identity and 
structure, board of directors, remuneration committee, and supervisory board. 
Internal governance mechanisms  
Most of the extant studies investigate what types of board composition and characteristics 
affect fund performance in the U.S. context (Adams et al. 2010; Ding & Wermers 2009; 
Ferris & Yan 2007; Khorana et al. 2007a; Khorana et al. 2007b; Kong & Tang 2008; Meschke 
2007). This dissertation extends the conventional analytical approach by including an analysis 
of the potential performance impact of FMC ownership structure and concentration, presence 
of remuneration committee and Chinese supervisory board. It contributes to the studies of the 
corporate governance of the fund industry with new perspective and evidence.   
 
Shareholder identity and concentration 
It is often argued that state ownership harms firm performance in Chinese firms (Li et al. 2009; 
Nee et al. 2007; Yiu & Lu 2005). Most of the controlling shareholder for Chinese FMC is 
state-owned financial institutions. Accordingly, in this study we will examine whether the 
level of ownership stake by state-owned financial institutions in FMC affects FMC 
performance. Hypothesis 12 is formulated: 
Hypothesis 12: Shareholding by state-owned financial institutions in FMC damages FMC 
performance. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, with highly concentrated ownership, controlling shareholder 
can influence internal governance mechanisms such as the appointment of directors and 
supervisors’ choice(Hu et al. 2010). As already discussed in Section 4 of this Chapter, a 
controlling shareholder of Chinese FMC on average holds nearly 47% of total shareholding. 
And listed companies are usually subject to more rigorous corporate governance mandates 
and are generally expected to exhibit higher governance standards. It is therefore important to 
understand better how controlling shareholder affect firm performance. Hypothesis 13 is 
formulated: 
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Hypothesis 13: A listed company as the controlling shareholder of FMC enhances FMC 
performance.   
 A dummy variable will be used to test the effect of the presence of foreign equity 
ownership in FMC on FMC performance (See hypothesis 14).  In the context that Chinese 
FMC shareholders are not fund investors, how concentrated ownership of FMC may affect 
performance deserves greater understanding and investigation. Hypothesis 14 and 15 are 
formulated: 
Hypothesis 14: The presence of foreign shareholding in FMC enhances FMC performance.   
Hypothesis 15:  Higher ownership concentration damages FMC performance. 
  
Board characteristics and composition  
Using Morningstar Stewardship Grades, both Wellman and Zhou (2007) and Lai, Tiwari et al. 
(2010) document that the quality of the board is the most important factor among all possible 
governance factors to explain mutual fund performance. The impact of board composition and 
characteristic on fund performance is the most researched area.  
      For instance, Ding and Wermers (2009) provide evidence that larger board 
composed of larger proportion of independent directors are related to better fund performance. 
Kong and Tang (2008) show however that none of the governance structures is significantly 
related to performance when continuous monthly returns (MPF) is used to measure 
performance, whereas fund with larger boards and boards with more than 75% independent 
directors actually underperform their peers when using objective-adjusted performance. By 
contrast, in a sample of 5957 U.S. mutual funds in 2002-2004, Meschke (2007) show that 
board independence affects fund performance negatively. Using 1406 U.S. equity and bond 
funds in 2005,  Khorana, Servaes et al. (2007a) find that the size of the board, the degree of 
board independence, and board member compensation exhibit no statistical significance in 
explaining abnormal performance. Adams, Mansi et al. (2010) find an inverse relation 
between board size and fund performance but find no evidence that director time constraint 
such as retirement status, number of funds overseen with the fund family complex, outside 
directorships, and board of directors tenure are related to fund performance. Ferris and Yan 
(2007) find that neither chairman nor board independence is related to fund scandals nor fund 
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performance. However, existing studies provide ambiguous results regarding whether and 
how composition and profile of board of directors could enhance FMC performance.  
    Literature has shown that having diversity in the board and senior management could 
potentially impact positively on firm performance (Bantel & Jackson 1989; Carter et al. 2003; 
Murray 1989; Weippert 2002). This study examines how board size, independence, gender 
diversity affect FMC performance under China’s contractual form (see Hypotheses 16-19).   
Hypothesis 16:  Smaller FMC board size enhances FMC performance.   
Hypothesis 17: Higher proportion of independent directors enhances FMC performance.   
Hypothesis 18:  A female CEO/ board chair enhances FMC performance.   
Hypothesis 19: Board with gender diversity enhances FMC performance.  
 
Executive remuneration and supervisory board    
Due to the acute shortage of qualified fund managers in China, fund managers turnover rate is 
therefore particularly important given managers turnover rate is on average 48% in 2000-2010 
(Zou 2011). In 2011, the average tenure for fund managers in 62 FMC was only 2.56 years 
(Wind database). Song (2012) points out that high turnover rate of fund managers signals the 
importance for the introduction of performance-based compensation.  
It could be argued that one desirable feature of good corporate governance for China's 
fund industry is to identify skilled managers, and set up the right incentives to motivate and 
encourage managers to retain their service so they would work longer and better than those 
FMC having poorer corporate governance practices. A remuneration committee can play an 
important role to align the interests of shareholders and those of senior managers and fund 
investors to better protect the interests of investors given fund investors are not shareholders 
and there is a conflict of interest between FMC shareholders and fund investors. Whether 
FMC with remuneration committee could enhance performance in contrast to those FMC 
without remuneration committee will be examined in this study (see Hypothesis 20). In China, 
supervisors of FMC are also required to play the same role as those in China’s public 
companies. Hypotheses 20 and 21are formulated:        
Hypothesis 20: The presence of remuneration committee enhances FMC performance.   
Hypothesis 21: Increasing the number of supervisors does not enhance FMC performance.   
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Table 19: List of Hypothesis to test the relation between internal governance mechanisms and FMC 
performance.  
Hypothesis 11: Good governance enhances FMC performance.  
Hypothesis 12: Shareholding by state-owned financial institutions in FMC damages FMC performance. 
Hypothesis 13: A listed company as the controlling shareholder of FMC enhances FMC performance.   
Hypothesis 14: The presence of foreign shareholding in FMC enhances FMC performance.   
Hypothesis 15:  Higher ownership concentration damages FMC performance. 
Hypothesis 16:  Smaller FMC board size enhances FMC performance.   
Hypothesis 17: Higher proportion of independent directors enhances FMC performance.   
Hypothesis 18:  A female CEO/ board chair enhances FMC performance.   
Hypothesis 19: Board with gender diversity enhances FMC performance.   
Hypothesis 20: The presence of remuneration committee enhances FMC performance.   
Hypothesis 21: Increasing the number of supervisors does not enhance FMC performance.   
 
 
5.7 Conclusion  
Under the contractual form of FMC in China, fund investors are not shareholders of FMC, 
which is different from the corporate form of mutual fund in the U.S. where fund investors are 
fund shareholders. A conflict of interests arises between FMC and fund investors as fund fees 
are the major income source for FMC which reduced fund returns for investors. Lack of direct 
representation for fund investors coupled with conflict of interests between FMC and fund 
investors gives rise to complex governance issues in Chinese FMC. The board of directors is 
placed as the key internal governance mechanism to protect the interests of fund investors. 
The first major research question of this thesis is therefore to examine how board 
effectiveness may be enhanced under highly concentrated ownership in China’s FMC where 
the controlling shareholder usually has a dominant position.   
Given the situation of a misalignment of interests between fund investors and FMC, 
FMC performance is a key to attract fund investors and protect their interests. Therefore, two 
major research questions are formulated to be tested empirically in this study:   
 How may specific internal corporate governance mechanisms impact on board 
effectiveness in Chinese FMC? (Chapter 7) 
 How does the overall quality of FMC corporate governance affect FMC performance? 
What are the relationships between specific internal governance mechanisms and FMC 
performance? (Chapter 8) 
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Internal corporate governance mechanisms including shareholder profile and 
characteristics, board structure and characteristics, size of supervisory board and the presence 
of remuneration committee are applied to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and board effectiveness and FMC financial performance. Corporate governance 
rating is applied to examine the relationship between quality of FMC corporate governance 
and FMC performance.   
With prevalent concentrated ownership in Chinese FMC, most of the board members 
especially the position of CEO or chairman are more likely to be appointed by the controlling 
shareholders. The question therefore arises whether these insiders could represent the interests 
of fund investors rather than FMC shareholders especially when there is a conflict of interests 
between fund investors and FMC shareholders. The controlling shareholder in China’s fund 
industry is, in most cases, ultimately the state, but the state’s dual role as owner and regulator 
raises another problem of how to motivate and monitor government appointed insiders to 
maximise the interests of fund investors in selecting, disciplining, and motivating senior 
management.  
The role of board independence in mutual fund in the West has received heightened 
attention.  But in China where there is a lack of qualified independent directors, their role as 
well as their independence has been questioned all the time. Therefore, whether independent 
directors could perform their assigned functions to represent the interests of investors in fund 
industry is poorly documented by empirical evidence and worthwhile to investigate.  
Given the complex and intense corporate governance issues in Chinese FMC, how to 
improve FMC board effectiveness and increase FMC performance is critically important in 
China, and a better understanding of what makes governance mechanisms’ effective is vital to 
addressing some major governance issues faced by the burgeoning fund industry in China. 
This study contributes to the literature by examining how governance mechanisms matter in 
the development of an effective and well-functioning board in FMC.  
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CHAPTER 6 
METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Introduction  
To investigate the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and board 
effectiveness as well as FMC performance, this chapter describes the data set and discuss the 
methodology used in this thesis. Four estimation models employed in this study are discussed: 
pooled ordinary least square (OLS) estimation, random effect (RM) specification, Bootstrap 
method, and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  
6.2 Sample 
Our sample comprises 288 firm-year observations covering 58 FMC over 5 years from 2006 
to 2010 (Table 20). Our sample FMC own more than 98% of all open-end funds (OEF) funds, 
managing more than 95% of AUM in fund industry (WIND database) and accounting for 58 
of the 61 FMC in China. We exclude three newly established FMC between 2008 to 2010 to 
eliminate the young FMC in the sample as a three-year track record is generally considered 
necessary for performance assessment. We further exclude CEF because of their relatively 
small size and difference in operations and fund management style from OEF. We use the 
year of 2006 as the start point because OEF only started in China in 2001 and there has been a 
lack of comprehensive data and specific regulations prior to 2006. Indeed, ‘China’s Fund 
Law’ as the major regulation for the fund industry only came into effect in 2004.   
          Article 29, Section 4 of CSRC’s‘Operation and management procedures to securities 
investment funds’ defines several types of funds. It defines that equity funds as a fund with 
more than 60% of its AUM invested in stocks; bond funds will have more than 80% of its 
AUM invested in bonds; funds investing only in money market is defined as money market 
funds; mixed funds include investments in stocks, bonds and/ or money market and are not 
within the above three definitions; others include represent non-fixed income funds. 
 
6.3 Data Sources 
Data are collected from three primary data sources. First is the WIND database, which 
provides information on fund performance, fund flows and fund characteristics such as 
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fund/FMC AUM, total fund fees, and fund investment objectives. The second data source is 
the fund prospectus. It offers useful information on FMC governance including the identity 
and composition of shareholders, board characteristics, and other governance information. 
When fund prospectus does not provide full information about governance, we check fund’s 
financial report. “Jian An Jin Xin Database” is the third data source for this study, where we 
collect fund performance data including fund’s continuous monthly returns, Jensen’s alpha 
and M2PF.  
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Table 20: Summary Description of Sample Data on China’s Fund Industry 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Fund type 
Fund
s No 
AU
M 
(b) 
% of 
Total 
AUM 
Funds 
No 
AUM 
(b) 
% of 
Total 
AUM 
Fund
s    
No 
AUM    
(b) 
% of 
Total 
AUM 
Fund
s No 
AUM   
(b) 
% of 
Total 
AUM 
Fund
s      
No 
AUM    
(b) 
% of 
Total 
AUM 
Funds   
No 
AUM  
(b) 
% of 
Total 
AUM 
Equity 61 52 12% 104 293.18 36% 127 1570.68 48% 308 695.47 37% 308 1325.21 49% 327 1281.64 53% 
Bond 13 24 5% 20 17.40 2% 29 63.50 2% 147 191.09 10% 98 82.51 3% 155 141.11 6% 
Mixed 86 116 26% 110 291.94 36% 122 1176.52 36% 165 542.02 29% 165 793.18 30% 167 741.45 31% 
Money 
Market  30 187 42% 49 79.49 10% 51 111.05 3% 69 350.07 18% 69 259.53 10% 69 153.28 6% 
Others* 28 70 16% 30 133.81 16% 36 330.39 10% 85 129.44 7% 85 217.69 8% 36 98.70 4% 
Total 218 449 100% 313 815.82 100% 365 3252.12 100% 509 1900.21 100% 725 2678.12 100% 754 2426.03 100% 
Sample 
Funds No Not in the sample 292 763.61 93.60% 358 3128.75 96.20% 478 1797.47 96.42% 672 2551.90 95.29% 691 2333.79 96.59% 
FMC No 47 56 58 60 61 63 
Sample 
FMC No Not in the sample 56 58 58 58 58 
Notes: We exclude from our sample three newly established FMC between 2008 to 2010 to eliminate the young FMC in the sample as a three year track record is generally considered necessary 
for performance  assessment. Others* include balanced funds, preservation funds, QDII funds and closed end funds. We further exclude CEF and passive index funds because of their relatively 
small size and different of operations and fund management style from OEF. We use “Plot Box” to identify outliers and replace them using mean-value.  
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6.4  Descriptive statistics on FMC governance structure  
6.4.1 Shareholders composition and concentration 
The number of shareholders ranges from 1 to 6 among China’s 61 FMC at the end of 2010 
(Table 21). Most FMC have 3 shareholders. The majority shareholder of FMC are in general 
state-financial institutions as CSRC has explicitly requires China’s financial institutions to be 
major shareholders according to Article 13.3 Section 2 “Chinese Fund Law”, which stipulates 
that the major shareholder of a FMC must participate in securities operation, consulting for 
securities investment, trust asset management, or other financial assets management.  
           This study defines a controlling shareholder as the shareholder with the largest 
shareholding which is at least 2% greater than the second largest shareholder. A 2% 
difference is used as China’s regulations only restrict majority shareholding greater than 50% 
to domestic companies and there are many companies with the largest shareholder holding at 
51% and the second shareholder holding 49%. This is particular common for FMC with 
foreign companies as equity partner. Article 8 of “Rules on the establishment of Joint Venture 
Fund Management Companies” limits the aggregate foreign direct and indirect shareholding 
to below 49% of FMC. It indicates that CSRC tries to control the power of foreign companies 
in FMC.  
 
 
Table 21: Numbers of Shareholders in China's 61 FMC (2010). 
Number of shareholders in a FMC Number of FMC 
1 2 
2 17 
3 25 
4 12 
5 4 
6 1 
                       Source: FMC financial reports 
 
             Table 22 indicates that the top 10 FMC in terms of AUM on average account for 50% 
of total industry AUM compared to the bottom 10 with only 1.5% from 2005 to 2010. In 
terms of industry concentration, Chinese FMC are highly concentrated. In examining the 
shareholding structure of Chinese FMC in this study, three types of major shareholders are 
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identified: state-owned financial institutions (average 58.34% shareholding), state-owned 
non-financial institutions (average 21.64% shareholding), and foreign companies (average 
20% shareholding) (WIND database).  
 
Table 22: 2005-2010 FMC Market Concentration (RMB Billion). 
Market Concentration 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Top 10 FMC AUM 258.3 474.63 1342.8 974.93 1187.48 1157.5 
(Their proportion of overall industry AUM (%)) (57.27) (58.18) (42.98) (51.55) (49.14) (48.00) 
Bottom 10 FMC AUM 1.14 8.33 1.35 28.16 42.76 44.8 
(Their proportion of overall industry AUM (%)) (0.25) (1.02) (1.00) (1.49) (1.77) (2.00) 
           Source: compiled based on WIND Database 
 
6.4.2 Board composition and characteristic  
There are 202 independent directors among 527 board of directors in the sample of 58 FMC, 
the proportion of independent director ranges from 33.3% to 60% at the end of 2010. Among 
all independent directors, 39.11% of them are academics and scholars from universities or 
research institutions, followed by retirees (15.35%), lawyers (11.88%), financial professionals 
(11.88%), and accountants (4.95%) (Table 23).  
 
Table 23: Composition of Independent directors in Chinese FMC (2010). 
Independent Directors Board Size ID ID % 
FMC 
FMC No. FMC % 
FMC with 3 Independent Directors 
9 3 33.33 18 30 
8 3 37.5 5 8.33 
7 3 42.86 15 25 
5 3 60 1 1.67 
Subtotal (Overall ID In FMC with 3 ID) 312 117 37.5 39 65 
FMC with 4 Independent Directors 
12 4 33.33 1 1.67 
11 4 36.36 9 15 
10 4 40 1 1.67 
9 4 44.44 9 15 
Subtotal 202 80 33.33 20 33.33 
FMC with 5 Independent Directors 13 5 38.46 1 1.67 
Subtotal 13 5 38.46 1 1.67 
Total 527 202 100 60 100 
     Source: FMC financial reports. 
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Table 24: FMC Description of Independent Directors Background (2010). 
Background/Affiliation ID No. ID % 
Universities and Research Institutions 79 39.11 
Retirees 31 15.35 
Law Firms 24 11.88 
Financial Institutions 24 11.88 
Accounting Firms 10 4.95 
Business 6 2.97 
Other Institutions 28 13.86 
Totals 202 100 
          Source: FMC financial reports. 
 
           Table 24 indicates that academics and scholars are popular as independent directors in 
China. However, while they have specialist knowledge, their usual lack of industrial 
experiences and operational background may pose challenges for them to contribute to the 
board. According to Article 45, “Corporate governance Code for Chinese FMC” the first set 
of independence directors on the board are  nominated by shareholders,  and further 
appointment of independence directors may be nominated by independence directors, with the 
specific nomination subject to FMC constitution, making it hard to ensure board 
independence.  
 
6.5 Panel data analysis  
This Section reviews different estimations to be applied in Chapter 7 and 8. From traditional 
Pooled OLS to more complicated GMM, the strengths and weakness are outlined below.  
 
6.5.1 Pooled OLS with panel data  
Existing literature mainly uses OLS estimation to examine the relation between board 
characteristics and mutual fund fees (Ferris & Yan 2007; Kong & Tang 2008; Meschke 2007), 
and between governance mechanisms and fund performance (Adams et al. 2010; Cremers et 
al. 2009; Khorana et al. 2007a; Kuhnen 2009).   
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We follow prior studies and adopt pooled OLS estimation as robustness test in this 
thesis, which is written as   
   tititi XY ,,,                  (4.1) 
Where tiY ,  is the dependent variable,  tiX ,  is the independent variable matrix, is 
intercept, and ti,  is the idiosyncratic error term.  
As the nature of sample in this study is panel data, pooled OLS is often not an 
appropriate estimation to use as it ignores the correlations of same FMC over time. However, 
this correlation over time is eliminated using more sophisticated GLS (generalized least 
square) method in Random Effect Model (REM) (Wooldridge 2009).   
6.5.2 Random effects estimation with panel data (applied in Chapter 7 and 8) 
Because of the nature of panel data set, we adopt Random Effect Model (REM) rather than 
Pooled OLS as main tests. Some of the key explanatory variables (governance variables) are 
constant over time in the analysis of the impact of governance variables on FMC performance. 
REM is generally accepted as more appropriate than Fixed Effects Model because REM 
allows for the inclusion of time-invariant variables (Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn 2011; 
Wooldridge 2009; Zhou 2001). For instance, key governance variables including board size, 
board independence and shareholder structure do not change frequently over a period of 5 
years, within-firm variations for these variables are therefore limited. In addition, all 
estimations reported in this study use heteroskedastic robust standard errors, which is used to 
minimise heterogeneity among FMC, and correct heterogeneity and influential observations 
(Arellano 2003 ; Wooldridge 2009).  
RE model is an expanded model of pooled-OLS (4.1) and is written as  
tititi XY ,,,                                       (4.2) 
Where tiY ,  is the dependent variable, tiX , is the independent variable matrix, and ti,  is 
the composite error term as iiti uY , . Because i  is the composite error in each time 
period, thus ti,  are serially correlated across time. By ignoring correlation issue, pooled OLS 
standard errors are biased by under/over estimating the true variability of the coefficient 
estimates. Generalized least squares estimation is therefore used in the analysis of RE models 
to solve this serial correlation problem (Petersen 2009).  
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Wooldridge  (2009) and Arellano  (2003 ) discuss that heteroskedastic robust standard 
errors vce (robust) is equivalent to specifying vce (cluster panelvar), where the panelvar is the 
variable used to identify the panels. It could be used to control for heteroskedasticity, within-
panel serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors and influential or extreme observations. 
Therefore, robust-cluster analysis is applied to all the models in this study to minimise the 
heterogeneity among FMC, correct heterogeneity and influential observations.   
 
6.5.3 Bootstrap methods for panel data (applied in Chapter 7 and 8) 
If the sample size is not large enough, the asymptotic behaviour of the statistics could lead to 
a poor approximation of the true one (Wooldridge 2009). Therefore, estimates using standard 
econometric approach, i.e. mean and standard deviation, are biased. Bootstrap could provide a 
solution that the mean and standard deviation be estimated with minimal bias (Cremers et al. 
2009). Bootstrapping is a statistical method to estimate the sample distribution of an estimator 
by using the sampling with replacement from the original sample (Shao & Tu 1995).  
This study has 288 year firm observations, which may be considered as small sample size. We 
then use bootstrap method as robustness test to examine whether results from REM are robust 
to those from bootstrap methods.  
 
6.5.4 Generalized Method of Moments (applied in Chapter 8) 
There are factors influencing firm performance that are hard to capture and measure (Pindado 
& De Miguel Hidaldo 2001). The result will be biased if we ignore heterogeneity. 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) can be used to eliminate unobservable 
heterogeneity (using panel data methodology) and to control for potential endogeneity (using 
instruments) (Arellano & Bond 1991).   
Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator formed “moment condition” using lagged-levels of 
the dependent variable and the predetermined variables with first-differences of the 
disturbances. They show how to construct estimators based on moment equations constructed 
from further lagged levels of dependent variable and the first-difference errors. In the case of 
nonidentically distributed disturbances, they use a two-step GMM estimator to estimates the 
covariance matrix of the moment conditions using the first-step residuals.  
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As Arellano-Bond (1991) methodology departs from a fixed effects formulation but the 
model is estimated in first differences and, therefore, the fixed effects are removed from the 
estimation.  As key governance variables in this study are nearly time-invariant, Arellano-
Bond (1991) is inappropriate to use.  
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that difference GMM performs poorly when dependent 
variable(y) appear to be a random walk because untransformed lags (lagged -levels) are weak 
instruments for transformed variables. Therefore, their suggested solution is to transform the 
instruments to make them exogenous to the fixed effect instead of transforming the regressors. 
They propose another estimator - system GMM- with one equation in levels (with lagged first 
differences as instruments) and one equation in first differences (with lagged level as 
instruments). This approach will introduce more instruments, and also improve efficiency 
dramatically. The time invariant variables are dropped from the equation in first difference (as 
expected) but they are still present in the equation in level. In the case of the Blundell-Bond 
system estimator, we could actually include time-invariant variables in the estimation.  
As some of the key repressors in this thesis are nearly time-invariant (fixed effects) in 
this study that will be removed from Arellano-Bond (1991) estimation because their model is 
estimated in first differences. Therefore, we use Blundell-Bond (1998) estimation and two 
steps estimation to correct the standard errors (two step system GMM) and will be used in this 
study.   
The dynamic panel-data model Blundell-Bond (1998) : 
tiititijti
p
j
jti wXyY ,2,1,,
1
,   

  
Where the j  are p parameters to be estimated,  
tiX ,  is a 11 K vector of strictly exogenous covariates,  
1  is a 11 K  vector of parameters to be estimated,  
tiw ,  is a  11 K  vector of predetermined or endogenous covariates, 
2  is a  12 K  vector of parameters to be estimated,  
i  are the panel-level effects,   ti,  are i.i.d over the whole sample with variance  2 .  
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6.6 Regression models  
6.6.1 Transforming variables and Issue of normality 
We first use “Box Plot” to identify outliers for all main variables and replace them using 
mean-value. Then, we look at the best forms of main variables. A normal distributed residuals 
is vital for the t-test to be valid, and a common cause of non-normally distributed residuals is 
non-normally distributed outcome/or predictor variables (Chen et al. 2003; Wooldridge 2009). 
Chen (2003) point out that in order to have valid t-tests in regression results, variables are 
expected transformed to a form with the smallest Chi-square. The transformed variables will 
have a more normal distribution.                 
Table 25 reports main variables with the chi-square value of identity and best form. The 
best form with the smallest chi-square will be applied. Most of variables use their original 
form except taking natural logarithm of Herfindahl index (HHI), NOSUPERVISOR and 
TOTALTER, and use 1/(ID^2) for ID (independent directors) .  
 
Table 25: Transforming variables. 
Formula Chi2(2) 
TSTATESH identity 7.35 
HHI identity 4.19 
BODSIZE identity 2.48 
ID identity 42.42 
1/square 36.63 
FEMALEBOD identity 3.45 
SUPERVIORNO identity 56.35 
log 13.88 
MPF identity 28.1 
OAPF identity 2.35 
M2PF identity 17.68 
JENSENPF identity 14.64 
TOTALTER identity 44.11 
log 20.47 
AWTER identity 13.46 
Notes: formula with the smallest Chi2(2) is the best form to use. For brevity, 
we only report the chi2(2) value for identity and the best form of the variable. 
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6.6.2 Endogenerity  
It could be argued that both FMC governance structure and TER/performance may be jointly 
and endogenously determined by the same set of underlying variables. For instance, Tufano 
and Sevick (1997) point out that fund adviser who seek higher fees could be more likely to 
select boards that are less effective. There are 44 incidences of Chinese FMC changing their 
shareholding structure over the sample periods from 2006 to 2010. Among these, 14 of them 
have changed their block shareholder, and 15 FMC changing whose shareholding once, but 
29 FMC change more than once. It could be argued that FMC total fee level and governance 
mechanisms may influence each other simultaneously or may be the same set of underlying 
variables affects fund fee level and FMC shareholding structure and other FMC governance 
mechanisms. For instance, FMC with lower total fee level may choose to adopt stricter 
corporate governance mechanisms, signalling their higher performance potential and 
willingness to comply with better corporate governance, which may in return reduce costs and 
expenses for FMC. In addition, FMC with higher performance may choose to adopt stricter 
corporate governance mechanisms, signalling their higher performance potential in future and 
willingness to comply with better corporate governance, which may in return enhance FMC 
performance.  
          Current year FMC TER/performance might thus be simultaneously determined with 
current-year governance variables. To mitigate the above-mentioned endogeneity problems, 
we therefore use one-year lagged FMC governance variables in all models. It could also be 
valuable to use lagged FMC governance variables as current governance mechanisms are 
more likely to influence future performance than the immediate current year’s.  
 
6.6.3 Model for testing FMC board effectiveness and governance variables  
As discussed in Chapter 4.3.6., FMC total expense ratio (TER) is employed as a proxy of 
FMC board effectiveness to investigate the impact of various governance mechanisms on 
board effectiveness. As discussed, this study investigates the impact of governance profile on 
board effectiveness at the FMC level rather than at the fund level, taking into account the 
contractual nature of Chinese FMC as funds within the FMC operate under the same set of 
governance mechanisms.   
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To examine the relationship between FMC total fee level and governance variables, we 
apply the following panel-data regression model.  
 
titij
i
tjti CVTER CG ,,1,,                                                         (1) 
Dependent variables: total expense ratio (TER)  
Two measures of FMC TER are adopted in this study. The first measure for FMC TER is total 
expense ratio (TOTALTER), calculated by total expenses of FMC as a fraction of its asset 
under management (AUM) at the end of the year. Funds managed within the same FMC 
shares overall costs and expenditures such as professional training, nurturing knowledge and 
information sharing, and direction and guidance from investment strategy committee. These 
activities and associated costs contribute to enhance fund managers’ skills that can be 
reflected in better productivity and lower costs. In addition, supervision over managerial 
opportunism of senior managers will also reduce overall unnecessary costs and agency costs. 
Therefore, all such fees and expenses are included in the calculation of TER.   
The second measure for FMC TER is asset-weighted individual fund expense ratio in a 
FMC (AWTER), covering equity, mixed, and other non-fixed income funds2. Fixed income 
funds such as bond funds and money market funds are excluded from measurement of AWER 
because of their different investment style from equity, mixed and other non-fixed income 
funds with significantly dissimilar cost structure and their relatively small size. It could be 
argued that managing equity, mixed and other non-fixed income funds normally requires 
greater and more active efforts, perhaps higher skills, and more time and effort by fund 
managers in their investment strategies than bonds and money market funds. Therefore, 
equity, mixed and other non-fixed income funds are more likely to exhibit the quality of 
governance of a FMC.  
 
Key independent variables  
Governance factors includes total state-owned financial shareholding (SHSTATEFIN), a 
listed company as controlling shareholder dummy (CSHLISTED), foreign ownership dummy 
(SHFOREIGN), ownership concentration (HHI), precentage of independent directors (ID), 
female member on board (FEMSENOIRBOD), female senior dummy (BOARDFEMALE), 
remmuneration committee dummy (REMUNERACOMM), number of members on 
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supervisory board (NOSUPERVISOR). Detailed explaination of variables are given in 
Appendix A.  
 
Control variables 
Literature suggests that fund expenses are affected by fund characteristics. The existing 
literature finds that fund age, fund size, lag performance, fund turnover rate all affect fund 
TER (Ferris & Yan 2007; Gao & Wang 2005; Kong & Tang 2008; Tufano & Sevick 1997).   
Economies of scale. In the U.S. context, Tufano and Sevick (1997) suggest that 
economies of scale can exist both at the fund level and the sponsor level. Larger funds may 
have lower costs over their research and selling efforts. Kong and Tan (2008) point out that 
fund in larger fund families tend to charge lower fees because of economies of scale and more 
bargaining power with other service providers. Ferris and Yan (2007) find that larger funds or 
funds in a larger families charge significantly lower fees. We therefore include in this study 
the natural logarithm of total net asset value for a FMC to control for possible economies of 
scale.  
FMC age. Tufano and Sevick (1997) suggest that younger fund may have less 
experience and high start-up costs, and thus higher fees. However, Ferris and Yan (2007) find 
that younger fund charges lower fees, suggesting that younger funds might be subsidized by 
the sponsor, and lower fees will be charged. We include FMC age as a control variable.  
Lagged FMC performance. Ferris and Yan (2007) document a negative relation 
between fund expense ratios and lagged fund performance. Fund with higher fees may have 
higher performance. We therefore include lagged FMC performance as control variable.  
Fund turnover rate. All else being equal, investors usually prefer funds with low 
turnover ratios. The transaction costs associated with turnover are passed on to investors 
(Bogle 1994). The extant literature exhibits mixed results in regard to the relationship 
between a fund’s turnover ratio and performance. FMC turnover rate is included to control for 
costs of transaction.  
We also include the year as dummy variables to control the year effect on dependent 
variables. Appendix A provides the detailed explanation of variables. 
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6.6.4 Model for testing overall quality of FMC governance and governance variables   
The proxy for the overall quality of FMC corporate governance is CGI over 2007-2009 
(MCG0709) from CCII. We examine the impact of the quality of corporate governance on 
FMC performances using the following model: 
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           (2) 
Two FMC performance measures are used: FMC annual continuous monthly returns   
(MPF) and risk-adjusted performance (Modigliani and Modigliani: M2PF) in model (2). As 
discussed, this study investigates the impact of governance profile on performance at the 
FMC level rather than at the fund level. FMC performance measure is calculated by sum of 
asset-weighted fund performance measure under the same FMC.  
 
FMC annual continuous monthly returns (MPF) 
The monthly returns is calculated by taking the change in a fund’s net asset value in a 
particular month, divided by the fund’s net asset value at the beginning of the month, 
assuming the reinvestment of all income and capital-gains distributions. FMC raw returns is 
the asset-weighted of all funds in FMC compounding monthly raw returns. Detailed of FMC 
performance measures are given in Appendix A. Annual continuous monthly returns  is 
widely used as a measure of fund performance by previous studies both in the U.S. mutual 
fund and Chinese fund industry (Cremers et al. 2009; Ferris & Yan 2007; Khorana, Servaes & 
Wedge 2007; Kong & Tang 2008; Kuhnen 2009; Yang 2007).  
 
M2PF  
Modigliani and Modigliani (1997) propose a “Modigliani measure risk-adjusted performance” 
which they believe that the average investor would find it easier to understand.  It expresses 
performance as follows:  
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Where  mt  is standard deviation of market index, “Shanghai composite index” is adopted;  
it  is fund i’s standard deviation, ftti RR   is fund’s average excess returns, ftR  is “China 7 
Day Repo Rates”. FMC M2 performance (M2PF) is the asset-weighted of all funds’ M2PF.         
M2PF measures a fund’s performance relative to the market in percentage terms, which 
considers all risks including both systematic and unsystematic risks a fund confronts (Yang 
2007a). In Chinese context, M2PF is widely used to compare the returns with the bank saving 
rate to evaluate fund investors’ investment returns, and M2PF is publicly available from 
database such as WIND and “Ji An Jin Xin”.  
 
6.6.5 Model for identified internal governance mechanisms and FMC performance   
 
To examine the relation between corporate governance quality in terms of the identified 
specific governance mechanisms and FMC performance, the following model is employed:   
 titij
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There are four measures of FMC performance: continuous monthly returns, objective-adjusted 
performance (OAPF), M2PF and Jensen’s alpha. FMC raw returns and M2PF have been 
explained in previous session. FMC performance measure is calculated by asset-weighted 
fund performance measure under the same FMC. Four performance measures from different 
perspective are used to provide more robust test outcomes. Detailed explanation of variables 
is given in Appendix A.  
 
Objective-adjusted annual return (OAPF) 
Objective-adjusted annual returns is computed as the difference between a fund’s annual 
return and the median returns of all funds within the same objective and divided by the cross-
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sectional standard deviation of a fund’s returns within same investment objectives33. FMC 
OAPF is the asset-weighted of all funds OAPF under a FMC.  
As funds in the same investment objective is affected similarly by the changes of 
economic and market condition, OAPF therefore presents the returns of each fund relative to 
the funds in the same category. This measure is also widely used by the relevant studies (Ajay 
1996; Ferris & Yan 2007; Khorana, Servaes & Wedge 2007; Kong & Tang 2008). 
 
Jensen’s alpha  
Jensen's alpha is written as  
)([ ftmtiftitit RRRR    
Where itR  is fund i’s returns for time period t;  ftR  is returns for risk-free assets during time 
period t, ftR  uses “China 7 Day Repo Rates”; i  is beta coefficient for fund I; and mtR  is 
market returns during the same time period. FMC Jensen performance is the asset-weighted of 
all funds Jensen’s returns. Risk-adjusted returns (Jensen's alpha) are also widely used by 
previous studies (Adams et al. 2010; Shu et al. 2002). In this study, the calculation of FMC 
Jensen’s alpha includes only equity and mixed funds under a FMC to make FMC performance 
comparable as equity and mixed funds have similar level of risk which substantially differ 
from other types of funds such as money market and index funds. AUM of overall equity and 
mixed funds between 2006 to 2010 accounts for more than 77% of overall AUM in the 
sample.      
 
Key independent variables  
Governance factors includes total state-owned financial shareholding (SHSTATEFIN), a 
listed company as controlling shareholder dummy (CSHLISTED), foreign ownership dummy 
(SHFOREIGN), ownership concentration (HHI), precentage of independent directors (ID), 
female member on board (FEMSENOIRBOD), female senior dummy (BOARDFEMALE), 
remmuneration committee dummy (REMUNERACOMM), number of members on 
                                                 
33 As shown in Table 20: Summary Description of Sample Data on China’s Fund Industry, the sample is divided 
into five types of funds in Chinese fund industry including equity, bond, mixed, money market and others. The 
definitions of those funds are discussed in Chapter 6.2.  
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supervisory board (NOSUPERVISOR). Detailed explanation of variables is given in 
Appendix A.  
	
Control variables  
Prior studies suggest that fund belonging to larger families perform better (Chen et al. 2004). 
Webster  (2002) find that market adjusted returns deteriorate as the fund get older.  Using 
16316 open-end actively managed equity mutual funds in 27 countries over 1999 - 2007, 
Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, & Ramos (2011) find that fund age is negatively related to fund 
performance in the sample of non-U.S. funds, but this relation is statistically insignificant in 
the sample of U.S. funds. Droms, William and Walker (1996) find that turnover ratio is 
negatively related to performance. Ippolito (1989) , Peterson et al. (2001) and Droms and 
Walker (2001) document that no statistically significant relationship between turnover and 
performance. 
This study includes FMC AUM, age, and turnover rate as control variable. The year 
dummy variable is also included to control the year effect on dependent variables. Lagged 
performance is included in the GMM model of the robustness tests to control the effects from 
past performance on current year performance. We also include the year as dummy variables 
to control the year effect on dependent variables. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter describes the data set and methodology to be used for empirically testing the 
hypotheses in this thesis. Four estimations including pooled OLS estimation, RM 
specification, Bootstrap method, and GMM to be used in Chapter 7 and 8 are discussed. As 
some of the key governance variables are time-invariant, REM are adopted as the main test to 
investigate how governance mechanisms affect FMC TER (Chapter 7), how overall quality of 
governance mechanisms affect FMC performance (Chapter 8) and how do specific 
governance mechanisms affect FMC performance  (Chapter 8). When sample size is not large, 
the asymptotic behaviour of  statistics could lead to poor approximation of the true one 
(Wooldridge 2009). Bootstrap method is used as robustness check in Chapter 7 and 8. GMM 
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is also used to deal with endogeneity problem and dynamic panel data to examine the 
appropriateness of REM in Chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER 7 
IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS ON BOARD 
EFFECTIVENESS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Board effectiveness is particularly important in the Chinese fund industry as investors are not 
shareholders and there is a lack of direct governance representation of fund investors. The 
board of directors is required by law to put the interests of investors ahead of FMC 
shareholders who control directors’ appointment, compensation, and tenure in China. 
Therefore, how to ensure and enhance board effectiveness is vital to the healthy and stable 
development of the fund industry. This chapter aims to investigate how governance settings 
influence board effectiveness in Chinese FMC. By using FMC total expense ratio (TER) as 
proxy for board effectiveness, our tests examine the impact of the identity and composition of 
shareholders and the board, presence of remuneration committee, and size of supervisory 
board on FMC board effectiveness.  
This chapter presents firstly a summary of descriptive statistics of the full sample. The 
relevant literature review and theoretical analysis of the relation between governance 
variables and board effectiveness are provided in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses the 
methodology and data for this chapter, which starts with an analysis of the relevance of 
governance variables with univariate analysis-correlation between main variables. Regression 
models including OLS, RE, Bootstrap and GMM are adopted to explore the relations between 
governance variables and FMC performance.  
 
7.2  Statistics summary  
Table 26 presents descriptive statistics of the variables in the sample. Included are the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values for the variables of FMC performance 
measures, governance characteristics, and FMC characteristics except dummy variables.   
Panel A in Table 26 contains a description of FMC fee measurements. FMC total TER 
(TOTALTER) is on average 2.52% with a maximum value of 8.58% and a minimum value of 
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0.391%. The mean value for asset-weighted TER (AWTER) is 1.93% arranging from 0.46 to 
5.28.   
Panel B provides descriptive information on FMC shareholder and board of directors 
characteristic. The total shareholding of state-owned financial institutions in FMC is on 
average 59.78%. HHI is 42.8%, affirming the concentrated nature of FMC ownership. The 
average board size has 8.6 members with 42% being independent directors, but there is a 
substantial cross-sectional variation among FMC, with a range from 4 to 13 members in the 
board and from 33% to 80% being independent directors. On average, there is 0.98 female on 
FMC board with a range from 0 to 3, with 8.3% of FMC having female as top executive 
(CEO or board chair). Overall, 33.33% of FMC has a listed company as controlling 
shareholders, 38.19% has set up a remuneration committee, and 54.86% are partnering with 
foreign shareholders.    
The average FMC age is about 5 years, and FMC AUM is on average of RMB 144.5 
billion yuan, with an average of 11.5 funds managed by each FMC (WIND database).   
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Table 26: Descriptive statistics of main variables. 
Summary statistics of main variables  
  Mean Std.   Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Board of directors effectiveness  
measurements  
   
FMC total expense ratio (%) (TOTALTER) 2.52 1.177 0.391 8.578 
Asset weighted FMC total expense ratio (%) (AWTER) 1.93 1.313 0.46 5.278 
     
Panel B: Shareholder and Board of directors characteristics 
HHI  0.428 0.144 0.1 1 
Total state-financial institutions shareholding (%) 
(TSTATESH) 59.781 17.98 10 100 
Board size (BODSIZE)         8.622 1.729 4 13 
Independent directors  Percentage (*100)  42.025 10.196 33.33 80 
Number of female on the board (FEMALEBOD) 0.983 0.953 0 3 
Number of Supervisors (SUPERVIORNO) 3.724 1.453 1 8 
     
Panel C: FMC characteristics and Control variables    
FMC age (FMCAGE) 5.7 3.056 1 13 
FMC AUM(billion) (AUM) 144.5 83.283 1 288 
FMC turnover rate /1000 (TURNOVER) 0.106 0.05 0.003 0.239 
Jensen performance 0.332 0.386 -0.585 1.5 
Number  Proportion of total number  Panel D: Dummy variables  
Listed controlling shareholder (LISTEDCONTROL) 96 33.33% 
Foreign companies' shareholding (FOREIGNSH) 158 54.86% 
Senoir female (FEMSENOIRBOD) 28 9.72% 
Remuneration Committee (REMUNERATION) 110 38.19% 
JENSENPF  144 50% 
Notes: our sample comprises 288 firm-year observations covering over 95% of all AUM in Chinese 
fund industry over 2006 - 2010. The definition and measurement of above variables are presented in 
Appendix A. We use “Box Plot” to identify outliers and replace them using mean-value.    
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7.3  Results and discussion  
7.3.1 Correlation analysis   
To investigate the relations between governance variables and FMC performance, we start our 
analysis with the examination of the Pearson correlation test to understand the approximate 
relations among main variables, and then explore these relations using panel-data regression 
models in the subsequent section.   
Table 27 reports the Pearson correlations of main variables showing the correlations of 
governance variables and board effective measurements: TOTALTER and AWTER.  
 
Table 27: Correlations of main variables 
 
TOTALTER AWTER 
TOTALTER 1.000 
 
AWTER -0.5927* 1.000 
TSTATESH -0.100 -0.072 
HHI  -0.049 -0.104 
BODSIZE        -0.041 -0.036 
IDNEWFORMPERCENT -0.043 -0.054 
FEMALEBOD -0.004 0.056 
SUPERVIORNO -0.013 -0.022 
 
Total state-owned financial shareholding (TSTATESH) has a negative relation with the 
TER measures of TOTALTER and AWTER, suggesting increasing shareholding by state in 
FMC reduces TER. This negative relation is contrary to the Hypothesis 1 that postulates state 
shareholding FMC damages FMC board effectiveness. There is negative relation between 
ownership concentration (HHI) and TER measures, suggesting highly concentrated ownership 
enhances board effectiveness. BODSIZE affects both TOTALTER and AWTER negatively, 
which is inconsistent with Hypothesis 5 that postulates smaller size enhances board 
effectiveness. Both measures of TER is found to negatively correlate with precentage of 
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independent directors (ID), suggesting higher board independence enhances board 
effectiveness. Number of members on supervisory board (SUPERVIORNO) is found to affect 
FMC TER negatively, indicating that increasing number of supervisors on the supervisory 
board will enhance board effectiveness.  
The Pearson correlation results provide some insights into the linkage between FMC 
TER measures and key governance variables. While correlations between governance 
variables and FMC TER are not statistically significant, most variables have the predicted 
signs with TER.  It should be noted that univariate analysis only considers the relations of two 
variables, and FMC TER measures may be influenced not only by governance variables but 
also by other variables such as FMC age or size. We further investigate these relations 
between governance variables and performance measures through regression models where 
we could incorporate governance variables in one model, and other variables are controlled.   
 
7.3.2 Random effects (RE) estimation  
Regression models used to investigate the relation between governance variables and FMC 
TER are discussed in Chapter 5. The description of variables is given in Chapter 4.  
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Table 28 reports the results of RE estimation. Two FMC TER measures: TOTALTER 
and AWTER. The results of two regressions are presented in Model 1 and Model 2 
respectively.   
Hypothesis 1 investigates the association between state financial institutions in FMC 
ownership and FMC board effectives. The coefficients for the level of shareholding by state-
financial institutions have inconsistent signs, and those relations are statistically insignificant. 
The result suggests that shareholding from state-owned financial institutions has no 
significant impact on board effectiveness. As discussed in Chapter 5.4, most findings of the 
current literature document that state ownership normally plays no discernible impact on firm 
performance in China. Similarly, it could be argued that those state-owned financial 
institutions as FMC shareholders play no role in FMC management. It may be because the 
state as the ultimate owner of FMC has several tiers in between, which limits the power or 
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interests of the state to intervene in the governance of FMC. In addition, it is generally 
accepted that Chinese fund industry is subject to an extra regime of financial regulations 
compared to other types of Chinese companies, therefore, state interventions in FMC 
governance and management may be less apparent and direct.   
Hypothesis 2 predicts that a listed company as the controlling shareholder of FMC 
enhances board effectiveness. Our result provides strong support for Hypothesis 2, the 
coefficients for dummy variable of a FMC with a listed controlling shareholder for the two 
models are statistically significant with the predicted sign. It suggests that a FMC with a listed 
controlling shareholder reduces FMC TER compared with those whose controlling 
shareholder which are not listed. For instance, the presence of a listed company as controlling 
shareholder of FMC on average lowers FMC TOTALTER by 12%, which is significant and 
important given the mean of TOTALTER is 2.5% and this result is significant at 5% 
confidence level. It could be explained that FMC with a listed company as the controlling 
shareholder exhibits higher governances standards which will therefore enhance board 
effectiveness. With an average of 48.7% shareholdings by the controlling shareholder, a listed 
company as the controlling shareholder in Chinese FMC could provide a powerful driver in 
enhancing board effectiveness and will thus reduce FMC fees and expenditures they charge.   
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the presence of foreign shareholding in FMC enhances board 
effectiveness. Results from both models testing against Hypothesis 3 show that both 
coefficients of foreign shareholding dummy variable in FMC are positive, and Model 1 shows 
this to be significant at 5% level. The results indicate that presence of foreign shareholder 
increases FMC TER. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is rejected. The finding may be due to the 
higher set up and running costs because of the adoption of foreign operational and 
remuneration standards in FMC with the presence of foreign shareholders compared to FMC 
with only domestic companies as FMC shareholders. Foreign invested FMC may incur costs 
such as higher pay for employees, higher compensation and cost for foreign directors to attend 
meetings, more expensive hardware and software for operations imported from foreign 
sources, etc. For instance, in 2010, 38% of FMC had remuneration committee; most of them 
have foreign presence in their ownership.  
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Table 28: RE estimation of the impact of lagged value of governance variables on FMC TER. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES LOG(TOTALTER) AWTER 
REM REM 
TSTATESH -0.001 0.001 
[-0.57] [0.33] 
LISTEDCONTROL -0.12** -0.22** 
[-2.17] [-1.96] 
FOREIGNSH 0.11** 0.14 
[2.31] [1.30] 
HHI -0.18 -0.25 
[-1.19] [-0.96] 
BODSIZE       0.019 0.047 
[0.94] [1.64] 
ID -0.033 -0.089 
[-0.68] [-1.30] 
FEMSENOIRBOD -0.12* -0.18 
[-1.70] [-1.06] 
FEMALEBOD 0.13 0.032 
[1.63] [0.63] 
REMUNERATION -0.091* -0.0013 
[-1.83] [-0.012] 
SUPERVIORNO -0.013 -0.0049 
[-0.69] [-0.17] 
LOGFMCSIZE -0.041 -0.03 
[-1.64] [-1.62] 
FMCAGE 0.021* 0.036 
[1.81] [0.51] 
LAGJENSENPF 0.016 -0.089 
[0.33] [-1.15] 
JENSENPF(DV) -0.19*** -0.32*** 
[-3.07] [-2.91] 
TURNOVER 0.00072*** 0.0011** 
[6.76] [2.25] 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Constant -3.81*** 0.44 
[-16.1] [0.92] 
Observations 288 288 
Number of fmc 58 58 
 Notes: t-statistics in brackets with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As explained in Chapter 6.6.1, original form of most 
variables are applied except for using log of TOTALTER, HHI,supervisory, and AUM. LAGJENSENPF represents the 
preivous year’s performance. JENSENPF(DV)  is dummy variable to represent the higher FMC performance group by its 
mean.  Variance inflation factor (VIF) is used to evaluated muti-collinerity among the key variables. We find no evidence of 
a collinerity problem in our main governance and control variables (see Table 29)  
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Table 29: Multicollinearity Test. 
TSTATESH 1.38 
LISTEDCONTROL 1.54 
FOREIGNSH 1.69 
HHI  1.77 
BODSIZE        2.17 
ID 1.85 
FEMALEBOD 1.39 
FEMSENOIRBOD 1.58 
REMUNERATION 1.2 
SUPERVIORNO 1.38 
  
 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that higher ownership concentration diminishes board 
effectiveness. Both models show that the coefficients for shareholding concentration are 
negative, but statistically insignificant. This result suggests that concentrated shareholdings, 
even when the majority shareholders tend to be state-owned financial institutions, makes no 
difference in board effectiveness. It could be argued because of the highly concentrated nature 
of shareholding in the Chinese fund industry,  ( with the number of shareholders from 1 to 6 
as shown in Chapter 5.4), shareholders are likely to have common interests, which is to 
increase the AUM so that the major income ( fees FMC charge) could be increased. Therefore, 
there is no difference between one shareholder or several shareholders in terms of 
shareholding’s impact on board effectiveness.   
Hypothesis 5 predicts that smaller FMC board size enhance board effectiveness. We 
did not find evidence for hypothesis 5 as both models find board size affects FMC TER 
positively but this relation is insignificant at all levels. The evidence on China FMC therefore 
shows that the size of board has no impact on board effectiveness, which is consistent with 
previous discussion that board size in general is ineffective in Chinese listed companies as 
discussed in Chapter 3.3.3. This result is inconsistent with findings by Kong and Tang (2008) 
that smaller board in the U.S. mutual fund has a lower total expense ratio, and Tufano and 
Sevick (1997), Ferris and Yan (2007) who shows that funds in U.S. with smaller boards 
charge lower management fees. 
Hypothesis 6 predicts that higher proportion of independent directors enhance board 
effectiveness. All models shows that there is negative relation between board independence 
and FMC TER but all of the coefficients are statistically insignificant. As Kakabadse, Yang et 
al. (2010) points out non-executive directors in China is primarily driven by legislation rather 
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than the result of market development. Because of China’s lack of well-functioning financial 
markets (e.g. a well-defined legal system, efficient regulatory agencies, and rigorous law 
enforcement), and with its concentrated ownership, a weak investor protection environment 
and shortage of qualified independent directors in China, it is unlikely that independent 
directors will play an effective role in monitoring and control. Although there is a range of 
board size from 4 to 13 and big variation from 33% to 80% of board independence among 
China’s FMC, we find that neither board size nor board independence is associated with FMC 
board effectiveness.  
This result is consistent with Ferris and Yan (2007) who find no relation between the 
percentage of independent directors on board and fund expense ratio, but contrary to the 
findings of Tufano and Sevick (1997) that the proportion of board independence is negatively 
related to fund expenses ratio in the U.S. context.  
Hypothesis 7 predicts that a presence of female senior executive (CEO/ board chair) 
enhance board effectiveness. Results from the models provide evidence for Hypothesis 7 as 
both models show that the coefficients for the FEMSENOIRBOD dummy variable are 
negative and Model 1 shows this to be statistically significant at 5% level. We could argue 
that female as the top executives in a FMC may contribute a different perspective and 
approach to the male dominated board environment, thus enabling them (female CEO or 
Chairman) to enhance productivity and reduces total fee level for fund investors.   
Hypothesis 8 predicts that board with gender diversity enhance board effectiveness. 
The coefficients of FEMALEBOD from both models are positive, and this relation is 
statistically significant at 10% level in Model 1. There is therefore modest evidence that 
increasing the number of females on the board diminishes FMC board effectiveness.  Most 
female directors are appointed to be independent directors. The result may suggest that 
appointing female on the board only for gender diversity or “guanxi” has little to do with 
enhancing board effectiveness; in fact it can increase the costs for fund investors. 
Hypothesis 9 predicts the presence of remuneration committee enhance board 
effectiveness. Results of models show that a FMC with remuneration committee lowers FMC 
fees, which is statistically significantly at 10% level in Model 1. It suggests that the presence 
of remuneration committee could enhance board effectiveness and reduce FMC TER. The 
results show that FMC with the presence of remuneration committee significantly enhances 
board performance than those FMC without setting up remuneration committee. 
Remuneration committee institute more rational incentive system to better align the interests 
155 
 
of board members and senior management to those of fund investors, and help motivate and 
review senior management performance more effectively. The establishment of remuneration 
committee is particularly important in Chinese FMC given the complex relationship between 
FMC shareholders and fund investors as its presence can help better align of interests between 
senior officers in FMC and fund investors enhance board effectiveness.  
Hypothesis 10 predicts that increasing the number of supervisors does not enhance 
board effectiveness. All models show that an increase in the number of supervisors on 
supervisory board reduces FMC TER, but this relation is statistically insignificant at all levels.  
It affirms the general expectation that supervisors are ineffective in terms of reducing overall 
fee level.  
For control variables, we find no evidence of economies of scale in the Chinese fund 
industry. But there is reasonable evidence to support that older FMC charge higher TER. It 
could be argued that older FMC may charge higher for their established reputation.  
We find financial performance from previous year has no impact on current year FMC 
TER. When we divide FMC performance by its mean to higher/lower performance groups, 
both models provide strong evidence that FMC within higher performance group charge 
significantly lower fees, and is statistically significant at 1% level. The result suggests either 
charging higher fees dramatically affect FMC performance or FMC with better performance 
have a lower costs compared to lower performing FMC. Consistent with findings by Gao and 
Wang (2005), we find strong evidence that higher FMC turnover rate leads to higher fee level 
in Chinese FMC, and this relation is significant at 1% level.  
 
7.4  Robustness test   
Our empirical results are robust to the use of alternative regression methods including 
Bootstrap regressions and Pooled OLS. As we have relatively small sample size (288 firm-
year observations), we use Bootstrap regression first to test the robustness of our findings 
from REM. Most of the current relevant studies in the literature use OLS to examine the 
relationship between governance variables and fund expense in the U.S. (Ferris and Yan 2007; 
Meschke 2007; Kong and Tang 2008). We therefore use Pooled OLS to examine whether the 
relations found in the U.S. also exsit in Chinese FMC. 
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7.4.1 Bootstrap methods for panel data  
Results from Bootstrap method shown in Table 30 are highly consistent with findings in the 
preceding Sections of this Chapter. In fact, Models 3 and 4 confirm prior findings especially 
for the presence of remuneration committee and foreign shareholding in more significant 
ways than REM. For instance, Table 30 provides strong evidence as both models show that 
the coefficient for the presence of foreign ownership on board effectiveness is positive and 
statistically significant. Results from Bootstrap methods also show that FMC with a 
remuneration committee enhances board effectiveness, and is statistically significant.  
 
7.4.2 Pooled OLS methods for panel data 
Table 31 reports Pooled OLS estimations to test the robustness of the results from the RE 
Model estimations. Pooled OLS model yields consistent results with RE estimations in a less 
statistically significant way but affirms the findings in previous section.  
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Table 30: Robustness test: Bootstrap method of the impact of lagged value of governance variables on 
FMC TER. 
  Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES LOGTOTALTER AWTER 
 Boostrap Boostrap 
TSTATESH -0.001 -0.001 
[-0.92] [-0.49] 
LISTEDCONTROL -0.11** -0.12** 
[-2.18] [-1.97] 
FOREIGNSH 0.10** 0.10* 
[2.43] [1.82] 
HHI  -0.18 -0.17 
[-1.00] [-0.74] 
BODSIZE        0.012 0.018 
[0.78] [0.82] 
ID -0.034 -0.031 
[-0.53] [-0.51] 
FEMSENOIRBOD -0.0026 -0.0017 
[-0.11] [-0.049] 
FEMALEBOD -0.12 -0.13 
[-1.63] [-1.18] 
REMUNERATION -0.087** -0.092*  
[-1.97] [-1.77] 
SUPERVIORNO -0.041 -0.04 
[-0.63] [-0.39] 
FMCAUM -0.042* -0.041* 
[-1.85] [-1.75] 
FMCAGE -0.18*** -0.19*** 
[-2.96] [-3.14] 
LJENSENPF  0.027 0.016 
[0.64] [0.34] 
I.JENSENPF  -0.018** -0.020* 
[-1.97] [-1.67] 
TURNOVER 0.001*** 0.001*** 
[4.08] [5.34] 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes 
Constant -3.86*** -3.81*** 
[-16.0] [-14.2] 
Observations 279 279 
R-squared 0.43 
Number of fmc   58 
 Notes: z-statistics in brackets with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 31: Robustness test: OLS estimation of the impact of lagged value of governance variables on FMC 
TER. 
  Model 5 Model 6 
VARIABLES TOTALTER AWTER 
OLS OLS 
TSTATESH -0.00076 0.001 
[-0.74] [0.69] 
LISTEDCONTROL -0.12** -0.24*** 
[-2.25] [-3.02] 
FOREIGNSH 0.12*** 0.13 
[2.74] [1.44] 
HHI  -0.21 -0.29 
[-1.24] [-1.17] 
BODSIZE        0.019 0.051** 
[1.03] [2.13] 
IDNEWFORMPERCENT -0.036 -0.091 
[-0.94] [-1.55] 
FEMSENOIRBOD -0.14** -0.23** 
[-2.03] [-2.19] 
FEMALEBOD 0.0004 0.035 
[0.018] [0.76] 
REMUNERATION -0.095** -0.023* 
[-2.13] [-1.87] 
SUPERVIORNO -0.014 -0.011 
[-0.92] [-0.35] 
FMCSIZE -0.043* 0.056 
[-1.96] [0.88] 
FMCAGE 0.022** -0.032 
[2.13] [-1.42] 
LJENSENPF  0.025 -0.08 
[0.58] [-1.15] 
I.JENSENPF  -0.18*** -0.30** 
[-2.88] [-2.32] 
TURNOVER 0.00077*** 0.0012** 
[7.70] [2.33] 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes 
Constant -3.80*** 0.33 
[-17.0] [0.62] 
Observations 288 288 
R-squared 0.43 0.82 
Number of FMC              58                58            
 Notes: z-statistics in brackets with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
159 
 
7.5 Conclusion  
 
The development of a well-functioning financial system is critical for a large, rapidly growing 
economy still undergoing economic reform with a dominant state-owned sector in the 
economy. The growth of the fund management industry is an important part of China’s 
financial development. The contractual form of FMC organisation in China presents a variety 
of governance issues in addition to the conventional agency problems associated with modern 
corporations. However, research on how fund management companies are governed is scant. 
This chapter presents an analysis of the effectiveness of the board of director as the key 
internal governance mechanism of Chinese FMC in ameliorating the misalignment of the 
interests between FMC and its fund investors.  
The literature on fund management industry in the West has traditionally concentrated 
more on fund performance than governance. There are relatively limited studies on board 
effectiveness of mutual funds in the U.S., and very little is known about board performance of 
FMC in China. This chapter represents a first systematic study on the corporate governance 
challenges confronting the fledging Chinese fund management industry by examining how 
governance variables affect board effectiveness.   
Our results suggest that a listed company as a controlling shareholder will enhance 
board performance. However, shareholding from state-owned financial institutions has no 
impact on FMC TER. This result suggests that concentrated shareholdings, even when the 
majority shareholders tend to be state-owned financial institutions, make no difference in 
board effectiveness.  The presence of foreign ownership in FMC increases total expense level. 
That may be due to the initial higher set up and running costs due to adoption of foreign 
operational and remuneration standards in FMC with the presence of foreign shareholders 
compared to FMC with wholly domestic company as FMC shareholders.  
The evidence also shows that neither board size nor board independence have 
significant impact on board effectiveness. Because of the absence of well-functioning 
financial markets, and with its concentrated ownership, a weak investor protection 
environment and shortage of qualified independent directors in China, it is unlikely that 
independent directors will play an effective role in monitoring and control. 
The female as the top executive (female CEO or Chairman) could enhance board 
effectiveness because of different perspective and approach to the male dominated board 
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environment. However, increasing the number of females on the board actually weakens 
board performance in China’s business environment. The presence of remuneration 
committee significantly enhances board performance. As expected, the supervisory board is 
found to have no impact on board effectiveness.  
The findings of this dissertation help to better understand how governance mechanisms 
may affect board effectiveness under the contractual form of FMC in China. It also extends 
the current literature from a focus on the corporate form of FMC in the US to the contractual 
from in China.  
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CHAPTER 8 
IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS ON PERFORMANCE 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 While the level of fees in FMC is analytically considered by researchers to exhibit the central 
conflict of interests between fund investors and FMC, FMC performance is certainly also a 
key concern for fund investors, and enhancing performance is vital to attract and retain the 
interests of investors. FMC therefore would be willing to enhance their performance to attract 
investors in order to increase their AUM so that more income could be earned. Examining 
how FMC performance may be enhanced by the quality of corporate governance therefore 
provides further clues to addressing the governance issues inherent in the fund industry. 
Using CGI as a proxy of the overall quality of FMC governance, this chapter first 
examines how the totality of FMC governance affects FMC performance under the 
contractual form of fund organization in China. It further investigates the relationship between 
the identified governance variables and FMC performance.  
The relevant literature review and theoretical analysis on the relation between 
governance variables and FMC performance are provided in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses 
the methodology and data used in this chapter. This chapter first provides a statistical 
summary of the full sample. We then present our analysis of the relevant governance variables 
with univariate analysis - correlation between main governance variables and FMC 
performance measures. Regression models are employed to explore the relations between 
governance variables and FMC performance. 
   
8.2 Summary of Statistics  
Table 32 provides an overview of the main summary statistics of the full sample. Included are 
the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values for the variables of FMC 
performance measures, governance characteristics, and FMC characteristics except dummy 
variables.   
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Panel A contains a description of FMC performance measurements. FMC MPF is on 
average 0.044 with a maximum value of 0.491 and a minimum value of -0.392. OAPF is on 
average -0.161 with a big standard deviation of 0.733. M2PF and JENSENPF are 0.353 and 
0.332 respectively after adjusting the original data by multiple 1000.  
Governance variables and FMC characteristics in Panel B of Table 31 are the same as 
those introduced in Chapter 7.2.  
 
Table 32: Descriptive statistics of main variables. 
   Mean  Std.   Dev.  Min Max 
Panel A: FMC performance measurements  
Continuous monthly FMC returns (MPF) 0.044 0.137 -0.392 0.491 
Objective-adjusted FMC returns (OAPF) 11.56 8.02 -0.0177 31.861 
M2pf*1000 (M2PF) 0.353 0.436 -0.747 1.759 
Jensen Performance*1000 (JENSENPF) 0.332 0.386 -0.585 1.5 
Panel B: Shareholder and BOD characteristics 
HHI  0.428 0.144 0.1 1 
Total state-financial institutions shareholding (%) (TSTATESH) 59.781 17.98 10 100 
Board size (BODSIZE)         8.622 1.729 4 13 
ID Percentage (*100) (IDPERCENT) 42.025 10.196 33.33 80 
Number of female on the board (FEMALEBOD) 0.983 0.953 0 3 
Number of Superviors (SUPERVIORNO) 3.724 1.453 1 8 
Panel C: FMC characteristics and Control variables 
FMC age (FMCAGE) 5.7 3.056 0 13 
FMC AUM(billion) (AUM) 144.5 83.283 1 288 
FMC total expense ratio(%) (TOTALTER) 2.52 1.177 0.391 8.578 
     
Panel D: Dummy variables  Number  Per cent   
Listed controlling shareholder (LISTEDCONTROL)  96  33.33% 
Foreign companies' shareholding (FOREIGNSH) 158 54.86% 
Senoir female (FEMALESENOIR) 28 9.72% 
Remuneration Committe (REMUNERATION) 110 38.19% 
 Notes: our sample comprises 288 firm-year observations covering over 95% of all AUM in Chinese fund industry over 2006 
- 2010. The definition and measurement of above variables are presented in Appendix A. We use “Box Plot” to identify 
outliers and replace them using mean-value.   
 
CGI 
As noted in Chapter 5.6, Corporate Governance Index (CGI) constructed by China Centre for 
Institutional Investors (CCII, based in Nanjing University) is used as a proxy for overall 
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quality of corporate governance and is applied to examine whether it could enhance FMC 
performance in China. The overall scores are divided into five groups where the highest group 
rated 5 star, and 1 star have the lowest marks. CGI of 2007-2009 (MCG0709) is used, and 
there are overall 174 observations as shown in         Table 33.  
        Table 33: Description of CGI 
CGI Rates Number 
Percent 
(%) 
1 Star 34 20 
2 Star 35 20 
3 Star 35 20 
4 Star 35 20 
5 Star 35 20 
 Source: CCII.  
 
8.3 Results and discussion  
8.3.1 Correlation analysis   
We start our analysis in the examination of the Pearson correlation test to understand the 
approximate relations between governance variables and FMC performance, and then explore 
these relations using panel-data regression models in the subsequent Section. Table 34 reports 
that the Peason correlations of main governance variables and four measures of performance.   
Total state-owned financial shareholding (SHSTATEFIN) has a positive relation with 
the performance measures of Objective-adjusted performance (OAPF), Modigliani and 
Modigliani (M2PF) and Jensen alpha (JENSENPF), except Monthly returns (MPF), 
suggesting increasing shareholding by the state enhances performance. This positive relation 
is inconsistent with Hypothesis 11 that shareholding by the state in FMC damage FMC returns.  
Herfindahl index (HHI) affects all performance measures negatively, significant at 10% 
level when using JENSENPF. It indicates higher shareholding concentration in FMC damages 
performance, which is consistent with Hypothesis 12. There is a mixed relation between 
BODSIZE and measures of performance.  
Most of the performance measures positively correlate with proportion of independent 
directors (ID) on the board, indicating that increasing board independence enhances FMC 
performance. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 16. Female members on board 
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(FEMSENOIRBOD) correlates negatively with FMC performance, suggesting increasing the 
number of female members on the board could damage FMC performance.  
The Pearson correlation results provide some insights into the linkage between 
performance measures and key governance variables. As discussed above, most of the signs 
of relations are as predicted. It should be noted that univariate analysis only considers the 
relationship of two variables. Performance measures may be influenced not only by 
governance variables but also by other variables. We further investigate these relationships 
between governance variables and performance measures through regression models that 
incorporate all governance variables into one model, while other variables are controlled.   
 
Table 34: Correlations of main governance variables and measures of performance. 
 
MPF  OAPF M2PF JENSENPF  
TSTATESH -0.079 0.071 0.105 0.059 
HHI  -0.058 -0.095 -0.053 -0.134* 
BODSIZE        0.040 -0.024 -0.038 0.089 
IDPERCENT -0.030 0.1237*  0.076 0.078 
FEMALEBOD -0.053 -0.003 -0.068 -0.065 
SUPERVIORNO -0.030 -0.054 0.008 0.095 
 
8.3.2 Major findings  
 
Results for FMC CGI and governance variables   
We examine the impact of the overall quality of corporate governance on FMC performance 
using the following model (detailed information about models and hypotheses are given in 
Chapter 5) : 
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           (2) 
Two FMC performance measures are used: FMC annual continuous monthly returns   
(MPF) and risk-adjusted performance (Modigliani and Modigliani: M2PF) in model (1). 
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Detailed of FMC performance measures are given in Appendix A. FMC performance 
measures are calculated by sum of asset-weighted fund performance measures under the same 
FMC. 
 
Table 35: RE estimation of the impact of lagged CGI on FMC performance. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES MPF MPF M2PF M2PF 
CGI 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.059*** 0.052*** 
[3.05] [5.07] [4.36] [6.01] 
FMCSIZE 0.006 0.004 0.015 0.028 
[0.25] [0.17] [0.19] [0.34] 
FMCAGE 0.000 0.001 0.048*** 0.047*** 
[0.049] [0.096] [3.39] [3.16] 
TURNOVERRATE 0.87** 0.90** 0.41 0.27 
[2.29] [2.57] [0.41] [0.26] 
AWTER -0.023*** -0.088*** 
[-2.78] [-4.51] 
TOTALTER -0.074* -0.064* 
[-1.84] [-4.18] 
Constant 0.07 0.074 0.039 0.013 
[0.61] [0.66] [0.11] [0.034] 
Year Fixed Effects 
Observations 
Y 
174 
Y 
174 
Y 
174 
Y 
174 
Notes: z-statistics in brackets with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. There are overall 174 firm-year observations which cover 
greater than 95% of overall AUM of fund industry in China. CGI is from 2007-2009, dependent variables are from 2008-
2010.  Detailed explanation of variables is given in Appendix A.  
 
All models in Table 35 show that higher overall quality in corporate governance (CGI) 
impacts on FMC performance positively and these effects are statistically significant at 1% 
level. It suggests corporate governance is important in enhancing FMC performance. For 
instance, Model 4 provide strong evidence that increasing one level in CGI rating could 
enhance performance (M2) by 0.059, this is significant given the mean of M2PF is 0.397.  
All model shows that the size of FMC has no impact on performance, indicating there is 
no evidence of economies of scale in China’s fund industry during this period. When using 
M2 as performance measure, coefficient of the FMC age (FMCAGE) is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level, indicating FMC with longer period of experiences 
enhance performance. It also suggests that FMC with longer period of experiences tend to 
focus on risk-adjusted performance rather than continuous monthly returns (MPF). All models 
find that coefficients of FMC turnover rate (TURNOVERRATE) is positive, and this relation 
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is significantly at 5% level when using MPF as a performance measure. All models show that 
both measures of FMC TER have significant effect on FMC performance. For instance, 
Model 4 shows one percentage point increase in AWTER could reduce performance by 0.088, 
and this effect is statistically significant at 1% level. This result suggests that increasing 
level of FMC total fees does significantly reduce FMC performance, thus affirming the 
expectation that a more effective board can on the whole produce better performance.   
Robustness test for CGI  
When sample size is relatively small, the asymptotic behaviour of  statistics could lead to poor 
approximation of the true one (Wooldridge 2009). Using Bootstrap method could provide a 
solution so that the mean and standard deviation could be estimated with minimal bias 
(Cremers et al. 2009).  
         The results from Bootstrap method in Table 36 are highly consistent with our findings 
from the REM model (Table 35) although at lower significance level. Similar results from 
bootstrap to REM indicate REM could provide reasonable evidence on these findings we 
investigate even though the sample size is relatively small.  
Table 36: Robustness test: Bootstrap method test impact of lagged CGI on FMC performance. 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
VARIABLES MPF MPF M2PF M2PF 
CGI 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.061* 0.059** 
[2.93] [2.69] [1.92] [2.08] 
FMCSIZE 0.0057 0.0071 -0.0032 0.017 
[0.54] [0.96] [-0.096] [0.65] 
FMCAGE 0 0 0.052*** 0.050*** 
[0.19] [0.20] [5.35] [5.05] 
TURNOVERRATE 0.87*** 0.92*** 0.58 0.35 
[4.79] [4.94] [1.16] [0.79] 
AWTER -0.023*** -0.061*** 
[-3.46] [-2.64] 
TOTALTER -0.0095 -0.075*** 
[-1.35] [-4.83] 
Constant 0.07 0.074 0.039 0.013 
[0.61] [0.66] [0.11] [0.034] 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 300 300 300 300 
 Notes: z-statistics in brackets with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Results for internal governance mechanisms and FMC performance    
Regression models to investigate the relation between corporate governance quality in terms 
of the identified specific governance mechanisms and FMC performance are presented in 
Chapter 5. The description of variables is in Chapter 4.  
titij
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There are four measures of FMC performance: continuous monthly returns (MPF), 
objective-adjusted performance (OAPF), M2PF and Jensen’s alpha. Detailed explanation of 
variables is given in Appendix A. FMC performance measures are calculated by sum of asset-
weighted fund performance measures under the same FMC. 
Table 37 reports the results of RE estimation for the above-presented equations. Model 
1-4 comprises different FMC performance measures, MPF, OAPF, M2PF, and JENSENPF 
respectively.  
Hypothesis 12 investigates the association between FMC state ownership and FMC 
performance. The coefficients for shareholding by state have inconsistent signs and are 
statistically insignificant. The results suggest that shareholding from state has no discernible 
impact on performance. As discussed in Chapter 7, the state as major shareholder has no 
significant impact on FMC governance and management, therefore, has no impact on either 
board effectiveness or FMC performance.  
 Hypothesis 13 predicts that a listed company as the controlling shareholder of FMC 
will enhance FMC performance. Our result provides strong support for this hypothesis, with 
all models showing the coefficients for dummy variable of a FMC with a listed controlling 
shareholder positive and statistically significant. For instance, the presence of listed company 
as controlling shareholder for FMC on average increase FMC OAPF substantially by 0.27, 
and this result is significant at 1% level given the mean of FMC OAPF is -0.161. With an 
average of 48.7% shareholdings holding by the controlling shareholder, a listed company as 
the controlling shareholder in Chinese FMC can dramatically improve FMC performance. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, the presence of listed companies as the controlling shareholder could 
also enhance board effectiveness. Therefore, it could be argued that when the controlling 
shareholder is a listed company, the anticipated higher governance standards of those 
controlling shareholders could have a significant positive impact on FMC board effectiveness 
and governance mechanisms, which help to increase FMC performance.  
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Table 37: RE estimation of the impact of lagged governance variables on FMC performance. 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
MPF OAPF M2PF JENSENPF 
TSTATESH 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.000 
[0.18] [-1.10] [0.81] [-0.28] 
LISTEDCONTROL 0.025* 0.27*** 0.13* 0.11** 
[-1.78] [2.89] [1.78] [2.19] 
FOREIGNSH 0.011 0.100 0.160** 0.072* 
[0.94] [1.19] [2.31] [1.81] 
HHI  -0.065*** -0.25* -0.28* -0.22** 
[-3.00] [-1.87] [-1.74] [-2.54] 
BODSIZE        0.006 -0.036* -0.006 -0.016 
[1.61] [-1.66] [-0.22] [-0.047] 
IDPERCENT -0.0066 -0.020 -0.015 0.016 
[-0.80] [-0.34] [-0.33] [0.61] 
FEMSENOIR 0.027 0.16 0.037 0.050 
 [1.26] [1.07] [0.27] [0.59] 
FEMALEBOD -0.010 -0.067* -0.043 -0.053** 
 [-1.49] [-1.70] [-1.47] [-2.56] 
REMUNERATION -0.0061 -0.094 -0.064 -0.027 
[-0.52] [-1.32] [-1.21] [-0.72] 
SUPERVIORNO -0.0091 -0.080 -0.15 -0.18** 
[-0.51] [-0.73] [-1.31] [-2.34] 
AUM 0.0044 0.0092 0.021 0.029 
[0.39] [0.17] [0.79] [1.17] 
FMCAGE -0.0022 0.028** 0.039*** 0.022*** 
[-1.10] [2.18] [3.30] [3.17] 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 288 288 288 288 
Number of FMC 58 58 58 58 
Notes: z-statistics in brackets with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variance inflation factor (VIF) is used to 
evaluated muti-collinerity among the key variables. We find no evidence of a collinerity problem in our main 
governance and control variables (see Table 29)  
 
Hypothesis 14 predicts that the presence of foreign shareholding in FMC enhances 
FMC performance. We find the presence of foreign shareholding in FMC affect FMC 
performance positively for all the measures, and these positive relations are significant using 
risk-adjusted performance (M2PF and JENSENPF). These results indicate that FMC with a 
presence of foreign ownership have higher risk-adjusted performance. It is generally accepted 
that foreign shareholders possess more advanced risk management skills and techniques, 
which is the major reason the Chinese government welcomes well-chosen foreign companies 
to enter into Chinese financial sector. As explained in Chapter 7, the presence of foreign 
financial institutions in FMC shareholding could incur higher costs such as higher 
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compensation and costs for foreign directors to attend meetings. However, the presence of 
foreign shareholding does enhance FMC performance.  
Hypothesis 15 predicts that higher ownership concentration damages FMC 
performance. We find evidence to support this hypothesis, as evidenced by the negative 
relation between Herfindahl index (HHI) and FMC performance by all measures of 
performance, and are significant at 1% level (when using OAPF and M2PF measures), at 5% 
level (using JENSENPF) and 10% level (using MPF measures). As discussed in Chapter 7, 
concentrated ownership in FMC has no impact on FMC fee level. However, it could be 
argued that increasing number of shareholders from different financial background such as 
banks, insurance companies, and investment companies would facilitate access to more 
expertise and information, and greater capacity to identify qualified fund managers to attain 
good FMC performance.     
Hypothesis 16 predicts that smaller FMC board size enhances FMC performance. We 
find reasonable evidence to support this hypothesis as three out of four models document 
board size affects FMC performance negatively and Model 6 finds this relation significant at 
10% level. These results are consistent with the findings of Liu, J (2009) in Chinese listed 
companies, and Adams, Mansi et al. (2010), Kong and Tang (2008) and Dann, Del Guercio et 
al. (2002) in U.S. mutual fund.  It could be argued that larger boards are likely to have higher 
coordination costs and communication problem, which may lead to the negative effect of 
board size has on FMC performance. Overall, we find the size of board has no impact on 
board effectiveness but increasing the size of board harm FMC performance.   
Hypothesis 17 predicts that higher proportion of independent directors enhances FMC 
performance. We find no evidence that board independence thus defined influences FMC 
performance, which is consistent with the findings by  Khorana, Servaes et al. (2007a) in the 
context of U.S. mutual funds. This paper documents that the proportion of independent 
directors has no impact on either board effectiveness or FMC performance. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, with its concentrated ownership and shortage of qualified independent directors in 
China, it is unlikely that independent directors will play an effective role in monitoring and 
control, resulting in compromised independence and ineffectual board in China’s 
circumstance. 
Hypothesis 18 predicts that the presence of female senior executive (CEO/ board chair) 
enhances FMC performance. All models show that there is positive relation between the 
presence of female senior executive and FMC performance, but this relation is insignificant in 
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all models, indicating presence of female senior executive does not improve FMC 
performance. While Chapter 7 documents that the presence of female senior executive 
enhances FMC board effectiveness, the impact of female senior executives on FMC 
performance is not found.  
Hypothesis 19 predicts that board with greater gender diversity enhances FMC 
performance. Results rejects H19, showing increasing number of females on board actually 
damages FMC performance in all models.  It suggests that having more female members on 
the board just for the sake of “Guan Xi” or “Gender diversity” would not enhance board 
effectiveness but is likely to incur costs as explained in Chapter 7. As a result, FMC 
performance are damaged because of extra costs incurred. In China, the appointing of female 
and male is probably subject to the same shortcomings and constraints of the existing 
governance processes so that superficial diversity makes little difference.  
Hypothesis 20 predicts that the presence of remuneration committee enhances FMC 
performance. Our findings show that there is positive relation between the presence of 
remuneration committee and FMC performance, but this relation is insignificant in all models, 
indicating the presence of remuneration committee plays no role in enhancing FMC 
performance. A possible explanation is that the quality and skills of fund managers plays a 
key role in FMC performance. The presence of remuneration committee plays negligible role 
in motivating Chinese fund managers in enhancing their performance because of the high 
turnover rate in Chinese fund managers. Therefore, even the presence of remuneration 
committee could enhance board effectiveness; it has limited effect to influence FMC 
performance.  
Hypothesis 21 predicts that increasing the number of supervisors does not enhance 
FMC performance. All models show that increase in number of supervisors on supervisory 
board damages FMC performance, and the result is significant at 5% level in Model 4. This 
affirms the general expectation that supervisors are ineffective in enhancing FMC 
performance.   
For control variables, we find that FMC asset under management has no effect on FMC 
performance, and is consistent with previous findings of this study, which affirms the 
arguments of misalignment of interests between FMC and fund investors. It suggests that 
FMC scale of operation does not help with its performance. Three out of four models show 
that older FMC have better FMC performance. This result is significant and important at 1% 
level in Model 3 and 4, and at 5% in Model 2. Therefore, older FMC may be more 
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experienced in investments and have more extensive networks in obtaining useful information 
and “Guan Xi” to enhance FMC performance.   
 
Robustness test for internal governance mechanisms and FMC performance 
 
Given the small total number of FMC in China, sample size is therefore relatively small. We 
use Bootstrap regression to test the robustness of our findings from REM. GMM is also used 
to deal with endogeneity problem and dynamic panel data to examine the appropriateness of 
REM. All similar studies in the literature use OLS to examine the relation between 
governance variables and fund performance in the U.S. (Adams et al. 2010; Ferris & Yan 
2007; Kong & Tang 2008; Meschke 2007), Pooled OLS is therefore also adopted to examine 
whether our tests by REM generate similar findings.  
Results from Bootstrap method (Table 38), GMM (Table 39), and Pooled OLS models 
(Table 40) show the signs of all main variables are qualitatively unchanged although with 
slightly lower statistical significance compared to results from REM. It can therefore be 
concluded that REM provides robust evidence for those findings. 
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Table 38: Bootstrap method: examines the robustness of the prior findings reported from RE estimations 
about the impact of governance variables on following year FMC performance. 
         MPF           OAPF        M2PF       JENSENPF 
TSTATESH 0.0001 -0.0023 0.00017 0.00046 
[0.23] [-1.30] [0.11] [0.33] 
LISTEDCONTROL 0.021 0.24*** 0.11 0.11** 
[1.41] [2.58] [1.27] [2.06] 
FOREIGNSH 0.007 0.074 0.097* 0.096** 
[0.58] [0.85] [1.69] [2.09] 
HHI  -0.053** -0.18 -0.15 -0.28*** 
[-2.28] [-1.22] [-0.95] [-2.76] 
BODSIZE        0.0046 -0.016 -0.0047 0.0053 
[1.06] [-0.70] [-0.22] [0.20] 
IDPERCENT -0.0056 -0.063 0.0071 0.015 
[-0.67] [-1.09] [0.14] [0.38] 
FEMSENOIR 0.026 0.1 0.067 0.02 
[1.46] [0.77] [0.47] [0.18] 
FEMALEBOD -0.0074 -0.054 -0.047 -0.037** 
[-1.13] [-1.27] [-1.43] [-2.26] 
REMUNERATION 0.005 0.028 0.024 0.028 
[0.41] [0.39] [0.41] [0.62] 
SUPERVIORNO -0.0077 -0.0068 -0.046 -0.22** 
[-0.42] [-0.056] [-0.48] [-2.39] 
AUM 0.005 -0.0085 -0.0051 0.023 
[0.48] [-0.17] [-0.15] [0.92] 
FMCAGE -0.003 0.035** 0.038** 0.029*** 
[-1.56] [2.42] [2.54] [3.00] 
Year Dummies           Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes 
Constant -0.056 -0.049 0.035 -0.18*** 
       [-0.58] [-0.53] [1.51] [-2.81] 
Observations 288 288 288 288 
R-squared 0.35 0.34 0.6  0.56 
 Notes: z-statistics in brackets with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
173 
 
  
Table 39: GMM examines the robustness of the main results reported from RE estimations about the 
impact of governance variables on following year FMC performance. 
VARIABLES    MPF    OAPF M2PF JENSENPF 
TSTATESH 0.0077*** -0.017 0.013 0.011 
[4.14] [-0.067] [1.01] [1.47] 
LISTEDCONTROL 4.66 10.7 2.16 1.75* 
[0.56] [0.032] [0.46] [1.81] 
FOREIGNSH -0.03 10.2*** 0.18 0.082 
[-0.16] [3.33] [0.46] [0.22] 
HHI  -0.16 -1.6 0.079 -0.43** 
[-0.93] [-0.19] [0.22] [-2.07] 
BODSIZE        0.10* -1.54 -0.23*** -0.24*** 
[1.79] [-0.31] [-5.11] [-4.55] 
IDPERCENT 2.53 203 -1.81 9.17 
[0.71] [0.028] [-0.15] [0.072] 
FEMSENOIR 0.18** 11.1** 0.34* 1.01*** 
[2.20] [2.57] [1.82] [3.35] 
FEMALEBOD -0.82 1,544 -0.12* -0.33*** 
[-0.053] [0.034] [-1.67] [-2.66] 
REMUNERATION -3.18 -14.2 1.99 -1.07 
[-0.44] [-0.056] [0.46] [-0.14] 
SUPERVIORNO -0.40*** -1.69 -0.18 -0.22 
[-3.74] [-0.21] [-0.66] [-1.02] 
AUM 0.026 0.2 0.074 0.070* 
[1.31] [0.26] [1.60] [1.78] 
FMCAGE 0.59 -2.22 1.24 -0.7 
[1.03] [-0.012] [0.35] [-0.070] 
FMCTER -0.44 -63.3 0.94 1.39 
[-0.38] [-1.00] [0.44] [0.50] 
LMPF -0.26*** 
[-4.62] 
LOAPF 0.25*** 
[2.80] 
LM2PF 0.11 
[0.88] 
LJENSENPF 0.055 
[0.22] 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0 0 -7.19 -22.2 
[-0.53] [-0.089] 
Observations 232 232 232 232 
Number of fmc 58 58 58 58 
 Notes: z-statistics in brackets with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 40: Robustness test: OLS estimation of the impact of governance variables on FMC performance. 
VARIABLES       MPF     OAPF    M2PF JENSENPF 
TSTATESH 0.000073 -0.0018 0.00071 -0.00039 
[0.15] [-1.06] [0.58] [-0.40] 
LISTEDCONTROL -0.025 0.27*** 0.13** 0.11** 
[-1.11] [2.70] [2.12] [2.33] 
FOREIGNSH 0.011 0.1 0.15*** 0.067* 
[0.50] [1.18] [2.76] [1.76] 
HHI  -0.065* -0.25* -0.25** -0.21*** 
[-1.75] [-1.70] [-2.10] [-2.74] 
BODSIZE        0.0056 -0.036 -0.0026 0.000059 
[0.79] [-1.31] [-0.15] [0.0044] 
IDPERCENT -0.0066 -0.02 -0.02 0.016 
[-0.43] [-0.30] [-0.56] [0.58] 
FEMSENOIR -0.027 0.16 0.039 0.052 
[-0.71] [1.14] [0.39] [0.70] 
FEMALEBOD -0.01 -0.067 -0.046* -0.053*** 
[-0.90] [-1.45] [-1.76] [-2.61] 
REMUNERATION -0.0061 -0.094 -0.06 -0.025 
[-0.32] [-1.04] [-1.36] [-0.70] 
SUPERVIORNO -0.0091 -0.08 -0.14* -0.17*** 
[-0.32] [-0.64] [-1.90] [-2.98] 
AUM 0.0044 0.0092 0.012 0.026 
[0.32] [0.16] [0.43] [1.11] 
FMCAGE -0.003 0.035** 0.038** 0.029*** 
[-1.56] [2.42] [2.54] [3.00] 
FMCTER -0.14 9.36* 0.11 1.32 
[-0.17] [1.83] [0.050] [0.70] 
Year Dummies          Yes       Yes       Yes      Yes 
Constant -0.056 -0.049 0.035 -0.18*** 
       [-0.58]      [-0.53] [1.51]      [-2.81] 
Observations 288 288 288 288 
R-squared 0.35 0.34 0.6 0.42 
Notes: z-statistics in brackets with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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8.4  Conclusion  
Operating under a regulatory environment with weak enforcement of investor protection, the 
contractual form of fund management companies (FMC) in China’s emerging fund industry 
presents some complex governance issues in addition to the conventional agency problems 
associated with modern public corporations. The lack of fund investor’s voice in the 
governance of FMC highlights the importance of the quality of FMC governance in ensuring 
FMC performance to produce results for fund investors. However, research on FMC governed 
is scant. This dissertation presents the first systematic study on whether the quality of 
corporate governance matters in the performance of the contractual form of FMC 
organizations by investigating evidence from China.  
Using panel data of 288 firm-year observations covering more than 98% of fund 
management companies in China from 2006 to 2010, this Chapter examines how overall 
quality of corporate governance affect FMC performance, and to investigate the relationship 
between identified governance variables and FMC performance. Compared to conventional 
OLS estimator, this study apply RE and GMM to examine the relationship between quality of 
governance and FMC performance. Our results suggest that FMC with good corporate 
governance does matter in generating performance for fund investors in China.  
Using CGI as the measure of overall quality of corporate governance to examine how 
corporate governance affects FMC performance, our results suggest that corporate governance 
quality is significant important in determining FMC performance. 
In examining the relationship between specific internal governance mechanisms and 
FMC performance, we find that a listed company as shareholder not only enhances board 
effectiveness, but also improves FMC performance. It highlights the importance of higher 
governance standards a listed company have to operate, resulting in more positive impact on 
the governance standards of its subsidiary (FMC).  
 The findings affirm the importance of the controlling shareholders in determining FMC 
board effectiveness and performance. While higher ownership concentration in FMC has no 
impact on FMC board effectiveness, it damages FMC performance. It could be argued that 
with highly concentrated ownership, increasing the number of shareholders from diversified 
financial background could enable more easy access to financial information and/or more 
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capacity to identify qualified fund managers to operate the AUM of FMC. Therefore, FMC 
performance is increased.  
 We document the role of foreign shareholding in FMC performance. We find board 
size affects FMC performance negatively, indicating the small board is more effective in 
enhancing FMC performance. However, board independence has been documented have no 
impact on either board effectiveness or FMC performance. This affirms the widely accepted 
view that director independence in China is problematic. Increasing number of females on the 
board is found to have no impact on board effectiveness and damage FMC performance, 
which suggests that having more female members on the board just for the sake of “Guan Xi” 
or “Gender diversity” would not enhance board effectiveness but could incur costs.  
The result shows that FMC with remuneration committee has in practice limited power 
to enhance FMC performance because of the very high turnover rate in Chinese fund 
managers, even though the presence of remuneration committee helps to enhance board 
performance. It also shows that increasing the level of FMC total fees does significantly 
reduce FMC performance, affirming that a more effective board can on the whole produce 
better performance. Overall, the internal governance mechanisms are important for FMC 
performance in China.  
In addition, the result shows that the size of FMC’s asset under management has no 
effect on FMC performance, suggesting that FMC scale of operation does not help its 
performance but will certainly increase the income of FMC through the fees FMC could 
charge, which affirms the existence of misalignment of interests between FMC and fund 
investors. It is also found that older FMC have better performance. A possible explanation is 
that older FMC may be more experienced in investments and have more extensive networks 
in obtaining useful information to enhance FMC performance.   
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION  
9.1 Introduction  
The growth of the fund management industry is an important part of China’s financial 
development. The contractual form of FMC organisation in China presents a variety of 
industry- and country- specific governance issues in addition to the conventional agency 
problems associated with modern corporations. This study explores how governance 
mechanisms help protects the interests of fund investors. This thesis provides an in-depth 
analysis of the governance problems under the contractual form of FMC in China, and 
investigates how governance mechanisms in FMC affect FMC board effectiveness and 
financial performance. The thesis presents the first systematic study to investigate how 
governance settings work in Chinese FMC, contributing new perspective, insights, and new 
empirical evidence to the literature.   
This chapter provides a summary and some conclusions of the thesis and is organised as 
follows. Section 9.2 outlines the research questions addressed in the thesis and summaries the 
analytical approach, hypothesis development and testing, and findings of the study by 
chapters. Section 9.3 review key contributions. Several limitations and future research 
directions are outlined in Section 9.4.  
9.2 A Summary of the thesis  
It is widely accepted that given the right institutional conditions, the quality of corporate 
governance can enhance firm performance in conventional firms. Improving FMC 
performance in financial institutions is important for a transition economy as the development 
of the fund industry forms an important aspect of a reforming economy’s path to financial 
development. Given the complex governance issues in FMC, therefore, how to protect the 
interests of fund investors in China is key for the healthy development of the fund industry. 
As a result, it is important to examine whether quality of corporate governance could enhance 
firm performance in Chinese fund industry when there is an immature capital market, weak 
legal enforcement and poor external institutional condition. Board effectiveness is considered 
as the central mechanism to protect fund investors, how to enhance board effectiveness is 
important. FMC performance is vital to the interests of fund investors. There is therefore a 
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need to understand how governance mechanisms could enhance FMC performance. The key 
research questions of this dissertation are:  
What are the key agency problems that Chinese FMC are exposed to? (Chapter 5) 
How do specific internal corporate governance mechanisms impact on board effectiveness? 
(Chapter 7) 
How does the overall quality of FMC corporate governance affect FMC performance? 
(Chapter 8) 
What specific FMC governance mechanisms enhance FMC performance? (Chapter 8) 
Chapter 2 provides a general theoretical background of corporate governance for a 
better understanding and analysis of corporate governance of Chinese FMC. Theories of 
corporate governance including agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence 
theory and global governance theory are explored. This study uses agency theoretical 
perspective to examine whether certain governance settings in Chinese FMC could mitigate 
the conflict of interests between fund investors and the FMC. The role of the board of 
directors and its effectiveness as the central governance mechanisms is discussed. The role of 
institutional investors in capital market development and corporate governance of investee 
firms are also highlighted.  
Chapter 3 discusses Chinese corporate governance in terms of external and internal 
governance mechanisms. The role and efficacy of capital market development and legal 
infrastructure as the key external governance mechanisms in China are examined. The 
relationship between corporate governance development and the development of China’s 
financial system are complementary. Tam and Yu (2011) stress that “well-functioning capital 
market and effective corporate governance at the firm level are widely accepted as mutually 
reinforcing”. Corporate governance is critically vital to enhance the credibility and confidence 
in company management, and is fundamental to the development of capital market. 
Development of a country’s capital market will also help drive the building of a well-
functioning and effective system of corporate governance. Tam and Yu (2011) point out that 
the pace and quality of Chinese capital market development is a major challenge for corporate 
governance to evolve, and there is an urgent need to speed up China’s financial development. 
Institutional investors could also play a crucial role in helping the steady growth of capital 
market. 
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Well-functioning regulatory infrastructure and legal system provide an effective set of 
external mechanisms in establishing good governance practices, building the capacity of 
institutions and individuals to implement and enforce formal and informal rules and 
regulations. External governance mechanisms in China are in general weak with poor legal 
enforcement and underdeveloped capital market, as well as ineffective and negligible market 
for corporate control. Corporate governance reforms in China have in practice relied on the 
development internal mechanisms with a particular focus on the responsibilities of directors 
and managers.  
 China imposes a two-tier board structure, consisting the board of directors and 
supervisory board. Chapter 3 also investigates in the Chinese context some key features of 
internal governance mechanisms such as the state as the dominant owner with a concentrated 
ownership, the function of supervisory board, and the independence of directors.  
A better understanding of the historical development and structure of the Chinese fund 
industry is important for analysing the governance of China’s FMC. Chapter 4 examines the 
overall development and pertinent changes in the fund industry, the governance structure and 
governance issues of Chinese FMC, and to review the relevant literature of FMC governance 
in China. A comparison of the organizational form between Chinese FMC and U.S. mutual 
fund is outlined so as to better understand to what extent governance issues in U.S. mutual 
fund could be considered in the context of the Chinese fund industry, and how the rich 
literature of corporate governance of U.S. mutual funds could inform and be used in this study 
given that most of the extant literature of corporate governance of the industry and FMC 
focuses on the U.S.  
Chapter 5 provides an analysis of key agency problems in Chinese FMC and outlines 
the two major research questions for this study. Under the contractual form of FMC, fund 
investors in China are not shareholders of FMC, as distinct from the corporate form of mutual 
fund in the U.S. where fund investors are fund shareholders (discussed in Chapter 4). This 
study investigates the impact of governance profile on board effectiveness and performance at 
the FMC level rather than at the fund level as in most studies, taking into account the 
contractual nature of Chinese FMC as funds within the FMC are managed under the same set 
of governance mechanisms. A conflict of interests between FMC and fund investors arises 
from the misalignment of objectives regarding the fund fees which enriches FMC but reduces 
fund performance for fund investors. The complex structure of FMC provides additional 
governance issues compared to the conventional publicly listed companies. Both in the 
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literature and in practice, the board of directors is considered as the central governance 
mechanism to protect the interest of investors. The first major research question for this study 
is to investigate what specific governance setting could enhance board effectiveness.  
FMC performance is a key concern for fund investors, and improving FMC 
performance is to protect the interests of fund investors given the presence of conflict of 
interests between FMC and fund investors with fund fees being FMC’s major income source 
which could harms FMC performance.  
Therefore, the second research question of this study is to examine how the totality of 
corporate governance quality affects FMC performance, and the relation between the specific 
governance mechanisms and FMC performance. The extant literature on U.S. mutual fund 
focuses on how board composition and characterises influence board effectiveness. This study 
also considers the impact on board effectiveness and FMC performance from shareholder 
profile and composition, but will also incorporates some unique characterises of supervisory 
board, and the role of compensation committee.  
Chapter 6 presents the data set, descriptive statistics of key governance variables and the 
methodology used in this thesis. Our sample comprises 288 firm-year observations covering 
58 FMC over 5 years from 2006 to 2010 (Table 20). Our sample FMC own more than 98% of 
all open-end funds (OEF) funds, managing more than 95% of AUM in fund industry (WIND 
database) and accounting for 58 of the 61 FMC in China.  
As some of the key explanatory variables (governance variables) are time-invariant in 
the analysis of the impact of governance variables on FMC board effectiveness and financial 
performance in Chapter 7 and 8, REM is generally accepted as more appropriate than Fixed 
Effects Model because REM allows for the inclusion of time-invariant variables. REM is 
therefore applied in chapter 7 and 8 in the main empirical tests. Following most previous 
relevant studies in the literature, Pooled-OLS is used as a robustness test in both Chapters. 
This study has 288 year firm observations, which may be considered as having a small sample 
size. Bootstrap method is therefore used as robustness test to examine whether results from 
REM are robust to those from Bootstrap methods in Chapter 7 and 8.  
Factors influencing firm performance are generally hard to capture and measure. Results 
will be biased if heterogeneity is ignored. In examining the relation between internal 
governance mechanisms and FMC performance in Chapter 8, Generalized Method of 
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Moments (GMM) is applied to eliminate unobservable heterogeneity (using panel data 
methodology) and to control for potential endogeneity (using instruments). 
Chapter 7 examines how certain governance mechanisms affect board effectiveness 
using FMC total expense ratio (TER) as proxy for board effectiveness. Our results show that a 
listed company as a controlling shareholder enhance board performance. Given that the 
controlling shareholders on average holds 47% of total shareholding in Chinese FMC over the 
period under investigation, controlling shareholders could influence FMC board effectiveness. 
FMC with a listed company as the controlling shareholder are found to exhibit higher 
governance standards than those FMC whose controlling shareholder is not listed, thus 
leading to better board effectiveness. 
However, increasing shareholding by state-owned financial institutions and the level of 
shareholding concentration in FMC are found to have no impact on board effectiveness. Most 
of the shareholders of FMC are state-owned financial institutions, or foreign financial 
institutions, and state-owned non-financial institutions. The result may suggest there is no 
impact from shareholding by state-owned enterprises financial institutions as FMC 
shareholders. But the presence of foreign shareholding in FMC is associated with higher FMC 
total expense ratio. That may be because of higher set up and running costs due to the 
adoption of foreign operational and remuneration standards in FMC with the presence of 
foreign shareholders compared to FMC with domestic company particularly state-owned 
enterprises as FMC shareholders.  
While there is wide range of board size from 4 to 13, and large variation from 33% to 
80% of board independence among FMC, we find that neither board size nor board 
independence are associated with FMC board effectiveness. This study provides strong 
evidence that a female as CEO or board chair improves board effectiveness significantly. This 
suggests a female as top officer could contribute their skills and different mindset from men to 
enhance board performance. However, FMC with gender diversity in the membership of the 
board does not enhance board performance. Most of female directors are appointed to be 
independent directors. This may suggest that if females serve on the board only for diversity 
purpose, they will have little to contribute to enhance board effectiveness.  
The results also show that FMC with the presence of remuneration committee 
significantly enhances board performance compared to those FMC without remuneration 
committee. Having a remuneration committee could better align the interests of board 
members and senior management to those of fund investors, and motivate and review senior 
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management performance systematically and regularly. The establishment of remuneration 
committee is particular important in Chinese FMC amidst the complex relations between 
FMC shareholders and fund investors. Better alignment of interests between senior officers in 
FMC and fund investors enhances board effectiveness. Increasing the size and number of the 
supervisory board is found to have higher total expense ratio, indicating the ineffectiveness of 
supervisory board.  
Chapter 8 use corporate governance index as the measure of quality of corporate 
governance to examine how corporate governance affects FMC performance, the result shows 
that corporate governance quality is important in enhancing FMC performance. 
In examining the relationship between governance variables and FMC performance in 
Chapter 8, we find that FMC with a listed company as controlling shareholder outperform 
those FMC whose controlling shareholder that are not listed. The results affirm the 
importance of controlling shareholders on FMC performance. It is also found that FMC with 
higher ownership concentration damages FMC performance.   
We document the presence of foreign shareholding in FMC affecting FMC performance 
positively across all the measures, and these positive relations are significant using risk-
adjusted performance (M2 and JENSENPF). We could argue that foreign shareholders pay 
more attention to risk adjusted performance rather than raw return (MPF). This result is 
consistent with Yoshikawa and Gedajlovic (2002) that show foreign ownership is positively 
associated with firm performance in conventional listed company. 
We find board size affects FMC performance negatively, indicating smaller board is 
more effective in enhancing FMC performance. This result is consistent with the findings 
from Adams, Mansi et al. (2010), Kong and Tang (2008) and Dann, Del Guercio et al. (2002) 
that board size is negatively related to fund performance. We may argue that larger boards are 
likely to have higher coordination costs, which reduces their ability to effectively monitor 
management.  
However, there is again no evidence of the importance of board independence on FMC 
performance which is consistent with the findings by Khorana, Servaes et al. (2007a). As 
discussed above, in the Chinese context, it is hard to ensure true independence and quality of 
the board. We find FMC with longer tenure of fund managers enhances FMC performance.   
In addition, as a form of robustness test, this study also uses FMC total expense ratio as 
a proxy of board effectiveness to examine the relation between the key governance 
183 
 
mechanism (board performance) and FMC performance, this thesis document that increasing 
the level of FMC total fees does significantly reduce FMC performance, affirming that a more 
effective board can on the whole produce better performance.  
Overall, this thesis provides evidence that even in the Chinese fund industry where there 
is an immature capital market, weak legal enforcement and poor external institutional 
conditions, the quality of corporate governance could make a difference by enhancing board 
effectiveness and FMC financial performance.  
As shown in Table 41, we find that FMC with a listed controlling shareholder 
significantly enhances board effectiveness and improves FMC performance compared with 
those FMC with non-listed controlling shareholder. It could be explained that when the 
controlling shareholder is a listed company, the higher governance standards expected of 
those controlling shareholders could have a significant positive impact on the effectiveness of 
FMC board and governance mechanisms, which increases FMC performance.  
 While the presence of foreign ownership in FMC increases FMC TER, it enhances 
FMC performance substantially especially when using risk-adjusted returns as proxies to 
measure performance. The introduction of foreign investment could significantly enhance 
FMC Performance, which affirms the benefits of the introduction of foreign investment in 
Chinese market especially during the period of global finance crisis. The concentrated 
ownership in FMC is found to have no impact on FMC board effectiveness but harms FMC 
performance. It could be argued that increasing the number of FMC shareholders from 
different financial background such as banks, insurance companies, and investment 
companies could lead to better access to more financial information, and/or they have more 
capacity to identify and appoint qualified fund managers to manage AUM so that could 
increase FMC performance.    
This paper documents that larger board size has no effect on board effectiveness but 
harms FMC performance, affirming the ineffectiveness of board size in China and higher 
coordination costs leading to the negative effect on FMC performance. The proportion of 
independent directors is found to have no impact on either board effectiveness or FMC 
performance. With its concentrated ownership and shortage of qualified independent directors 
in China, it is unlikely that independent directors will play an effective role in monitoring and 
control, resulting in ineffectual board independence in China’s circumstance. 
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Although the presence of female senior executive’s is found to enhance FMC board 
effectiveness, the impact of female senior executives on FMC performance is not found.  
We found increasing number of females on board have no impact on board 
effectiveness but actually damages FMC performance. It suggests that having more female 
members on the board just for the sake of “Guan Xi” or “Gender diversity” would not 
enhance board effectiveness but is likely to incur costs. In China, the appointing of female and 
male is probably subject to the same shortcomings and constraints of the existing governance 
processes so that superficial diversity makes little difference. This thesis shows that while the 
presence of remuneration committee could enhance board effectiveness; it has limited power 
to influence FMC performance. 
The results show that FMC with the presence of remuneration committee significantly 
enhances board performance than those FMC without setting up remuneration committee 
because the presence of Remuneration committee institute more rational incentive system to 
better align the interests of board members and senior management to those of fund investors, 
can help better align of interests between senior officers in FMC and fund investors enhance 
board effectiveness. However, the presence of remuneration committee plays no role in 
enhancing FMC performance. A possible explanation is that the quality and skills of fund 
managers plays a key role in FMC performance. The presence of remuneration committee 
plays negligible role in motivating Chinese fund managers in enhancing their performance 
because of the high turnover rate in Chinese fund managers.  
The number of supervisors does not enhance either FMC board effectiveness or FMC 
performance. This affirms the general expectation that supervisors are generally ineffective in 
performing their roles in China.   
The result also shows that there is no relation between the size of FMC’s asset under 
management (AUM) and FMC performance, suggesting that FMC’s scale of operation does 
not help to increase FMC performance. However, increasing FMC AUM enriches FMC 
because of the fees FMC could charge, thus affirming the arguments of misalignment of 
interests between FMC and fund investors.  
It also shows that older FMC have better FMC performance. It could be explained that 
older FMC may be more experienced in investments and have more extensive networks in 
obtaining useful information to enhance FMC performance.   
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Table 41: Governance variables’ impact on TER and Performance 
VARIABLES Measures for Board effectiveness Measures of PERFORMNACE 
   LOG (TOTALTER) AWTER MPF OAPF M2PF JENSENPF 
TSTATESH + - + - + - 
LISTEDCONTROL + ** + ** + * + *** + * + ** 
FOREIGNSH - ** - + + + ** + * 
HHI + + - *** - * - * - ** 
BODSIZE       - - + - * - - 
ID + + - - - - 
FEMSENOIRBOD + * + + + + + 
FEMALEBOD - - - - * - - ** 
REMUNERATION + * + - - - - 
SUPERVIORNO + + - - - - ** 
 
 
9.3 Contributions  
The thesis contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: First, it presents as a 
systematic study with quite comprehensive empirical evidence on the quality of corporate 
governance and its impacts under the contractual form of FMC, providing new perspectives 
and findings in an area of research much neglected in the literature.  
Second, this research represents a step forward from the extant studies focusing on how 
board characteristics and composition by investigating a wider range of governance 
mechanisms that affect board effectiveness which, to the best of our knowledge, no other 
study has attempted. For instance, this thesis introduces governance mechanisms such as 
shareholder profile and shareholding structure, the role of the supervisory board, and presence 
of remuneration committee. In China’s highly (although not necessarily effective) regulated 
contractual organisational form of FMC, the misalignment of the interests between FMC 
shareholders and fund investors also unwittingly makes the role of shareholder important and 
unique as they could influence board  appointment and tenure, and compensation (Article 45, 
‘Corporate Governance Code for FMC’), therefore ultimately influencing board effectiveness. 
The presence of remuneration committee in fund industry has not been examined previously, 
in contrast to the recent extensive media reports in the West about excessive pay for senior 
executives in firms. In an emerging economy like China, there is as yet no regulation 
mandating FMC to establish a remuneration committee.   
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        Third, applying corporate governance scores to proxy for corporate governance quality, 
this study is a first study to investigate the link between the governance quality indicator 
(rating) and FMC performance. Fourth, a set of unique but important governance variables is 
introduced in this study to which the literature has given relatively little attention. For 
instance, we test the impact of the presence of female directors and top executives or board 
chair on board effectiveness. In fact, influence from female as top executive or board chair in 
general has not been studied at all in China even in the context of non-FMC corporate boards.  
Fifth, we use 5-year panel data while most of the existing studies usually on U.S. fund 
industry only use one-year data. The advantage of using panel data is the ability to control for 
individual-specific, time-invariant, unobserved heterogeneity, the presence of which could 
lead to bias in standard estimators like OLS. Most of extant studies use either OLS (Ferris & 
Yan 2007; Kong & Tang 2008) or pooled OLS (Adams et al. 2010; Ding & Wermers 2009; 
Meschke 2007).  We use both random effect model and GMM in panel data to produce better 
estimation. Finally, our data cover nearly all FMC that together account for more than 95% of 
AUM of the fund industry in China. Selection bias is therefore minimised. 
In brief, this study bridges a gap in the literature by examining how governance 
mechanisms matter in the development of an effective and well-functioning board in FMC 
and in the enhancement of FMC financial performance. Fund management companies as the 
major institutional investors could play a major role in the development of capital market and 
governance of investee companies. With the weak legal environment for investor protection 
and a short history of the Chinese fund industry, both fund investors and regulatory 
authorities would like to see enhanced fund performance to protect the interests of investors 
and sustain the healthy development of fund industry. This study sheds light on several areas 
of governance issues in the Chinese fund industry, and the findings of this study show how 
practices and quality of governance could enhance board effectiveness and improve FMC 
performance.    
 
9.4 Limitations and directions for future research  
While more than 95% of AUM in Chinese fund industry were included, our sample size on 
FMC is small (288 firm-year observations in 2006-2010) because of the relatively small size 
of fund industry in China, although the sample still provide reasonable level of evidence and 
the findings of this study are found to be robust.  
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Second, findings from this thesis may not be generalised to anther countries, as the legal 
environment and institutional setup all affect corporate governance practices and outcomes. 
Finally, we only investigate China’s fund industry; further research focusing on comparative 
analysis of FMC in other countries will uncover both common and specific traits and 
characteristics of corporate governance practices and challenges across economic systems and 
social conditions for more insights on the advancement of the interest of fund investors.  
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Appendix A. Variables Definitions and Measurement  
Abbreviations  Definition & Measurement 
Performance measures  
A fund i’s return 
11 /)(  tttjit AUMAUMAUMR  
j
itR 	refers to the return for fund i in FMC j, where return is 
calculated by AUM at the end of the year minus AUM at the 
beginning of the year, then divided AUM at the beginning of 
the year.		
 
Continuous monthly FMC return  
(MPF)  
 
FMC performance(MPF) = asset weighted individual fund return 
where return is calculated by continuous monthly returns    
M2PF 
ftmtftit
it
mt
it RRRRPFM  )(2 

Where  mt  is standard 
deviation of market index, “Shanghai composite index” is adopted;  
it  is fund i’s standard deviation, ftit RR   is fund’s average excess 
return, ft
R
 use “China 7 Day Repo Rates”. FMC M2PF is asset-
weighted fund’s M2PF within a FMC.   
 
Objective-adjusted risk free FMC 
return (OAPF)  
FMC style-adjust performance (SAPF) =  ∑ (fund AUM/ FMC AUM) 
* (Fund return - the investment objective’s average return) /  the 
cross-sectional standard deviation of a fund’s return within an 
investment objectives. 
Jensen Performance  ( JENSENPF)  )([ ftmtiftitit RRRR   Where itR  is fund i’s return for 
time period t;  ftR  is return for risk-free assets during time period t, 
ftR  use “China 7 Day Repo Rates”; i  is beta coefficient for fund I; 
and mtR  is market return during the same time period. FMC 
JENSENPF is asset-weighted fund’s JENSENPF within a FMC.   
Governance Variables  
  
Total state-owned  financial 
shareholding   (SHSTATEFIN) 
Total shareholding of state-owned financial shareholders.  
A listed company as controlling 
shareholder dummy     (CSHLISTED)     
Controlling shareholder equals to 1 if the controlling shareholder is a 
listed company, otherwise 0.  
Foreign ownership dummy 
( SHFOREIGN)  
Foreign ownership equals to 1 if there is the presence of foreign
ownership, otherwise 0.  
Ownership concentration ( HHI)  Herfindahl index will be used to calculate:   
 


N
t
iSHHI
1
2  , where S stands for the percentage of each 
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shareholders’ shareholding within a FMC.                                                
Board Size  (BS)  Number of directors in a board.  
Independent Directors (ID)  The percentage of outside directors. 
Female member on board  
(BOARDFEMALE) 
Number of females on board. 
Female senior dummy  
(SENOIRFEMALE) 
Female as CEO or board chair. 
Remuneration committee dummy  
(REMUNERCOMM) 
Remuneration committee equals to 1 if there is the presence of 
remuneration committee, otherwise 0.  
Number of members on supervisory 
board  (NOSUPERVISOR)  
Number of members on supervisory board.   
Control variables  
  
FMC Size   (FMCSIZE) Total net assets under management by all funds within a FMC. 
FMC Age   (FMCAGE)  FMC age is calculated, if months are greater than 6 months in a year, 
and then it is 1 year older.   
FMC turnover ratio  
(TURNOVERRATE)  
Asset-weighted turnover rate of each fund within a FMC.  Turnover 
rate of each fund is calculated by dividing the average asset of a fund 
in a year by the lesser of the value of purchases and the value of sales 
during the same period.  
FMC lag performance  ( LPF)                  Previous year's FMC performance.  
Total expense ratio  (TOTALTER) FMC TER = FMC fees and expenses / FMC asset under 
management(AUM)   
Asset-weighted expense ratio   
(AWTER)  
Asset- weighted FMC TER (AWTER) =  ∑ fund expense ratio * 
(fund AUM/ FMC AUM)  
 
 
 
